tully's three books of offices

author

cicero, marcus tullius.

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the first book.

chapter 1.

cicero *exhorts his son, a young student at* athens, *not to forget his* latin, *tho' he was in a* greek *university: but to mix the studies of both those languages, and also learn to write both as a philosopher and an orator. to this purpose he advises him to read his works, as having equally written in each of those kinds, which none of the* grecians *had ever done. but he modestly adds, that he thinks they could have done it, but that they applied themselves wholly to one of them.*

dear son marcus,

though' after a year's study under *cratippus,* and that at such a place as *athens,* you can't but have abundantly furnished yourself with knowledge in the doctrines and rules of philosophy; having had the advantage of so eminent a master to supply you with learning, and a city that affords you such excellent examples: yet i should think it convenient for you “which is a method i took for my own profit” always to mingle some latin with your greek, in the study of eloquence as well as philosophy; that you may be equally perfect in both those ways of writing, and make your self-master of either language. for the furtherance of which, i am apt to imagine, i have done no inconsiderable service to our country-men; so that not only those who don't understand greek, but even the learned themselves will confess, that, by reading my works, they have mended their stiles, and somewhat improved their reason and judgments. wherefore i am willing, 'tis true, you should learn of your present master, the greatest philosopher of this age, and *learn* of him too as long as you desire it; and so long i think 'tis your duty to *desire* it, as you find yourself sufficiently benefited by it: but withal, i would have you to read my writings, which very little differ from those of the peripateticks; for both we and they profess ourselves followers, not of *socrates* only, but of *plato* likewise. as for the matters contained in them, use your own judgment with freedom and impartiality, for i lay no manner of restraint upon you: your improvement in the *latin* is what i chiefly desire, which i am confident must follow from a careful perusal of them. nor let anyone think that i am vain or pretending when i speak thus: for, allowing some others the precedence in philosophy, should i assume to myself what's the part of an orator, *viz.* to speak suitably, methodically and handsomely upon any subject, seeing i have spent my whole life in that study, i think 'tis no more than what i might reasonably and fairly lay claim to. i can't but very earnestly desire you therefore, my dear *cicero,* to read my books with care and diligence; not my *orations* only, but these pieces also that concern *philosophy,* which are now of a bulk almost equal to them: for tho' in the former there is more of the force and power of eloquence, yet is the smooth and even stile of the latter by no means to be neglected. and of all the *grecians* i find not one, that has employed his pen in both these kinds; and been at once successful in the language of the bar, and this other more gentle and easy stile of philosophical discourses: unless *demetrius phalereus* may be reckoned for one, who is subtle enough in his disputes of philosophy, but methinks in his oratory, wants that spirit and vehemence that is requisite; however, has so much of sweetness in him, that one might know he had been *theophrastus*'s scholar. whether i have had any better success in both these ways, must be left to the judgment of others to determine: i can only say that i have attempted them both. and 'tis my opinion, that if ever *plato* had undertaken to plead, heed have been a most copious and powerful orator; and if *demosthenes* had studied and discoursed of those things, which he learnt of *plato,* heed have done it with a great deal of ornament and majesty. the same i think true of *isocrates* and *aristotle;* each of which, pleased with his own way of writing, neglected to cultivate and improve the other.

chapter 2.

the reasons why he writes upon this subject. the general use and importance of it. all philosophers have handled it; tho' some, by their false notions of happiness and misery, utterly pervert it. what sects they are, that have a right to lay down any rules or precepts concerning it. he designs in this work to follow the stoicks principally. the subject of a discourse ought first to be defined, before we begin to say anything upon it.

but having resolved to write something at present, and a great many others hereafter to you, i thought i could begin upon no better argument, than that which is fittest for your age, and most becoming my authority as a father: for, of all those useful and important subjects, which philosophers have handled so largely and accurately, the precepts they have delivered about *offices* or *duties,* seem of the largest extent and comprehension: for they take in every part of our lives, so that whatever we go about, whether of public or private affairs, whether at home or abroad, whether considered barely by ourselves, or as we stand in relation to other people, we lye constantly under an *obligation* to some duties; and, as all the virtue and credit of our lives proceeds from the due discharge of *this,* so all the baseness and turpitude of them results from the non-observance of *it.* now, tho' this be a subject which all philosophers have busied themselves about, “for, whoever dared to assume that name without laying down some instructions about duty?” yet have some sects of them given such accounts of man's happiness and misery, as destroy the very being of virtue and honesty. for he that makes anything his chiefest good, wherein justice or virtue does not bear a part, and sets up profit, not honesty for the measure of his happiness; as long as he acts in conformity with his own principles, and is not overruled by meer dictates of reason and humanity, can never do the offices of friendship, justice or liberality. nor can he be ever a man of courage, who thinks that pain is the greatest evil; or he of temperance, who imagines pleasure to be the sovereign good. which things are all so obvious and plain, that one would think they could never stand in need of a dispute: however, i have largely discoursed upon them in another work. these sects therefore, unless they are resolved to be inconsistent with themselves, ought wholly to abstain from speaking anything about duties: nor indeed can any constant, unalterable, rational rules of them at all be given, unless it be by those who go upon this principle, *that 'tis virtue alone,* or at least that *chiefly, which ought to be desired for its own sake.* so that only the stoicks, academics and peripateticks, have a right to lay down any rules upon this subject: for as to the opinion of *aristo, pyrrho* and *herillus,* that has been exploded a good while ago; who might have claimed a privilege to treat about duties, *as well as the former three,* had they but left a possibility of choosing, and allowed at least so much difference between things, as to put us into a capacity of finding out our duty, and distinguishing it from that, which is not so. i shall follow therefore at this time, and on this subject more especially the stoicks; not as a bare translator of them, but “according to my usual custom” shall take out of their stores so much, and after such a manner, as in my own judgment i shall think most convenient. seeing then the whole of our following discourse is designed to be about *offices* or *duties,* i think 'twill be necessary for me in the first place, to determine and fix the signification of the word *office,* which i can't but admire to find omitted by *panaetius:* for every clear and rational discourse upon any subject, ought first to begin with an explication of that subject, that so we may have a distinct conception of what we are afterwards to discourse about.

chapter 3.

the whole subject of duties consists of two parts. ordinary and perfect duties, and what they are. panaetius *made but three general heads of deliberation, to which* cicero *adds two more. the general method he designs to take in the whole work.*

the whole subject of duties then, in its greatest latitude, comprehends under it these two parts: the first is taken up in explaining what is *good,* and what our *greatest good.* the second in certain directions and precepts, according to which, upon all occasions, 'tis our duty to govern our lives and actions. to the first part belong such questions as these, *whether all duties are perfect, or not?* and, *whether one can be greater or less than another?* with several others to the same purpose. not but that the duties of this second part, the rules and precepts of which are laid down, have some tendency and relation to our chiefest good; but only it does not so plainly appear, because they seem to concern more immediately the government of our lives, and regulation of our manners: and these are they i design to explain in the following treatise. there is also another distribution of duties, some of them being called *middle* or ordinary, and others *perfect* or compleat. to the latter, i think, we may give the name of *right* or *strait,* which sort by the *greeks* is called 〈 non-latin 〉; as the former *ordinary one* 〈 non-latin 〉. by that which we have called *right* or *strait,* as they explain it, is meant a virtue, *that is wholly compleat in all its parts, without any manner of flaw or imperfection;* and by that, which we have called *ordinary,* such a one, as, *a fair and reasonable account may be given for the doing of it.* now these *fair and reasonable accounts* are all to be drawn from several heads, which are by *panaetius* reduced to three, and may be called general heads of deliberating or doubting concerning any action, whether it should, or should not be done. the first is when 'tis consulted or doubted, whether the action, that's under consideration, be honest or dishonest; in which enquiry men are often divided between several opinions. the second is, when 'tis enquired and consulted, whether the action, that's under deliberation, will supply us with the pleasures and conveniencies of life, furnish us with plenty of outward things, such as riches, honors, power, *&c.* which may put us into a capacity of doing good to ourselves, and to all those for whom we are more nearly concerned; all which enquiry comes under the general head of *profit.* the third ground or reason of doubting is, when that thing, which seems to be profitable for us, comes into competition with that which is honest: for then our interest drawing us one way, and honesty pulling us back another, the wavering mind is, as 'twere, toru in sunder between the two, and is racked with doubting and anxious thoughts. there's no greater fault in any division, than not to take in all the several parts of the matter to be divided; and yet two are omitted in the now mentioned one of *panaetius.* for men not only consult and deliberate, whether such an action be honest or dishonest; but also, of two honests, that are both proposed to them, which is the most so; and, in like manner, of two profitables, which is the most profitable. from whence it appears, that what he thought was contained in three, ought rather to be divided into five heads. we must then, in the first place, discourse about *honesty,* and this we shall do under these two enquiries; *whether the thing proposed be honest or dishonest?* and, *of two that are honest, which is the most so?* which will make up the subject of our first book. we shall treat in our second of *profit* or *interest* under the same heads. and lastly, in our third, we shall endeavour to shew, *when a seeming advantage and honesty come into competition, how a good man should determine his judgment.*

chapter 4.

the excellence of the nature of man, above that of brutes. how the several virtues, prudence, justice, *&c. are agreeable to its dictates, and result from them. wherein* honestum *in general consists.*

the first thing then to be taken notice of is this, that every creature doth by nature endeavour to preserve its own self, its life and body; and to shun and avoid those things which appear prejudicial and hurtful to it; but to seek and procure whatever is necessary for the support of its being, and advancement of its happiness, such as food, shelter, and the like. there is likewise common to all sorts of animals, a desire of copulation, for the continuance and propagation of their several species; together with a love and concern for their young ones. now there's this special difference between men and brutes; that the *latter* are governed by nothing but their senses, never look any farther than just to what strikes and affects them at present, and have a very little, if any concern for what is past or to come: but the *former* are creatures endowed with reason, which gives them a power to carry their thoughts to the consequences of things; to discover causes before they have yet produced their effects; to see the whole progress, and even the first seeds, “as it were” and appearances of them; to compare like occurrences with like; and by joining what is past, and what is to come together, to make a just estimate of the one from the other; whereby they are able at once to take a view of their whole lives, and accordingly make provision for the necessities of them. and the same force of reason makes all men by nature to love one another, and desire an entercourse of words and actions. it begets in them likewise a somewhat extraordinary love and affection for their own children, and strongly inclines them to frequent publick meetings, and keep up societies one amongst another. for the same reason also they are very industrious, to provide for the necessaries and conveniencies of life; and that not only for themselves in particular, but for their wives, their children, and others, whom they have a kindness for, and are obliged to take care of; which concern is very proper to rouse up the spirits, and make them more vigorous and active in business. but of all the properties and inclinations of men, there is none more natural and peculiar to them, than an earnest desire and search after truth. hence 'tis our minds are no sooner free, from the thoughts and engagements of necessary business, but we presently long to be either seeing, or hearing, or learning of something; and esteem the knowledge of things secret and wonderful, as a necessary ingredient of a happy life. from whence it appears, that nothing is more agreeable and suited to the nature and minds of men, than undisguised openness, truth and sincerity. next to this love and affection for truth, there follows in the soul an impatient desire and inclination to rule; so that whoever has the genuine nature of a man in him, will never endure to be subject to another, unless he be one that instructs, or advises, or is invested with a just and lawful authority, for the benefit of the publick. from whence there arises a greatness of soul, which sets it above all the petty concerns, and trifling enjoyments of this present world. 'tis another, and that too no mean prerogative of our reasonable nature, that man alone can discern all the beauties of order and decency, and knows how to govern his words and actions in conformity to them. 'tis he alone, that of all the creatures, observes and is pleased with the beauty, gracefulness and symmetry of parts in the *objects of sense;* which nature and reason observing in them, from thence take occasion to apply the same also to *those of the mind;* and conclude that beauty, consistency, and regularity, should be much more kept up in our words and actions; and therefore command us, that nothing be done that is effeminate or unbecoming; and, that so strict a guard be kept over every thought and action, as that no lust or filthiness be either conceived or practised by us. from these inclinations and instincts of nature, arises and results that *honestum* we're seeking for; which however little valued and esteemed it may be, is nevertheless virtuous and amiable in itself; and which we may justly say, tho' 'twere commended by no one, is yet in its own nature truly commendable.

chapter 5.

the admirable beauty of honesty. *four general heads of* it, *from which all the several duties arise; and what the object of each of them is, about which 'tis employed.*

thus, son *marcus,* have i given you a rough draught, and just the outlines, as it were, of *honesty;* which could she be seen in her full beauty with mortal eye, would make the whole world “as *plato* has said” be in love with wisdom. now whatever's contained under the notion of honesty, arises from one of these four heads; *first,* a sagacious enquiry and observation for the finding out of truth; *which may be called by the general name of prudence. secondly,* a care to maintain that society and mutual entercourse, which is between men; to render to every man what is his due; and to stand to one's words in all promises and bargains; *which we call justice. thirdly,* the greatness and unshaken resolution of a truely brave and invincible mind; *which goes by the name of magnanimity or fortitude.* and, *lastly,* a keeping of our words and actions within the due limits of order and decency; under which are comprehended *temperance* and *moderation.* now every one of these several heads, tho' they all have a mutual connexion and dependence on one another, has yet its particular *classis* “as it were” and respective set of duties arising from it. from that, for example, which is mentioned first, and under which *prudence* and *wisdom* are contained, arises the duty of seeking, contemplating and finding out of truth, which is the proper and peculiar business of those virtues: for 'tis then, and then alone, that we justly esteem a man prudent and wise, when we find that he's able to see and discover the truth of things; and of an active, vigorous and piercing mind, to give an account of the reasons of them; so that 'tis *truth* that is the proper object of both these virtues, and that about which they are only concerned. the other three heads more peculiarly belong to the *active life,* and their business lies in procuring and maintaining what is useful and necessary for the preservation of it; as in keeping up mutual love and correspondence among mankind; in an elevated greatness and strength of mind; which appears, as in getting things profitable and pleasant for ourselves and dependants; so more especially in despising and being above them. then as for the last, *viz.* order, uniformity, moderation and the like, 'tis plain they belong not only to contemplation, but have also a respect to our outward actions; since from keeping of *these* within the bounds and limits of order and moderation, we are said to observe what is virtuous and becoming.

chapter 6.

prudence or contemplation of truth, the first of the general virtues, is the nearest allied to the nature of man. two cautions concerning it. it ought to give place to the duties of the active life. what it ought especially to be employed about.

having thus explained how the whole nature, and power of honesty, is deduced from some one of these four parts, we are now to discourse of them each in particular. and, first, of *prudence,* which is wholly taken up in the knowledge of truth, and has the nearest affinity of any with the reasonable nature of man. for how are we all of us drawn and enticed with the desire of wisdom? how noble and glorious a thing do we imagine it to excel in knowledge? and how mean and reproachful do we count it on the other hand, to slip, to be in an error, to be ignorant, or to be imposed upon? in gratifying this so natural and virtuous inclination in the mind of man, there are two grand faults to be carefully avoided: the *first* is an over-great hastiness and rashness in giving up our assent, presuming that we know things before we really do so. whoever desires “as i am sure all ought” to avoid this error, must in all his enquiries allow himself time, and diligently consider the matter with himself, before he proceeds to pass his judgment upon it. the *second* fault is, that a great many men bestow abundance of study, and a world of pains, upon very difficult and obscure subjects; and such as perhaps, when they are found out, are of but very little, or no concernment. would men but be careful to shun these two mistakes, whatsoever study or pains they might spend upon virtuous, worthy, or profitable subjects, 'twould not without reason be highly commended. thus *caius sulpicius* was heretofore praised for his skill in astronomy: *sext. pompeius,* since my memory, for his in geometry: many have been famous in the study of logic, and more in that of the civil laws: the more peculiar business, of all which parts of learning, is the finding out of truth. no man however should be so taken up in the search of truth, as thereby to neglect the more necessary duties of the active life: for, after all is done, 'tis action only that gives a true value and commendation to virtue. not that we are able to be always a doing without intermission, but often retire from business to study; beside that the mind, which is in perpetual motion and agitation, of itself will supply us with study and thinking, whether we set ourselves to it, or not. in a word, the general aim and design of our thought, and application of mind, is either the attainment of such things as are honest, and tend to a virtuous and happy way of life; or else the improvement of our reason and understanding in wisdom and knowledge. and this may suffice for the first of our general heads of duty.

chapter 7.

the second general virtue, which consists in maintaining of human society. two parts of it, justice *and* liberality. *the first duty of justice. all things at first common. the original of property. men are born for the good,* &c. *of one another: whence arises the second duty of justice. two sorts of injustice, the one of* commission; *the other of* omission. *the causes of the first sort of injustice; first,* fear: *secondly,* desire.

of the other remaining three, that which consists in upholding society, and keeping up mutual love and good nature amongst mankind, seems of the largest and most diffusive extent. it comprehends under it these two parts: first, *justice,* which is much the most glorious and splendid of all virtues, and alone entitles us to the name and appellation of *good* men. and, secondly, *beneficence,* which may also be called either bounty or liberality. now the first thing that justice requires of us is this, *that no one should do any hurt to another, unless he be necessarily driven upon it for his own security: and whatever belongs either to all in common, or to particular persons as their own propriety, should not be altered, but made use of accordingly.* now no man can say that he has anything *his own* by a right of nature; but either by an ancient immemorial seizure, as those who first planted uninhabited countries: or, secondly, by conquest, as those who have got things by the right of the sword; or else by some law, compact, agreement, or lot. 'tis by some of these means, that the people inhabiting *arpinum* and *tusculum* came to have those lands, which are now called theirs; and the same may be said as to private men's estates. however, since at present, *by some of these ways,* each particular man has his personal possessions, out of that which by nature was common to all, 'tis but reason that each should hold what is now his own; which if anyone endeavour to take away from him, he directly breaks in upon common justice, and violates the rights of human society. *but seeing* "as is excellently said by *plato" we are not born for ourselves alone; but that our native country, our friends and relations, have a just claim and title to some part of us;* and seeing whatsoever is created on earth, was merely designed "as the stoicks will have it" for the service of men; and men themselves for the service, good and assistance of one another: we certainly in this should be followers of nature, and second her intentions; and by producing all that lies within the reach of our power for the general interest, by mutually giving and receiving good turns, by our knowledge, industry, riches, or other means, should endeavour to keep up that love and society, that should be amongst men. now the great foundation of justice is *faithfulness,* which consists in being constantly firm to your word, and a conscientious performance of all compacts and bargains; whereupon for this once, let us venture to follow the opinion of the stoicks, those mighty admirers of derivations, and believe that *fides* [faithfulness] is so called, "tho' perhaps it may seem a little too farfetched" *quia fiat quod dictum est,* because what was promised is performed. the vice that is opposite to justice is injustice, of which there are two sorts; the *first* consists in the actual doing an injury to another; the *second* in tamely looking on while he is injured, and not helping and defending him, tho' we are able. for he that injuriously falls upon another, whether prompted by rage or other violent passion, does as 'twere leap at the throat of his companion; and he that refuses to help him when injured, and to ward off the wrong, if it lies in his power, is as plainly guilty of baseness and injustice, as tho' he had deserted his father, his friends, or his native country. now that former injustice, which consists in the *wilful and actual wronging another,* has oftentimes no other cause but *fear;* when he, who designedly does a man an injury, is afraid least himself should be forced to undergo one, if he does not secure himself by doing it before-hand. but generally speaking, the great source and fountain of all such injustice is the satisfying some irregular and exorbitant appetite; and in a more especial manner, the desire of riches: *of which we shall therefore say something in particular.*

chapter 8

the desire of riches, which is one cause of injustice, whence it proceeds. 'tis allowable enough so long as it does not draw men to the injuring of others. the desire of honours, &c. *another cause of injustice. it usually is found in men of the greatest minds. there's a difference to be made between those injuries, that are done hastily and in a passion, and those that proceed from premeditated malice.*

riches then are most commonly desired, either to supply us with the necessaries of life, or furnish us with the pleasures and conveniences of it or else, as it often is observed to happen in persons of great and aspiring minds, as a means of obtaining *an interest* in the publick, and a *power* of obliging and gratifying one's friends: to which purpose was that saying of the late *marcus crassus,* that whoever designed to be a leading man in the commonwealth, ought never to think he had estate enough, till he could maintain an army with its yearly revenue. others take pleasure in splendor and magnificence; in a handsome, noble and plentiful way of living; all which things have begot an insatiable greediness after money, without which they can never be supported and maintained. not but that a moderate desire of riches, and bettering a man's estate, so long as it abstains from oppressing of others, is allowable enough; but a very great care ought always to be taken, that we be not drawn to any injustice by it. there's another *desire* that makes men as apt to be forgetful of justice, as that after ricfies; the thirst, i mean, of empire, glory, honours, *&c.* for that saying of *ennius, there's no inviolable faith or friendship in the matter of a kingdom,* tho' applied by him to that one case only, is yet full out as true in a great many others; for where-ever the subject of contention is such, as that only one party can meet with success, and the rest must fall short of what they desire; things are usually carried to so great a height, as that 'tis very difficult not to break in upon faith and friendship. this hath appeared but too manifestly of late, in that rash and most impudent attempt of *caesar*'s; who has broke through' all those ties and obligations, that either by gods or men could be laid upon him; for the compassing and getting of that empire to himself, which he vainly proposed in his depraved imagination. but in this case, 'tis one very great unhappiness, that the thirst after honour, empire, power *&c.* falls most upon men of the greatest souls, and most exalted natures; wherefore the greater care ought to be taken, that nothing of offence be committed in this kind. now it makes a great difference in all acts of injustice, whether they proceed from some violent passion, "which is for the most part of short continuance" or are done with design and previous deliberation: for those that are the effects of a sudden gust of passion, ought not to be esteemed of so heinous a nature, as those that proceed from premeditated malice. and this may suffice for the first sort of injustice, which consists in *the actual doing of wrong;* and the causes of it.

chapter 9.

injustice of omission, and the caused of it those: are guilty of it, who spend their whole lives in study and contemplation; as some philosophers have done. justice ought to proceed from choice. those who mind nothing but their own business are guilty of this injustice. self-love hinders men from seeing their duty. an excellent rule for the avoiding of all injustice.

as for the second, which only consists *in seeing another injured, and being wanting to our duty, by not defending him;* the causes of *that* are wont to be several. for some are afraid of offending others, or of bringing a trouble and charge upon themselves: others are negligent, idle, or mean-spirited: and a third sort there is, who are so taken up with their own concerns, that they have no time left to regard the oppressed, whom yet 'tis their duty to save and protect. i am therefore of opinion, that *plato*'s consequence will hardly hold good, where speaking about the philosophers, he says,

they are wholly taken up in the seeking out of truth, and perfectly neglect and make light of those things, which the rest of the world are so eager after, and so contend about; and that *therefore* they are just.

this, i say, *i am afraid is a bad consequence;* for tho', 'tis true, they keep the first sort of justice, inasmuch as they *actually do* no wrong; yet they run perfectly counter to the other: for being engaged in their learning and studies, they abandon their friends to be injured by others, whom in justice they ought to have protected and defended. so that 'tis believed, they'd hardly ever trouble themselves so far, as at all to inter-meddle with the business of the publick, if it was not altogether, as it were, forced upon them. but 'twere a great deal better would they do it voluntarily; for an action, tho' honest, is not therefore truly virtuous, unless it be done out of choice, and with a good-will. there are others yet, who out of a desire of improving their own estates, or else a morose and unsociable sort of temper, cry, *they meddle with nobody's business but their own,* that so they may seem to be men of strict honesty, and to injure nobody: and they do indeed avoid the one sort of injustice, but directly run themselves into the other; for they desert the common good and society of mankind, while they bestow neither study, pains, nor money toward the preservation of it. thus have i laid down the two sorts of injustice, and pointed out to you the causes of each; and have also endeavoured to explain the true nature and extent of justice; from all which account 'twill be easy to judge, unless we are extremely fond of our own ease, what those several duties are, which at *several* times are required of us. i say, *unless we are fond of our own ease;* for the truth on't is, 'tis a troublesome thing to be concerned in the business of other people; however old *chremes* in *terence* thinks, *that he ought to be concerned for the good of all men.* but be that as it will, forasmuch as the success of our own affairs, whether good or ill, more nearly concerns us, and makes us more sensible, than that of another's; "which appears to us small, as a thing at a great distance" therefore we pass a quite different judgment upon the one and the other. and, upon this account, 'tis a very good rule that is given by some men, *that we should never venture upon any action, of which we doubt whether 'tis honest or dishonest.* for honesty quickly would shew itself by its own native brightness; and the doubting about it is a plain intimation, that at least we suspected some injustice when we did it.

chapter 10.

justice is altered upon an alteration of circumstances; and what was our duty in one case to do, in other circumstances 'tis our duty to avoid. promises are not to be stood to in several cases, as, if they are prejudicial: if made through' fear, &c. a close adhering to the words of a law, or bargain, is a means of being unjust; craft in such cases to be diligently avoided.

but here 'tis observable that the limits of justice are not so fixed, but that they may be altered upon an alteration of the circumstances; so that what at one time appears to be the duty of an honest and good man, at another is altered and becomes the quite contrary: to deliver up a trust, for example, or perform a promise, and other things relating to truth and faithfulness, are duties which justice itself will allow us, in several cases, to neglect or omit: for respect must be had to those general rules we before laid down, as the ground and foundation of all justice, *first,* that no injury be done to any other. and, *secondly,* that we make it our earnest endeavour to promote the good and interest of all mankind: so that our duty is not always the same, but various according to the variety of circumstances. there may be a contract or promise, for instance, the performance of which would bring very great damage, either to the person himself that made it, or the other party whom it was made to. thus, had *naptune* not granted what he promised to *theseus, theseus* had not suffered the loss of his son *hippolytus.* for "as the story goes" *neptune* having granted him any three wishes, for the third, he once in a very great passion, desired the death of his own son; by obtaining of which, he was afterwards brought into the greatest afflictions. such promises therefore are not to be kept, as will but bring a mischief on him they were made to; no more are those, which tend to the damage of the promiser himself, more than to the profit of him they were promised to. again, even justice itself requires us to perform a greater before a lesser duty: you promise, for example, a friend of yours, to assist him in a cause that he has depending, but your son grows dangerously sick in the meantime; here 'twould be no breach of duty in you, if you should not make good what you promised to your friend; and he himself rather would be much to blame, should he complain of being disappointed by you. further, 'tis plain to anyone's sence, that such sort of promises can never be binding, as are made by people over-awed by fear, or overreached by deceit; most of which are void by the praetor's edicts, and some of them even by the laws themselves. but another great spring from which injuries arise, is some quirk or cavil, and an over-subtle and malicious interpretation of the laws; from whence that saying, *summum jus summa injuria, the height of justice is the height of roguery,* is now become a daily and common proverb among us. there are frequent examples of this to be met with in our publick transactions; as that of him, for example, who concluding a truce with the enemy for thirty days, made continual incursions into their territory by night; because, forsooth, the truce was not made for so many nights, but only so many days. just such a crafty and pitiful trick "if the story be true" was that notable cunning of *quintus fabius labeo*'s; "or whoever the man was, for i have it only by hear-say" who being by the senate appointed arbitrator, in a difference between those of *nola* and *naples* about their bounds; when he came to the place that was appointed for the treaty, took aside the commissioners of either party, and exhorted them privately, not to be too eager and greedy in their demands, but rather to take up and content themselves with less, than pretend to any more than what was honestly their due. both parties did so according to his desire, so that a good quantity of ground was left between them; this he e'en goes and adjudges to the *romans,* leaving that to each party, which they themselves had demanded. and is not this now to deceive and cheat, rather than to judge? in all cases therefore such subtle kind of tricks should be diligently avoided.

chapter 11.

justice to be kept towards all sorts of men. bounds to be observed in punishing those that have injured us. laws of war to be strictly observed. two sorts of disputing, by reason *and* by the sword: *the latter is allowable, when we can't obtain what's our right by the former. what ought to be the end of making war. how it should be carried on. the strictness of the old* romans *in observing the laws of war. a story of the elder* cato *to that purpose.*

there are certain duties or offices also, to be strictly observed, even towards those that have injured us; for we ought not to go beyond such and such bounds, in exacting revenge and punishment of another: in which particular it may perhaps be enough, to make him that has wronged us repent of the wrong done; so that he himself may abstain from the like, and others take warning from his example, for the future. there are certain peculiar laws of war also, which are of all things most strictly to be observed in the commonwealth: for there being two sorts of disputing in the world, the one by reason, and the other by open force; and the former of these being that which is agreeable to the nature of man, and the latter to that of brutes; when we can't obtain what is our right by the one, we must even of necessity have recourse to the other. 'tis allowable therefore to undertake wars, but it must always be with design of obtaining a secure peace. and when we have gotten the better of our enemies, we should rest content with the victory alone, and shew ourselves merciful and kind to them afterwards; unless they are such as have been very cruel, and committed inhuman barbarities in the war. thus our forefathers took into their city the *aequians, volscians, sabines,* and others, whom they had subdued; whereas *carthage* and *numantia* they entirely destroyed. i could wish i might not add *corinth* too; but i believe they had something in their eye when they did it, and that more especially the situation of the place; which being so very convenient as it was, they were afraid least it might be, at one time or other, an encouragement to a revolt. in my opinion 'tis always our duty, to do what we can for a fair and safe peace: in which thing if people would have hearkened to me, we might at this time have seen the republic, tho', 'tis true, i can't say in a flourishing condition; yet certainly not, as at present we perceive it, entirely subverted and fallen into ruins. and as we are bound to be merciful to those we have actually conquered; so should those also be received into favour, who have laid down their arms, and thrown themselves wholly upon the general's mercy; and *that* even tho' the breach be made in their city walls. our good fore-fathers were most strictly just as to this particular; the custom of those times making him the patron of a conquered city or people, who first received them into the faith and allegiance of the people of *rome.* in short, the whole right, and all the duties of war are most religiously set down in the fecial laws; out of which it is manifest, that never any war can be justly undertaken, unless satisfaction have been first demanded, and proclamation of it made publicly before-hand. *poppilius* was commander in one of the provinces, and *cato*'s son a young soldier under him; and *poppilius* thinking fit to disband one of his legions, it happened to be the same in which the young man was, who therefore was dismissed among the rest of the soldiers: but having a mind to see more of the war; he notwithstanding this, continued still in the army. hereupon old *cato* writes a letter to *poppilius,* and therein desires him, *that if he suffered his son to remain in the army, he would give him his military oath again; for as much the former being void by his disbanding, he could not any longer fight lawfully with an enemy:* so religiously careful they were in those days, of doing nothing that's contrary to the laws of war. there is extant still an epistle of *cato* the father's to his son, in which he tells him, *that he had heard of his being disbanded by the consul, when he was a soldier in* macedonia, *in the war with* perseus: *and therefore he advises him not, by any means to intermeddle in a battle; because,* he says, *'tis unlawful for one, that is no longer a soldier, to engage with the enemy.*

chapter 12.

the civility of the old romans *towards their enemies, in giving them the mildest names: some wars are only for empire, others for safety: difference of conduct to be observed in each. a noble and generous saying of king* pyrrhus.

and here i can't but observe moreover, that he who is properly called *perduellis, [a stubborn enemy]* had by our ancestors the name of *hostis* given him; the gentleness of the word somewhat lessening the foulness and odium of the thing: for *hostis [an enemy]* among them signified the same thing, that *peregrinus [a stranger]* does now amongst us; as appears from the laws of the 12 tables, and therein such sort of expressions as these, *status dies cum hoste;* and, *adversus hostem aeterna auctoritas.* what greater courtesy could be shewn than this, to call even an enemy by only the softest and most obliging names? tho' the word is now altered, i confess, from that mild to an harsher sence, custom having changed it from what it first properly signified, *a stranger,* to denote such a one as *bears arms against us.* we have told you already what previous causes and conditions there should be, before any war can be lawful and just; the same are required even in those wars also, which are undertaken merely for glory and empire: but then all contests of this latter sort, should be carried on with less heat and animosities; for as in the differences that happen among citizens, we make a distinction between a violent enemy, and a generous rival; "in one case nothing but a title of honour, in the other our lives and reputations being concerned" so did our ancestors do in their wars. that which they waged with the *cimbers* and *celtibers,* was managed as with hateful and implacable enemies; the question then being, not whether of the two should remain a conquerour, but whether should remain a people at all: whereas those with the *latins, carthaginians; pyrrhus,* &c. were only quarrels about honour and dominion. the *carthaginians* were perfidious and treacherous; *hannibal* their great commander cruel; but all the rest more faithful and merciful. that speech of *pyrrhus* is indeed very extraordinary upon restoring the captives, when he says,

i neither gold of you nor price demand: nor will i chaffer, *but* fight *out the war: let* steel, *not* gold *to each their fate decide. whether to* you, *or* me *dame fortune will the victory grant; or what the chance of war, shall courage try. and this i add withal, that freely i their liberties restore to these brave men, whose lives the war has spared. freely i give; do you as freely take, in thy name of thy mighty gods.*

a truly royal and princely saying, and worthy of the glorious family of the *aeacidae.*

chapter 13.

particular persons bound in justice to keep the promises made to an enemy. the example of regulus. *the story of ten who did the contrary: how punished by the* romans; *particularly one, who thought to have escaped by a quirk. a noble instance of the* roman *justice to king* pyrrhus. *justice to be kept towards the meanest slaves. two ways whereby injuries are done,* fraud *and* force. fraud *the more odious. to be a rogue under the mask of honesty, the greatest of villainies.*

'tis also the duty of particular persons, if at any time, forced by the necessity of their circumstances, they have made any promise or oath to an enemy; afterwards to see that they perform it faithfully. thus *regulus* was taken in the first *punick* war by the *carthaginians,* and sent by them to *rome,* about an exchange of prisoners, upon solemn oath given that he would return to them again: as soon then as he was come to *rome,* he first advised the senate against making such a change, and when he had done it "tho' begged on to stay by his friends and relations" rather returned to a certain punishment, than his oath should be broken, tho' made to an enemy. but *hannibal* in the second *carthaginian* war, after our fatal defeat at *cannae,* sent ten to *rome* under the same obligation of returning again, unless by their interest they could prevail with the senate to redeem their prisoners; who were all by the censors deprived of their privileges as free-men, and tied to pay such and such duties to the publick as long as they lived, for not being true to their oaths and obligations. there was one of them thought by a trick to have eluded the force of his oath, but was nevertheless punished for all that: his shift was this; *hannibal* had let them depart his camp upon the condition afore-mentioned; when therefore they had gotten a little way out of it, what does he do but come back to it again, under colour of having forgot to take something "i know not what" with him: and then away he goes out again, discharged "as he thought" from his obligation of returning. and so, 'tis very true, he was in word, but not in reality; for in all such oaths we aren't to attend to the meer form of words, but the true design and intention of them. but the greatest example of justice to an enemy, was shewn by our ancestors towards king *pyrrhus:* there came a deserter out of *pyrrhus*'s camp, and offered the senate to dispatch him with poison; which they and *fabricius* were so far from accepting of, that they gave him up again as a traitor to his master. thus we may see, that they would not allow of any unjust way of dealing, tho for the death of a powerful and invading adversary: and so much for the duties required in war. there is one part of justice remaining behind, and which ought by no means to be forgotten by us; i mean that towards the lowest and meanest sort of people: and these are more especially those we call our slaves; in relation to whom, 'tis a very good rule that is given by some men, that we should use them no otherwise than we do our day-labourers, *make them first do their work, and then pay them honestly what they have earned.* in fine, to close up this discourse of justice, there are two ways or methods, whereby one man may injure or oppress another; the one is *eraud* and subtlety, the other open *force* and violence; the former of which is held the part of a fox, and the latter of a lyon: both of them certainly very unworthy of a reasonable creature; tho' fraud, i think, is the more odious of the two. but of all injustice, theirs is certainly of the deepest dye; who make it their business to appear honest men, even whilst they are practising the greatest of villainies.

chapter 14

of liberality, the second part of general justice. three cautions to be observed concerning it. 'tis not liberality, to bestow upon one, what is wrongfully taken from another; nor what ought to have rather been given to our relations; nor to give out of vainglory. bounty should be proportioned to the merit of the receiver, which is of several sorts.

we have now gone through' with the subject of justice, it remains in the next place “to go on according to our method proposed” that we say something likewise of bounty and liberality, than which there is nothing more nearly allied to the nature of man. but then we must observe these following cautions: *first,* that we take care in all acts of bounty, that they be not prejudicial to those we would oblige by them, nor to any other body. *secondly,* that we don't in our bounty and liberality go beyond our estates. and, *thirdly,* that we duly proportion our kindness, according to every man's merit and deserts. and first of the former, which is grounded upon the great and fundamental principle of all justice, to which this duty in all its particular instances should be referred. for he who pretending to do one a kindness, does that which is really a prejudice to him, is indeed so far from being kind and obliging, as that he ought to be counted a most pernicious flatterer: and to do any manner of injury to one, that you may shew your generosity and bounty to another, is just one and the same sort of roguery and injustice, as to enrich yourself by the spoils of your neighbour. yet this is the fault of a great many people, and especially those who are desirous of glory, to take away from some that which justly belongs to them, that so they may have to bestow upon others; and they're apt to think themselves extremely bountiful, if they enrich their adherents by any manner of means. but this is so far from being a duty of liberality, that nothing in the world can be more contrary to it. it ought to be therefore our first care in giving, that what we bestow be a real advantage and kindness to our friend, and no ways an injury to any third person. that action therefore of *caesar* and *sylla*'s, in taking away estates from the rightful proprietors, and giving them to others who had nothing to do with them, ought by no means to be accounted liberal; for nothing can ever be truly such, that is not at the same time just and honest. a *second* caution to be observed was this, *that our bounty be not suffered to exceed our abilities;* for they who give more than their estates will allow off, are, in the first place, injurious to their own relations, by spending that wealth upon other people, which should rather have been given, or left to them. beside that this over-great bounty in giving, is usually accompanied with an answerable desire and greediness of getting; which often proceeds even to down-right oppression, that so men may have wherewithal to supply this extravagant humour. one may also observe in a great many people, that they take a sort of pride in being counted magnificent, and give very plentifully, not from any generous principle in their natures, but only to appear great in the eye of the world; so that all their bounty is resolved into nothing but meer outside and pretence, and is nearer of kin to vanity and folly, that 'tis to either liberality or honesty. the *third* caution was, *that our bounty should be proportioned to the merits of the receiver:* in judging of which, we are first to confider the man's honesty or *manners;* secondly, the *good-will* he bears towards us; thirdly, the *nearness of relation,* or society that is between us; and, lastly, the *benefits* we have formerly received from him. 'tis desirable that all these inducements might concur in the same person; but when they do not, we should bestow our kindness more especially on him, in whom we find the most, and weightiest of them.

chapter 15.

honesty, the first sort of merit. we aren't to expect we shall find perfectly good men. modesty, temperance, &c. *more especially to be regarded. how we should judge of men's good-will towards us. gratitude a most necessary duty: we should imitate fruitful fields, by returning more than we have received. how to judge of the value of any kindness: those to be least esteemed that are done rashly and inconsiderately. we should do most for those that stand in greatest need, if they are otherwise deserving.*

now seeing we don't live amongst such as, are perfectly and fully wise, but such as are thought to have done very well, if they are but, as 'twere, the rough draughts of virtue; we ought to consider, i think, in the first place, that no one should wholly be neglected in this case, in whom there appears any shadow or resemblance of real honesty; but that those men ought to be principally regarded, who excel in the quiet and more peaceable virtues of modesty, temperance, and especially this justice, of which i have now been discoursing a great while. for most times greatness of spirit and courage, unless it be in those who are *perfectly* wise and virtuous, is something too hot and apt to boil over; the others are the virtues, which seem more peculiarly to constitute a good man. and so much for the first sort of merit to be considered, *viz.* the manners or honesty of the person we would be kind to. the *second* was, *the good-will which he bears towards us;* as to which it should always be our principal care, to do most for him, by whom we are most beloved: now in judging of the good-will that anyone bears us, we are not to consider “like boys and children” any sudden flashes and heats of passion, but rather a constant and well-settled affection. but if a man, *in the next place,* has done us any real service, so that our part is to make a requital, and not first to lay an obligation upon him, 'tis then our duty to take some greater care; for of all the virtues, there's none we are more necessarily obliged to, than *gratitude.* if then, according to *hesiod*'s rule, even that which was nothing but barely lent us, is, if possible, to be returned back with interest again; what abundant returns should we make to those, by whom we have been freely and generously obliged? what less can we do than be like fruitful fields, which produce, beyond comparison more than was thrown into them? and if we do services even to those men, from whom we hope afterwards to receive any favours; ought we not much more to do the same to those, from whose forward kindness we have already received them? for the virtue of liberality containing under it these two parts; in the *first* place, the doing a kindness to anyone; and, *secondly,* the requiting it when done to us; whether we'll perform the former or not, is altogether left to our own choice; but every good man's obliged to the latter, when here he can do it without injustice. but then we're to make a distinction between benefits, and are *there* bound to make the most ample returns, *where* the obligations we have received are the greatest. and to judge of the merits of any kindness, we are chiefly to consider in what manner it was done; as whether freely, considerately and from a principle of good-nature. for several people do manything s rashly, . and with a blind sort of impulse; throwing away their favours upon all without distinction; being hurried about, as it were with a tempest, by every mad and frolicsome humour, and every sudden or impetuous passion. a benefit therefore, when received from such a one, is not to be esteemed of an equal value, with those that proceed from a settled judgment and due consideration. but our principal duty both in doing of kindnesses and making requitals, is, to do most for those that stand in greatest need of it, supposing all circumstances else to be equal: the contrary to which appears plainly in the practice and actions of the most part of men; for, people choose to bestow their favours, upon those from whom they expect to receive the most benefits, tho' the persons perhaps don't at all stand in need of them.

chapter 16.

we should be most ready to give to those, who are most nearly allied to us. the first sort of alliance is that between all men in general. the bond of it, and duties resulting from it. we're bound to do for any man what will be a kindness to him, and no prejudice to ourselves; but with this caution, that we don't thereby make ourselves unable to assist those, who are more nearly allied to us.

the fourth inducement remaining to be spoke to, is, *the nearness of relation,* or society that is amongst men; for the maintenance of which, we can't do better, than to give most to those, that stand nearest related to us. but that we may consider, with greater distinctness, the natural principles of human society, we shall here trace it down from the fountain head. the first thing then to be taken notice of is this, *that there is such a thing as a fellowship or society between all men in general:* the bond or cement that holds this together, is reason and discourse, which by teaching, learning, communicating one with another, *&c.* easily make men agree together, and unite them all in one natural sort of conjunction and community. nor does anything set us at a greater distance from the nature of beasts: for we *oftentimes* talk of the courage of *them,* such as lyons and horses; but *never* a word of their equity, justice or goodness; and why is this; but because they are destitute of reason and discourse? this is then the largest and most comprehensive of all societies, being made up of men considered barely as such, and so taking in even the whole race and kind of them one with another: the duties of which are, to let everyone have a share in those things, which by nature were produced for the common advantage and benefit of all; to let what's already determined by laws, and civil constitutions, remain as it is, without breaking in upon any man's right; as to which things however we should remember a rule, which is now among the *greeks* become an usual proverb, *all things in common amongst friends.* but perhaps you may ask, what kind of things we suppose them to be, which ought to be common to all mankind: *ennius* has given us one instance of them, which may easily be applied to a great many others:

he who directs the wandering traveller, doth, as 'twere, light another's torch by his own; which gives him never the less of light, for that it gave another.

by this one case he sufficiently teaches us, that whatever kindness can be done for another, without any damage or loss to ourselves, 'tis our duty to do it, tho' to never so much a stranger. from hence have arisen those general maxims and principles of humanity, *not to deny one a little running-water;* or, *the lighting his fire by ours, if he has occasion: to give the best counsel we are able to one who is in doubt or distress;* which are things that do good to the person that receives them, and are no loss or trouble to him that confers them. such things therefore, being by *nature common,* should accordingly be kept open for the free use of all men: and of those which are *our own* we should always be giving something, that may contribute to the benefit and welfare of the whole. but because the revenues of particulars are small, and there are infinite numbers of those that want, therefore is this universal bounty to be kept within the limits prescribed by *ennius, it gives him nearer the less of light;* that so we may have it within our power, to be liberal to those that are more nearly allied to us.

chapter 17.

several other degrees of relation, less extensive than that mentioned in the former chapter. that of friendship the most closely knit. the ground and foundation of true friendship. the relation arising from doing kindnesses to one another. the love a man has for his native country swallows up all other loves whatever. which of the several relatives we ought to prefer, in our liberality and doing kindnesses. a description of friendship; and of all friendships, which is most pleasant.

but there are several degrees of society and fellowship amongst mankind; for to take now our leave of that general and universal one already mentioned, there's a nearer among those who are all of the same country, nation or language; than which, nothing more knits and unites men to one another. there is a closer yet among those, who are all of the same city; for a great manything s are in common to fellow-citizens, such as markets, temples, walks, ways, laws, privileges, courts of justice, freedom of votes, besides common meetings and familiarities, and abundance of business and entercourse with one another. but there's a stricter bond of alliance still, between those who belong to the same family, as taking into it but a very small part of that vast and immense one of all mankind. for there being by nature implanted in all things a certain desire of begetting their like, the closest and nearest of all societies is between man and wife; then follows that between *them* and their children and afterwards *that* of the whole family, who inhabit together, and have all things in common; which is, as it were, the first beginning of a city, and ground or seed-plot of a whole commonwealth. next to this comes the bond of relation between brothers; as also between first and second cosins; who growing too numerous to live in the same house, are sent out to others, as it were into new colonies. next after this follow marriages and alliances, and so a new stock of relations that way; from whence comes a new propagation and off-spring, which serves to give rise, as was said, to commonwealths. now that nearness of blood, and the natural love which arises from it, can't but endear men to one another, is past all doubt; 'tis a very great matter to have the same relics and monuments of our ancestors; to make use of the same religious ceremonies, and be laid after death in the same place of burial: but of all the societies and unions amongst men, there is none more excellent or more closely knit, than when such as are men of real virtue and honesty, from a certain agreement and likeness of their manners, contract a familiarity and friendship one with another. for virtue and goodness “as we often observe” of necessity moves us where-ever we see it; and makes us all have a love and respect for that person, in whom we discover it. and as every virtue thus wins upon our hearts, and even forces us to love those we take to possess it; so more especially do justice and beneficence. but when several persons are all like one another in honesty and good manners, then no society can ever be more loving, or more closely united. for where there are many of the same humour, and same inclinations; everyone sees, in some measure, his own self, and is accordingly delighted, in the person of another; and that's brought about, which *pythagoras* thought the perfection of all friendship, *that a great many several are made into one.* there's another remarkable fellowship or community, arising from an entercourse of doing and receiving benefits; which while 'tis kept up by a mutual gratitude and kindness of all the parties, can't but occasion a firm and very lasting agreement between them. but when we have gone over all the relations that are in the world, and thoroughly considered the nature of each, we shall find that there's no one of greater obligation, no one that's dearer and nearer to us, than that which we all of us bear to the publick. we have a tender concern and regard for our parents, for our children, our kindred and acquaintance; but the love which we have for our native country swallows up all other loves whatever; for which there is no honest man but would die, if by his death he could do it any necessary service. how detestable then must the wickedness and barbarity of those people be, who have mangled and rent this their native country by all manner of villainies; and have made it their business “nay, and still do so” to bring it to ruine and utter desolation? now if there should happen any contest or competition between these relations, which of them should have the greatest share of our duty; we should pay the first regard to our country and parents, from whom we have received the most endearing obligations; the next to our children and family, who all have their eyes upon us alone, and have no body else they can depend upon; next in order to these come our kindred and relations, whose fortune is generally the same with our own. to each of these therefore, whom i have just now mentioned, we most of all owe what is necessary for their subsistence: but then, as for living and eating together, for mutual advising, discourse, exhortation, comforting, and sometimes “if occasion serves” rebuking, friendship is the properest soil for them; and of all kinds of friendship, there is none so pleasant, as that which is cemented by a likeness of manners.

chapter 18

in liberality the necessity of the person is especially to be considered. some kindnesses due to some relatives more than to others. rules signify but little of themselves, unless they are confirmed by practice and exercise. greatness of soul, the third general virtue, most glorious and splendid of them all. is most of all praised, and its contrary dispraised among men.

but in all these duties of beneficence and liberality, one principal thing to be taken notice of is, what necessity the person we would be kind to lies under, and what he is able or not able to do, without our assistance: so that in some cases, the present posture and circumstances of a man's condition, ought more to prevail with us, than the degrees of relation. again, there are certain particular offices, which are more peculiarly owing to someone sort of relatives, than they are to another: in the business “for example” of getting in his corn, 'tis our duty rather to assist a next neighbour, than either a brother or familiar friend: but if the business be a case at law, then a kinsman or friend must rather be defended, than only a next neighbour. these things therefore, and such like circumstances, should be well considered, in the practice and exercise of every virtue; and our minds should be brought to a kind of acquaintance and familiarity with them; that so we may be quick at the accounts of our duty, and able by casting up all things together, to see at last what the remainder is, and know what we owe to the several sorts and conditions of men. for as a general, orator or physician, however well skilled in the rules of his art, can never be perfect without the assistance of practice and experience; just so it is in the case now before us: many have laid down the rules and precepts of *virtue* and good-living; “as i myself am doing at this very time” but there's moreover required to a due degree of height and perfection in *it,* that one accustom himself to the exercise of them. and thus have i shown how virtue and honesty “from which all our duty does immediately flow” are deduced from those things, which concern the society and good of mankind; which was the second general i proposed to discourse of.

it is to be observed, that whereas there were laid down four general heads, from which all virtue and honesty is derived; whatever proceeds from a brave and exalted mind, that's raised above fortune, and all the little chances and accidents of the world, is usually made most account of amongst men. hence in reproaches we find there's nothing more common, than such things as these:

for shame! young men, and yet have women’s hearts! while this brave woman plays the man—

or something like this,

dear salmacis *give spoils, that cost no sweat or [blood!*

whereas on the contrary in praises or panegyrics, those things that are done with a bravery of mind, and have something of extraordinary courage in them, “i know not how” we commend in a nobler and loftier strain, than we do anything else. hence *marathon, salamis, plateae,* &c. are so common a field for all the rhetoricians: hence our *cocles;* hence the *decii,* the *scipio's, marcellus,* and a great many others; and especially the people of *rome* itself is particularly famous for greatness of courage. but the value that is set upon military glory appears from this, that almost all statues are done in the habit and garb of a soldier.

chapter 19.

courage is not truely a virtue, unless it be accompanied with justice, truth, &c. *an excellent definition of it given by the* stoicks. *an admirable saying of* plato *to the same purpose. men of great souls are apt to be ungovernable and ambitious; which prompts them to injustice. a man of a truly noble spirit never injures another, but protects from injuries; scorns applause, and the voice of the ignorant multitude.*

but that sort of courage which is seen in the dangers and fatigues of war, unless a man be governed by the rules of justice, and fight for the safety and good of the publick, and not for particular ends of his own, is altogether blamable; and so far from being a part of true virtue, that 'tis indeed a piece of the most barbarous inhumanity. fortitude therefore is very well defined by the stoick philosophers, when they call it, *a virtue contending for justice and honesty.* no man therefore by baseness and treachery has ever got the name and reputation of true courage; for nothing can ever be virtuous or credible, that is not just. to which purpose, that of *plato* was admirably well said,

as that sort of knowledge, which is not directed by the rules of justice, ought rather to have the name of *design* and *subtilty,* than *wisdom* and *prudence;* just so that bold and adventurous mind, which is hurried by the stream of its own passions, and not for the good and advantage of the publick, should rather have the name of *fool-hardy* and *daring,* than *valiant* and *couragious.*

the first thing therefore led have in a truely courageous man, is, that he be a follower of goodness and fair dealing, of truth and sincerity; which are principal and constituent parts of justice. but here 'tis one very unhappy thing, that most times these great and exalted minds are naturally ungovernable and desirous of rule: so that what *plato* observed of the *spartans, that all their customs had no other aim, but to get the superiority,* may fitly enough be applied to these persons: for the more any man has of this greatness of soul, the more eager he is of being a sharer in the government, or rather of obtaining it wholly to himself: and 'tis no easy matter to be fair and equitable in all one's actions, “which is the proper and peculiar office of justice” while one is endeavouring to make himself uppermost. from hence it comes to pass, that they'll never be conquered in any debates, or over-ruled by the laws and constitutions of the publick; but make it their business by factions and bribery to get a strong party and interest in the republic; and rather choose to be uppermost by force and injustice, than equal to others by fair and upright dealing. but the difficulty of it can only serve to make it more honourable, *but never its contrary more excusable:* for no sort of case or circumstance whatever, can excuse any man for being guilty of injustice. those are therefore your truly brave and courageous men, not who rob, plunder and injure others, but those who secure and protect them from injuries. but that greatness of mind, which is *truly* such, and under the direction of wisdom and prudence, makes that honour and credit, which we naturally desire, not consist in the outward imaginary applause, but in the real intrinsic goodness of its actions; and is not so eager of *appearing* to be greater and better than others, as of *really being so.* for he that is so mean as to depend upon the giddy and ignorant multitude, ought never to be accounted of a truly great and exalted spirit: besides that, there's nothing so easily draws men to acts of injustice, as a loftiness of mind, when joyned with this foolish desire of applause. this is indeed a very dangerous place, and requires our greatest concern and watchfulness; because you shall hardly find any man, that, when he has gone through' labours and difficulties, does not expect this honour and applause, as a kind of reward for his courage and achievements.

chapter 20.

wherein true greatness of soul consists. an excellent description of it. 'tis an enemy to covetousness, to the desire of applause, and of power. produces a calm and unpassionate mind. the desire of this calm and tranquillity of mind, has made some men retire, and separate themselves from public business. in what a perfect freedom consists.

now all true courage and greatness of mind is more especially seen in these two things: the *first* is a generous contempt or disregard of all outward goods, proceeding from an opinion, that 'tis unworthy of a man *to admire,* or wish for, or endeavour after anything, unless it be that which is honest and becoming; *to* make himself subject to anyone's will; *to* be a slave to his own irregular passions; or any ways depend upon the capricio's of fortune. when he has gotten such a temper of mind as i have now been describing, then the *second* thing is, that he perform such actions as are glorious and profitable, but withal very full both of labour and difficulty; and extremely dangerous to his life itself, as well as to those things that are requisite for its preservation. now all the *lustre* and *dignity* of these two parts, nay and i add all their *usefulness* too, is lodged only in the latter; but the ground-work, as 'twere, and foundation of all true greatness, is laid in the former. for in that are contained those generous principles which exalt men's minds, and raise them to a contempt of all worldly things. but that former itself is made up of two parts, the *first* is an opinion that nothing is truely and really good, but only what is honest: the *second* a freedom from all sort of passion or disturbance of mind. for what can more discover a man of a brave and heroic spirit, than to make no account in the world of those things, which seem so glorious and dazzling to the generality of mankind; but wholly to despise them, not from any vain and fantastic humour, but from solid and firm principles of reason and judgment? or what can more shew a robust mind and unshaken constancy, than to bear those heavy and numerous calamities, which are incident to mankind in this life, with such a firm temper and fixedness of soul, as never to offend against nature and right reason, or do anything that's unworthy the dignity and character of a wise man? now 'twould not at all be consistent or agreeable, that he who bore up so courageously against *fear,* should be afterwards unable to resist *desire;* or that he who could never be conquered by *pain,* should suffer himself to be captivated by *pleasure.* these things therefore should well be considered, and of all desires, that of *money* should be avoided; for nothing's a greater sign of a narrow, mean and sordid spirit, than to dote upon riches; nor is anything on the contrary more creditable and magnificent, than to contemn wealth, if you have it not; and if you have it, to lay it out freely in acts of bounty and liberality. the desire of glory "as i before observed" ought also to be avoided: for it robs a man wholly of his freedom and liberty, which generous spirits ought of all things in the world to maintain and defend. neither ought places of power to be sought after; but at some times rather to be refused when offered, at others, be laid down if they can conveniently. we should free ourselves, in short, from all vehement passions and disorders of mind, not only those of *desire* and *fear,* but also of *sorrow,* of *joy* and *anger;* that so the state of the mind may be calm and undisturbed, which will make the whole life become graceful and uniform. now there both *are* and *have been* many, who to gain this repose of which i am speaking, have betaken themselves to a life of retirement, and wholly withdrawn from all business of the publick. among these the noblest and most eminent of the philosophers; and some men of rigid and severe lives, who misliking the manners of the people or governors, have gone and withdrawn themselves into the country, pleased with the management of their private fortunes. these men proposed the same end to themselves that kings and princes do, *viz.* the living so as to want for nothing, to be under the power and control of none, but to enjoy a full and perfect freedom; which consists in living so, as one's self best *pleases.*

chapter 21.

those who live a publick and a private life aim both at freedom. their lives compared: the former more useful, the latter more safe. in what cases a man may be excused from serving the publick. those ought to serve it who are qualified for the service. greatness of soul more necessary for those in a public, than retired life. two or three rules to be observed before a man enters upon business.

this then being the common design and end of them both, those who're ambitious of power and authority, think to obtain it by enlarging their fortunes and interests in the world; but these whom i have mentioned as men of repose, by contenting themselves with their own condition, tho' but humble and mean. in which they are neither of them wholly in the wrong; but the life of the latter, i mean the retired, is both easier and safer, and begets less of trouble and disturbance to others; whereas that of the former, who give themselves up to affairs of state, and the management of great and important concerns, is more adapted to the benefit and good of mankind, and the getting of credit and reputation in the world. those people therefore are perhaps excusable, who being of parts and capacities for learning, give themselves wholly to the study of it, and never at all meddle with publick business: and so are those also, who being disabled by sickness and infirmities, or on any other good and allowable account, have separated themselves from the administration of affairs, leaving the power and reputation of it in the hands of others. but as for those people, who have none of these reasons, and pretend to despise those commands and honours, which most men admire; i am so far from thinking it a virtue in them, that i rather esteem it a very great fault: thus far, 'tis true, one can hardly condemn them, in that they despise, and make little account of glory and applause; but their true reason seems to be rather this, that they don't care to suffer the labour and fatigue of them, and are afraid of encountering with rubs and repulses, as things that are attended with some shame and dishonour. for you shall often find there's a great many men, who are very inconsistent with themselves in things of a contrary nature: as for *pleasure,* they despise it with all the severity of a stoick; but yet are so effeminate, as not to be able to bear the least *trouble;* are mighty contemners of *fame* and *applause;* but extremely concerned at anything of *disgrace:* which are things that don't very well agree together. those people then, whom nature has endowed with abilities for that purpose, should forthwith endeavour to procure themselves places, and manage the business of the commonwealth: otherwise how should the city be well governed, or the greatness of their endowments be made known to the world? but that greatness of soul, and contempt of all human things, "which we have often mentioned" together with that calmness and serenity of mind, is requisite in those of a public station, as much, if not more than 'tis in philosophers, if ever they hope to be free from anxieties, and arrive at any steadiness or uniformity in their lives. now these things are easier to philosophers, than to them; for as much as their lives, being led in private, require for their support a less number of things, and have fewer within the power and reach of fortune: and if any ill accident should befall them, 'tis impossible their sufferings can be very considerable. those men therefore that are in publick stations, having things of more weight and importance to be taken care of, must in reason be supposed to lye much more open to the assaults of the passions, than those who spend their days in privacy and retirement. upon which account they should take the more care, to fortify themselves with this greatness of spirit, and to free their minds from the grievous torments and disturbances of them. but he who takes upon him a publick trust, should not only look that the business be honest, but that he himself be qualified for the management of it. in considering of which there's a double extreme to be carefully avoided, that he neither despair thro' a mean cow heartedness; nor yet be over confident thro' eagerness of desire. and lastly, in whatever he sets about, let all things be diligently and carefully put in order, before he goes on to the execution of it.

chapter 22.

'tis no less great and commendable to manage affairs of peace, than of war. several examples to prove this. arms useless abroad, without civil prudence at home. cicero*'s eminent services to the republic: a saying of* pompey *the great's to him upon that subject.*

but seeing most people are apt to imagine, that 'tis greater and more glorious to manage affairs of war, than peace; i shall endeavour to lessen this general opinion. for the greatness of that glory, which is given to warriors, has made many people, for no other reason, desirous of quarrels; especially men of the greatest parts and most aspiring minds; particularly if they are qualified for a soldier's life, and their disposition carry them to the profession of arms. but if we would make a just estimate of the case, we should find both greater and more glorious actions done by wisdom at home, than by arms abroad. for what tho' *themistocles* be deservedly commended, and his name more illustrious than that of *solon?*

and tho' *salamis* be brought for the proof of a victory, which is far to be preferred to the wisdom of *solon,* in constituting and settling the senate of *areopagus?* yet in truth ought *this* to be judged no less great and extraordinary than *that:* for *themistocles*'s victory was only a kindness to the commonwealth once; but *solon*'s counsel will be so for ever: seeing 'tis by *this* that the laws of the *athenians,* and constitutions of their ancestors are kept up and maintained. beside, *themistocles* can name nothing in the world, wherein he assisted the *areopagus:* but *solon* on his part may truly say, that he, by his wisdom, was assisting to *themistocles;* for the war was carried on by the directions of that senate, which he by his prudence at first appointed. the same may be said of *pausanias* and *lysander;* for tho' by their valour they are thought to have enlarged the dominion of the *spartans,* yet 'tis by no means at all to be compared with the laws and discipline of the wise *lycurgus:* beside that to nothing but these laws, and this discipline, they owed all the courage and obedience of their armies. i, for my own part, was always of opinion, that *marcus scaurus,* when i was a boy, was by no means inferior to *caius marius;* nor *quintus catulus,* since i meddled with the republic, to *cneus pompeius;* for armies can signify but little abroad, unless there be counsel and wise management at home. neither was the rasing and destroying of *numantia,* by that incomparable person, and brave commander the second *africanus,* a greater and more signal piece of service to the republic, than the murther of *tiberius gracchus* by *nasica,* tho' a meer private citizen at the same time. 'tis true, this action had something of the soldier in it, as being done by force and down-right violence, and so does not wholly come under the notion of civil concerns: however, i have brought it as an instance of these, because 'twas effected by this civil sort of prudence, and without the assistance of a military power. i can't but therefore still extremely approve of that saying of mine, which i'm told some malicious and envious fellows most mightily carp at, let warlike arms give place to thy peaceful gown, and to the statesman's praise the victor yield his crown.

for not to say anything of other people, when i my own self sat at the helm of the government, did not *arms* then give place to the *gown?* never was the state in more imminent danger, and yet never were things better and more happily quieted. thus by my prudence and careful management, the most impudent and audacious of all the citizens let, as 'twere, their arms fall out of their hands. what action then was there ever performed in war like this? or where's the triumph that can be compared to it? for i think i may venture a little to boast before you, son *mark,* whose happiness it is to succeed in the glory, and whose duty to imitate the excellence of my actions: this i am sure of, even *pompey* himself "a man the most famous for martial achievements" did me that justice in the hearing of several, as to say,

that his returning home with his third triumph, had been to but little or no purpose, unless my endeavours and services to the republic had preserved the city for him to triumph in.

i conclude therefore, from what has been observed, that *that* sort of courage which is seen in the management of civil affairs, is no less deserving than *that* which consists in the business of fighting; and the former requires more pains and application to be perfect in it, than the latter doth.

chapter 23.

the body ought to be so far taken care of, as that it may be able to bear fatigues. but 'tis the mind that truly makes great men. war should be undertaken only for the sake of peace. the difference between a great soul and a great understanding; and the duties of each. fighting one of the least parts of courage.

now 'tis certain *that* virtue, which consists in greatness and elevation of soul, and makes up the subject of our present enquiry, is obtained by the strength of the mind, not the body. however the body ought not to be neglected; but by exercise brought to such a frame and condition, as that it may obey the prescriptions of the mind, in performing that business and bearing those fatigues, which are required of it. but still the nature of the virtue we are seeking for, consists in due care and application of mind; in which particular, the publick receives as much benefit from gownsmen, who manage and take care of its civil concerns; as it doth from soldiers, who are generals of its armies. for they by their prudence have often either hindered the breaking out of wars, or else have occasioned their speedy conclusion; and sometimes too have been the cause of their being undertaken: as the third with *carthage* was entered into upon the advice of *cato,* whose credit and authority prevailed in that case, even after he was dead. wisdom therefore, and skill in determining civil affairs, is more to be desired than courage in fighting: but then we must always be careful in this case, that our design be not the avoiding of war, but the being more useful and serviceable to the publick. and as for war, it should never be undertaken with any other aim, but only that of obtaining an honourable peace. 'tis the part of a brave and unshaken spirit, not to be disturbed under any misfortune, or suffer itself in disorder and tumult to be thrown off the saddle "as we usually speak; " but always to keep such a presence of mind, as to be able to consult upon every occasion, and be hurried on to nothing, but what is agreeable to reason and discretion. and as this is the part of an exalted spirit, so is what follows of an elevated understanding; to discover effects even while they are yet in the wombs of their causes, and consider before-hand whatever may happen on either side, and accordingly what's to be done when it *does* happen; that so he may never be taken unawares, and brought to that lamentable shift of crying out, *i never once thought of it.* these are the duties, as of a truly courageous and lofty, so of a wise and judicious mind; but rashly to run and lay about one in battel, and come to wounds and down-right blows with an enemy, is but a savage and brutish kind of business: however, necessity so requiring, a man should fight, and choose rather to part with his life than his liberty, or be guilty of any base or dishonourable action.

chapter 24.

the duty of a truly couragious man, after he has conquered his enemies. cool and deliberate counsels to be preferred before heat and boldness. nothing more foolish, than to expose one's self to unnecessary dangers. 'tis a duty rather to expose one's self, than the publick affairs. they are to blame, who rather venture the loss of their armies, than their own reputation. the folly of callicratidas *and* cleombrotus *in this. the wisdom of* fabius maximus *in doing the contrary. men should speak what they think for the good of the publick, without regarding what offence it may give to others.*

in the business of razing and plundering cities, there ought to be taken a very especial care, that nothing of rashness or cruelty be shewn; and all true greatness of spirit obliges us, having first considered things calmly and maturely, to pardon the multitude, and punish those only that were principally faulty; and in every state and condition of fortune, to observe the just *medium* of virtue and honesty. for as we've already observed of some, that they count it more noble to manage affairs of war, than of peace; so you shall find there are a great many others, who imagine, that hot and adventurous undertakings have something that's greater and more glorious in them, than wisely cool and deliberate counsels. now as no man ought, by too warily avoiding of dangers and labours, to get himself the name of a faint-heart and coward; so, on the other hand, care should be taken, that we thrust not ourselves into hazards and difficulties, where there's no manner of occasion for it; than which there is no greater folly upon earth. 'tis a duty therefore, in attempts of any danger, to imitate the practice of skilful physicians, who always to light and inconsiderable diseases, apply none but easy and gentle remedies; but in desperate cases are forced to have recourse to desperate cures. 'tis a madness therefore, while all things are calm and in a peaceful state, to desire a storm; but to keep off the mischiefs of it when it does happen, is the part of a wise and a prudent man; and so much the more, if the good to be obtained by getting well rid of it, out-balance the evils you may be brought into by the attempt. the danger of some actions only relates to the person that undertakes them, but *that* of others to the whole republic: and again, a man's life is endangered in some, in others his reputation and the good-will of his citizens. 'tis our duty then, *in the former case,* more willingly to expose and endanger ourselves, than the whole state; and *in the latter,* to fight for our glory and reputation, more readily than any other conveniencies whatever. yet the contrary to this appears plainly in the practice of a great many men, who are willing to spend their estates and lives for the good of their country; but won't bear the least diminution of their honour, tho' the present occasions of the republic require it. thus *callicratidas,* admiral of *sparta,* in the *peloponnesian* war, after he had done many signal services, at last was the occasion of ruining all; for when he was advised to retreat with his navy from *arginussae,* and not venture giving the *athenians* battel, he utterly refused it; and told his advisers, *that* if this whole navy should chance to be lost, the *lacedaemonians* could rig out another; but that he for his part could never fly, without an irreparable loss of his honour. and here the *lacedaemonians* had tho' a great, yet a tolerable blow; but that other was mortal, and put a full period to the *spartan* greatness, when their leader *cleombrotus,* only for fear of being somewhat ill-spoken of, unadvisedly ventured to fight *epaminondas.* how much better did *fabius maximus* do? concerning whom *ennius* has these words:

one man our state has saved by wise delays: for he regarded not the foolish prate of idle people; but the city's good. therefore his growing fame now flourishes more, when his deeds are past.

the same kind of fault should also be avoided in civil administrations; for a great many men are afraid to speak out what they really think, tho' perhaps 'tis for the best, for fear it should give any offence to others.

chapter 25.

two rules of plato*'s to be observed by those who govern the state. the good of the governed ought to be their sole aim. an excellent description of a good minister of state. ambition very destructive in a government. a good saying of* plato*'s to that purpose. men should carry themselves civilly towards those, who are of an opposite party in the state; and not count them their enemies. the example of* scipio *and* metellus. *anger towards an adversary no part of courage. affability,* &*c. requisite in a statesman. severity and chastisements sometimes necessary; and rules to be observed about them. nothing can be well done, that's done in a passion, rulers should be like the laws themselves.*

those who design to be partakers in the government should be sure to remember these two precepts of *plato: first,* to make the safety and interest of their citizens, the great aim and design of all their thoughts and endeavours; without ever considering their own personal advantage. and, *secondly,* so to take care of the whole collective body of the republic, as not to serve the interest of anyone party, to the prejudice or neglecting of all the rest. for the government of a state is much like the office of a guardian or trustee; which should always be managed for the good of the pupil, and not of the persons to whom he is entrusted. and those men, who, whilst they take care of one, neglect or disregard another part of the citizens, do but occasion sedition and discord, the most destructive things in the world to a state: from whence it comes to pass, that, while some take part with the popular faction, and others make their court to every great one, there's but very few left, who are concerned for the benefit and good of the whole. from this root have sprung many grievous dissentions amongst the *athenians;* and not only tumults, but even deadly civil wars in our own republic: things which a worthy and truly brave citizen, and one who deserves to hold the reins of the government, will shun and detest; and will give himself so to the service of the publick, as to aim at no riches or power for himself; and will so take care of the whole community, as not to pass over anyone part of it: such a one will scorn, by the mean arts of calumny and a false accusation, to bring others into hatred and disrepute with the people; but will always adhere to what is just and honest, and never be drawn from it, whatever offence may be taken by others; nay, will rather part with his life itself, than do anything that is contrary to the virtues i have mentioned. eager ambition, and contending for honours, is, of all things, most ruinous and destructive to a state; concerning which, *plato* has said admirably well,

that for men to contend and fall out with one another, about which should be chief in the management of the state, is just as if the ship's crew should go tother by the ears, about who should be master or pilot of the vessel.

and the same philosopher has given us this for a rule,

that only those men should be reckoned as enemies, who have taken up arms in opposition to the republic; not those who would govern it after their own schemes.

such was the dissention between *p. africanus* and *q. metellus,* without any great bitterness or animosities between them. some people think it the part of a brave and heroic spirit, to shew heat of anger and passion against an adversary; but what they say is by no means to be regarded: for it's certain on the other hand, nothing's more laudable, nothing more worthy of a great and brave person, than clemency, meekness and gentleness of spirit. in cities that are free, and where all men in common enjoy the same privileges, courtesy and affability, and that which they call *altitudo animi,* a calm and undisturbed temper of mind, are peculiarly requisite: for to fret upon every unseasonable visit, or at every impertinent and troublesome petitioner, makes a man sowre and morose in his humour; which as it brings no kind of good to himself, so it gets him the hatred and ill-will of others. but tho' meekness and clemency be laudable virtues, yet no further, than as they leave room for a just severity, whenever the occasions of the publick require it; without which a city can never be well governed. now every reproof and chastisement, *in the first place,* should be always free from contumelious language, and not inflicted for the sake of the person chastising or reproving another, but the good and advantage of the whole republic. diligent care should be taken, *in the next place,* that the penalty be proportioned to the nature of the crime, and that some don't pass without ever being questioned, while others are punished for the same misdemeanours. but of all things, anger should be excluded in punishing; for whoever comes to this work in a passion, will never observe that due mediocrity, which equally abstains from too much and too little, so strictly required by the peripatetick schools: and they have very good reason indeed to require it; but then i can't but wonder they should commend anger, and say, nature has given it us to good ends and purposes: for *that* in truth ought in no case to be allowed of; and 'twere heartily to be wished that the governors of a state, would, in this particular, be like the laws themselves, which punish offenders according to justice, without being any ways guided by passion.

chapter 26.

greatness of soul commands an even temper, free from haughtiness in prosperity, and dejectedness in adversity. phillip *greater than* alexander, *in bearing his good fortune with an even mind. the higher men are, the more care they should take of being humble and moderate. an admirable saying of* scipio *to this purpose. in prosperity we should especially consult our friends; and have a care of flatterers. greatness of soul seen often among the philosophers, and those who in private manage their own estates. how an estate should be got, improved and used.*

another great duty of fortitude is, not to be haughty, disdainful and arrogant when fortune favours us, and all things go forward according to our wishes: for it shews as much meanness and poorness of spirit, to be transported with *good,* as it does with *ill* fortune: whereas, on the other hand, nothing's more brave, than an evenness of temper in every condition, and "as is reported of *socrates* and *lelius"* a constant retaining the same air in one's countenance, without ever seeming puffed up or dejected. i find that *philip;* the king of *macedonia,* was inferior to his son in the outward glory and splendor of his *achievements,* but very far above him in good nature and condescension; therefore the father kept always the character of a great person, whereas the son often was guilty of base and dishonourable actions. 'tis a good rule therefore, i think, which is given by some men, *that the higher our station in the world is, the more care we should take of our lives and actions, that they be kept within the compass of lowliness and humility. panaetius* tells us 'twas an usual saying with his schollar and familiar friend *africanus,*

that men who give the reins to their vitious appetites, and are high and presuming upon the greatness of their fortunes, should be dealt with like horses, when grown fierce and unruly by frequent engagements: for as *these* are delivered to breakers to tame and be made fit for riding; so *those* should be brought within the barriers and limits of reason and philosophy, to teach them the uncertainty of all human things, and the great volubility and changeableness of fortune.

we should also in prosperity more especially make use of the counsel of our friends, and pay more respect and deference to their advices, than we were wont to do. at the same time also we should take a great care, that we don't give over-much ear to flatterers, nor suffer ourselves to be wheedled and imposed upon by their deceitful words. for there's nothing wherein we're more apt to be mistaken, than in this particular; every one having such a fond conceit and opinion of himself, as to think he deserves those applauses which they give him. hence spring innumerable errors in our lives; whilst men, puffed up with a vain imagination, and mistaken notions of their own great merit, are exposed to the raillery of all the world besides. and so much may suffice upon this head. from what has been said we may easily gather, that those who are over affairs of the publick, do the greatest actions, and such as express the most bravery of mind; their business affording them more opportunities, and there being more men who are concerned in *this,* than in any *other* method of living whatever. but after all, we can't but acknowledge there *are,* and *have been* a great many noble spirits, even in a life of retirement and privacy; who being sequestered from the business of the world, have given up themselves to enquiries after truth, and the great concernment of the practice of virtue: or else leading a life in the middle, as it were, between the statesman and philosopher, have been delighted with the management of their own private fortunes; not scraping up money by all manner of ways, or hoarding it so as to make no body the better for it; but parting with it freely for the sake of their friends, or to serve the republic, when occasion required it. now this private estate i would have, in the *first place,* to be *honestly* come by, not by any base, scandalous or invidious way of gaining: *then* let it be distributed to the uses and necessities of as many as is possible, provided they are worthy and deserving people; and let it be increased by such ordinary methods of saving and good husbandry, as are agreeable to the dictates of reason and prudence: and *lastly,* let none of it be spent in debauchery and luxurious living, but in acts of munificence and liberality towards others. whoever observes these measures laid down "let his way of life be either public or private" may perform all the duties of magnanimity, constancy and greatness of soul, as well as of sincerity, fidelity, and doing good to mankind:

chapter 27.

the virtues contained under the fourth head of honesty. whatever is honest, and nothing else but that, is becoming a man; honesty and decency being really the same thing, and distinguished only by an act of the mind. two sorts of decorum, and what the nature of each of them is.

we are now in the next place to speak of the fourth, and only remaining part of virtue or honesty, under which are comprehended bashfulness, temperance, modesty, government of the passions, and the observing a just order as to time and place in our words and actions; from all which arises a certain engaging kind of beauty and gracefulness, which serves to set off and adorn our lives. under this head is contained that becomingness *[decorum,* as we call it in latin] which among the *greeks* has the name of 〈 non-latin 〉; which is in its nature so closely united and riveted to honesty, that there's no way left of pulling them a sunder: for whatever is *becoming* is likewise *honest,* and whatever is *honest* is likewise *becoming*. the difference between them is so very small, that we may better conceive what it is, than explain it; for whatever becomingness there is in any action, it immediately arises from the honesty of it. from hence it appears, that becomingness does not peculiarly belong to this one part of honesty, whereof we are now undertaking to discourse; but shews itself also in each of the three former. to reason, for instance, and discourse according to the rules of *prudence;* to go about nothing but after due consideration; and on every occasion to be quick at espying and defending the truth, are things that are *becoming:* whereas to be deceived, to be in an error or mistake, and to be imposed upon, are very *unbecoming,* as well as to be mad or beside one's self. so again, all actions of *justice* are *becoming,* but those of injustice are both scandalous and unbecoming. the same may be said as to the actions of *fortitude;* whatever is done with a manful courage and bravery of mind, as 'tis *worthy* of, so it *becomes* a man; but whatever on the other hand shews any cowardice or meanness of spirit, is as contrary to becomingness, as it is to true virtue. i conclude therefore, that the decency whereof i am now discoursing, appertaineth to each of the four parts of honesty; and so appertaineth, as not to stand in need of any mighty reach of understanding to perceive it; but is easily discoverable at the first view: for there's something of becoming contained in the very notion and idea of all virtue, from which 'tis distinguished by the mind alone, and not by the nature of the thing itself. just as the beauty and good colour of the countenance, can never be separate from the health of the body; so this becomingness, of which we are speaking, in itself is all one, and, as it were, incorporate with virtue and honesty; but may be distinguished from it by thought and imagination. now there are *two kinds* or sorts of it; the one *universal,* which belongs to the nature of *honesty in general;* the other *particular* and contained under this, which belongs to the *several parts of it.* the *former* is used to be thus defined, *decorum or*

becoming is that, which is congruous or agreeable to that excellent part of the nature of man, by which he is distinguished from the rest of the creation. as for the latter, which is contained under this, 'tis most commonly made to consist in *that, which is so agreeable to the nature of man, as withal to shew something of temper and moderation, with a certain sweet air of gentility and good* manners.

chapter 28.

poetical decorum what it is, and how differing from that we here speak of. nature has given us a character of reason, &c. *which we ought to live up to. nature teaches us to have a respect for other men. proportion, regularity,* &c. *please, where-ever they are found. we ought to be concerned about other people's opinion of us. how the duties of justice, and those of modesty, decency,* &c. *differ. we should live agreeably to nature, which will always lead us right. decency relates both to the actions of the body and mind. the nature or mind of man consists of sence and reason. the former of these ought to obey the latter.*

that this is so, will more plainly appear, if we consider that *decorum* or convenience of manners, which the poets aim at in all their writings; concerning which were it anywise necessary to my present purpose, i might largely discourse. suffice it at present for me only to observe, that the poets are then said to keep this decorum, when each of their persons is brought in saying and doing those things, which are suitable to the character he bears in the world: should *aeacus,* for example, or *minos* say

e'en let them hate me, whilst they dread me too:

or,

the child's entombed in its own parent's bowels.

'twould be an offence against the rules of *decency;* because they pass in the world for men of justice and honesty: but let the same be said by a cruel *atreus,* and the whole theatre shall clap and applaud it; because 'tis a saying very agreeable to his character. now the poet can judge what is becoming and convenient for every person, according to the character he himself has fixed on him; but nature has fixed one on every one of us, by giving us that nobleness and excellence of being, whereby we are set above all other creatures.

the poets then, there being so great a variety of characters, can see what's becoming and convenient for all, even the most vitious: but we have got only one character to live up to, i mean that which is assigned us by nature herself; a *character* of temperance and modesty, of constancy and moderation. and the same nature having also taught us, that we ought to be careful of our carriage and demeanour towards the rest of men; from hence it appears of how large an extent that becomingness is, which belongs to the nature of *honesty in general;* and also that other, which is seen in the exercise of the *several kinds of it.* for, as the beauty and comeliness of the body draws the eyes to it by the fit composure of all its members, and pleases us only upon this account, because all its parts correspond with a kind of proportion and harmony: so this decorum, which gives a sort of lustre and grace to our lives, engages the approbation and esteem of all we live with, by that just and due order, consistency, and regularity, which it keeps and maintains in our words and actions. we ought to have therefore a certain respect and reverence for all men, and desire to be approved not only by the best, but by all the world: for not to care a farthing what 'tis people think of one, is a sign not only of pride and conceitedness, but indeed of having perfectly abandoned all modesty. but here we must observe, there's a great deal of difference between that which justice, and that which this modesty, respect or reverence demands, in relation to other people: 'tis the duty of justice, not to injure or wrong any man; of respect or reverence, not to do anything that may offend or displease him; wherein more especially the nature of that decorum we are speaking of consists. these things then being thus explained, i suppose it may clearly enough appear, what that is which we mean by *becoming*. as for the duties prescribed by it, the first thing to which it conducts us is, to demean ourselves suitably and agreeably to our nature, and do nothing that may any ways stain or deface it: for whilst we take *this* for our guide and conductress, 'tis impossible we should ever go out of the way; but by her shall be led thorough all the paths of wisdom, truth and understanding; of justice and beneficence toward the society of mankind; and of true magnanimity and greatness of soul. but the nature of decency is more peculiarly seen in the fourth part of honesty, concerning which we are now discoursing; and relates not only to the motions of the body, but more especially to those of the mind also; each of which are approved and becoming, when they are such as are suitable to nature. now the whole of the nature or mind of man, is made up of only these two parts: the *first* consists in the sensitive appetite, which by the *greeks* is called 〈 non-latin 〉, by the blind and extravagant impulse of which, he is hurried and transported from one thing to another. the *second* in reason, which shews and instructs him in the way of his duty, telling him what he should *do,* and what *not do:* from whence it follows, that 'tis reason which ought to be the governing faculty; and the appetite subject to the commands of it.

chapter 29.

our actions should neither be rash nor careless, &c. *how the sensitive part should be subject to the reasonable. passion disorders the body, as well as mind. watchfulness and consideration necessary for the subduing of the passions. men were not designed by nature for jesting,* &c. *but serious studies. several sorts of jests and diversions. measures to be observed about them.*

every action therefore should be free, as from precipitancy and rashness on the one hand, so from all carelessness and negligence on the other; nor should anything be done, for which we can't give a sufficient *reason,* which is almost the very definition of duty. in order to this the passions must be brought under the power of reason, so as neither thro' hastiness to run before its orders, nor thro' coldness and heaviness to disregard them when given; but all their motions must be so quieted and so restrained, as to bring no uneasiness or disturbance to the mind. and from this calm and peaceable state of the soul arises that constancy and moderation we have mentioned: for when once the passions grow unruly and extravagant, and refuse to be guided in their desires and aversions by the rules of prudence, they'll run without question beyond all bounds and measure; for they abandon and cast off their allegiance to *reason,* which they ought to obey by the constitution of nature. by this means are all things turned topsy-turvy, and not the *mind* only, but even the *body* also, put very much into disorder and confusion. do but mark those, who're enflamed with a vehement *anger* or *desire;* who're transported with *fear,* or an over-great *joy;* and you'll see an alteration in their countenances, voices, gestures, and all their actions; which sufficiently gives us to understand "that we may return again to the duty now before us" how necessary 'tis to restrain and give check to the movements of the appetite, and to be always watchful and standing upon our guard, that so we may neither be careless and inconsiderate, nor do anything rashly and at all adventures. for mankind were never designed by nature, merely to sport and idle away their time; but to follow after grave and serious studies, and business of greater importance than play is. not but that jesting and diversion are allowable, provided we use them but only as sleep, and other such necessary refreshments of nature, *viz.* after the discharge of our serious and more important duties. and even then we must see, that our jesting be neither excessive nor immodest, but such as is handsome and becoming a gentleman. for as boys are allowed, not all kinds of sports, but only such as have nothing that is vicious or ill in them; so in this jesting we should allow ourselves nothing, but only what is agreeable to honesty and good-manners. we may therefore observe, that jesting or merriment is of two sorts, the *one* clownish, abusive, scandalous and obscene; the *other* handsome, gentile, ingenious and truly pleasant. of this kind are several instances to be met with, as in our *plautus,* and the *old greek* comedians; so in the writings of the socratick philosophers; to which we may add the ingenious sayings of several men, such as are collected by the senior *cato,* and usually go by the name of *apothegms.* there is no great difficulty then to distinguish between a gentile and a clownish jest; the *one,* if brought in at a seasonable time, and when a man's mind's disengaged from business, is becoming for a gentleman; the *other,* for no man at all indeed, when base and unhandsome things are dressed up in filthy and obscene expressions. our plays and recreations must also be kept within their due bounds; and care should be taken that we don't run out into great excesses, and suffer the pleasure, which we take in them, to carry us into anything that's base or unbecoming. hunting, and the exercises of the *campus martius,*

supply us with examples enough of creditable and manly recreations.

chapter 30.

the excellence of man's nature above that of brutes, necessary to be considered. wherein it consists. some are really beasts under the shape of men. sensual pleasures, effeminacy, &c. *unbecoming man's nature. beside reason, which is the common nature of all men, each man has his particular nature or genius. the difference of men's particular natures or dispositions, shewn by a large number of examples.*

but in all enquiries concerning what becomes us, 'tis of very great moment to be constantly reflecting, *how much man's nature excels that of beasts and inferior animals.* these have no taste or relish for anything, but the pleasures of the body, towards which they are carried with a great deal of eagerness: whereas nothing's more agreeable and nourishing, as it were, to the mind of man, than learning and contemplation. hence he is always a-seeking or contriving of something that's new, and is greatly delighted with seeing and hearing, for the increase of his knowledge. and if there is anyone too much addicted to sensual pleasures, unless he's transformed into a meer brute; "for some such there are, who are men in name, and not in reality" but if, i say, anyone is too much addicted, and suffers himself to be conquered by pleasure; yet, for very shame, he will hide and conceal his propensions towards it, as much as is possible. and what is this now but a plain indication, that sensual pleasures are unbecoming the dignity of a reasonable creature, and ought to be despised and rejected by it? and whoever sets any value upon them, should be sure to take care, that he keep within the limits of reason and moderation? from hence it follows, that we should not have any respect to pleasure, but only to the preservation of our health and strength, in our victuals, cloths, and other conveniencies belonging to the body. and does not the consideration of the same dignity and excellence of our natures, plainly inform us, how base and unworthy a thing it is, to dissolve in luxury, softness, and effeminacy? and how brave and becoming it is, on the other hand; for a man to lead a life of frugality and temperance, of strictness and sobriety? and here we must observe, that nature has given us, as it were, a *double* part to be acted in the world: the *first* is extended to all men in common, forasmuch as we are all partakers of reason, and that prerogative of our nature, whereby we are exalted above other animals; 'tis this that conducts us in the finding out our duty, and from it all honesty and becomingness arises: the *second* is appropriate to each in particular; for as there's a great deal of difference in bodies, "some being nimble, and proper for running, others more lofty, and fitter for wrestling; some of a noble and majestic air, others of a sweet and engaging kind of beauty; " so there's no less, or rather a far greater variety in humours. thus *lucius crassus* and *lucius philippus* were men of a great deal of wit and pleasantry: *caius,* the son of *lucius caesar* of more than they, and a great deal more studied. whereas the young *drusus* and *scaurus* at the same time, were men of extraordinary gravity and severity *laelius* had abundance of mirth and gaity; his familiar *scipio* much more ambition, and greater austerity and strictness of living. amongst the *greeks, socrates* is said to have been one, that was of a very easy and facetious humour; that always loved to be merry and jesting, and was a mighty artist at hiding his meaning under witty ironies and drooling expressions "which sort of men are by the *grecians* called 〈 non-latin 〉; " whereas *pericles* and *pythagoras* got themselves credit, by being of exactly the contrary temper. *hannibal* among the *carthaginian* generals, and amongst our own *fabius,* was crafty and subtle; one that knew how to disguise his intentions and keep his counsel; that could make shew of one thing, whilst he was really designing another; of exquisite skill for contriving of stratagems, and preventing those laid by the enemy against himself. in this kind, the *grecians* give *jason* the *pheraean,* and *themistocles* the preference before any others; and there's one thing of *solon*'s which shews he had his share of this cunning and subtilty, when he feigned himself

distracted to save his own life, and withal to do a good piece of service to the publick. there are others to be found of just an opposite humour, who think it unlawful to do anything by stratagem and under-hand dealing, but are all for simplicity and plainness in their actions; lovers of open and undisguised truth, but haters of anything that looks like a trick. there are some that will undergo anything in the world, fawn and crouch to any manner of person, if they can but obtain their own ends and designs by it; as *marcus crassus* we know did to *sylla.* of which sort of crafty and complying kind of people, *lysander* the *lacedaemonian* is said to have been chief: whereas *callicratidas,* who was admiral of the navy next after *lysander,* was quite the contrary. *again,* there's as great a variety in men's ways of discourse as in their humours and complexions; some, who are able to speak very nobly, can yet suit their language to the humours and capacities of the ignorant vulgar; as i remember *catulus,* father and son, as also *mutius mancia* could do; and i have heard old people relate the same of *scipio nasica:* but his father, on the contrary, he who, by slaying *tiberius gracchus,* put a full end to his ruinous attempts, had none of that affable, familiar way of speaking. no more had *xenecrates,* the most

rigid and severe of all the philosophers; and for that very reason was noted and eminent. *in short,* there's almost an infinite number of these different natures and characters in men, not one of which is in itself to be condemned.

chapter 31.

everyone should follow his own genius, so far as 'tis innocent. uniformity or consistency most becoming a man, which can't be kept if we run counter to our own natures. the great force of this difference in men's natures. custom of the actors on the stage. several other rules relating to the same.

the more easily then to arrive at that decorum, of which we are speaking, let everyone stick to his own *peculiar* character and humour, provided it has nothing that's vicious in it. i say *provided it has nothing that's vicious in it;* for we should always take a particular care to do nothing that is contrary to that *universal character,* which nature has imprinted on every one of us: but, saving the reverence we owe to *that,* then to live according to our own particular one; so as to follow after that kind of study, and apply ourselves to that course of life, which is most suitable and agreeable to our own inclinations, tho' others perhaps may be more useful and important: for 'tis in vain to struggle against the bias of your nature; or at first to set upon that sort of business, which you can never arrive at any perfection in. from what has been said it more fully

appears, what that is which we call *becoming;* since nothing can be such, that is done “as we say” in despite of nature, *i. e.* contrary to the bent and tendency of a man's genius. now it's certain if anything in the world is becoming, 'tis a constant uniformity in our whole lives, and particular actions; which 'tis utterly impossible we should ever maintain, so long as we run counter to our own inclinations, and foolishly follow after those of other people: for as we should use our own native language, which all are supposed to understand best, and not *lard* our talk “as a great many do” with expressions out of *greek,* who are therefore deservedly laughed at by others: so we should keep to one constant tenour, and regular conduct in our lives and actions; so that nothing may be in them, which is not well suited and of a piece with the rest. and this difference in the characters or natures of men is of so great moment, as that in consequence of it, one man may be obliged to make away with himself; whilst another, tho' like him as to all other circumstances, may be obliged to the contrary. *cato,* for instance, and those who in *africk* surrendered themselves to *caesar,* were all of them under the same condition; and yet any of the rest might perhaps have been blamed for it, had they murdered themselves so as *cato* did; because they were men of less strictness in their lives, and less severity in their manners. but *cato* was a person, whom nature had endowed with incredible firmness and strength of soul, which he had augmented by perpetual constancy, and unalterably adhering to his once undertaken designs and resolutions: it became his character therefore to die, rather than to see the face of the tyrant. how many thing s did *ulysses* undergo in his tedious wanderings, when he was forced to be at the pleasure of women, “if *circe* and *calypso* may be called women” and by fawning words, and fair complaisant speeches, wheedle himself into the favour of all he met with? how did he bear the contemptuous usage of his servants and maids, even in his own palace, that at last he might arrive at his wished-for end? whereas *ajax,* according to the character we have of him, would rather have died you a thousand deaths, than ever have submitted to such mean compliances. these observations should teach us all, to look carefully every one into himself, and consider well what is his peculiar genius, and endeavour to make the best use of it he is able; and not to be foolishly trying experiments, to see how he can succeed in what's another body's talent: for 'tis certain that nothing becomes a man so well, as that which is best suited to his own inclinations. every one therefore should inform himself thoroughly which way his humour and genius lies; and be severe in examining what he's well fitted, or not fitted for; otherwise the players may seem to be wiser than we are; for they, when they pitch upon what they'll act, don't always choose those parts that are best, but those that are best suited to their humours and abilities. they that have the ablest voices, for instance, *epigoni* or *medus;* they that have most action, *menalippa* or *clytemnestra; rupilius,* whom i remember, always had *antiopa,* and *aesop* very rarely *ajax*. and shall actors observe this in choosing their parts, and wise men not do it in choosing their business and way of living in the world? we should therefore apply our selves especially to that, which we find most agreeable to the bent of our natures; but if we should chance to be driven upon anything , which is not so proper for our parts and talents; we should make it our business, by care and application, if not to go through' with it, the most perfectly that is possible, yet at least with as few faults as ever we are able. and let us rather labour to avoid those vices, which we are naturally inclined to, than try to arrive at those excellencies and perfections, which we were never made for.

chapter 32.

duties arising from men's several stations, and professions in the world. they whose fathers have been famous, imitate their virtues, or add to them. the choice of a profession very difficult. prodicus*'s story of* hercules. *what usually determines men in their choice of a way of life.*

but beside those two parts, which i have already mentioned, there are still two others remaining behind: the *one* is allotted us by time and chance: the *other* we ourselves choose voluntarily to ourselves. to the first appertain one's being a king, a general, or a magistrate; coming of a great family; having riches and power, together with the contraries of all these: which are all of them things that depend upon fortune, and alter according to the difference of times. as for the *second,* 'tis altogether left to our own choice, what sort of calling we have a mind to be of: accordingly some chuse to study philosophy, others the civil law, and a third sort eloquence: and of the virtues themselves, some are desirous of being eminent in one kind, and some in another.

now those men, whose fathers or ancestors have been eminent in anyone kind, for the most part endeavour to excel in the same: as *quintus* the son of *publius mucius* did in the civil law; *africanus* the son of *paullus* in martial achievements. and some, not content with the glory of their ancestors, have added something else of their own to it: as that *africanus,* whom i just now mentioned; who beside his great fame for military exploits, made himself noted for his learning and eloquence. the same did *timotheus* the son of *conon,* who was equal to his father in the glory of war, and obtained that of learning and ingenuity besides. but it happens sometimes, that, omitting to tread in the steps of their fathers, some take new methods and designs of their own; which, generally speaking, is the case with those, who are born of mean parents, and propose to rise, and make their fortunes in the world. each of these things should be thoroughly considered and revolved in our minds, when e'er we deliberate about what will *become* us. the first thing then to be determined is, what sort of men we design to be, and what course of living to take to in the world; which is a case of all others the most hazardous and difficult. for *when* people are young, and consequently most foolish, they generally pitch upon that way of life, which *then* best pleases their unexperienced fancies; so that they are fixed and engaged in a certain course, before they have the judgment to discern what is best. *prodicus* indeed “as i find it in *xenophon”* tells us this story concerning *hercules;*

that when he was a youth, “which is the proper season allotted by nature for choosing a way of life” he withdrew himself into a solitary place, and there having found out a couple of ways, the one of *pleasure,* and the other of *virtue,* he sat musing and considered a while with himself, which of these two he had best to follow:

such a thing as this might happen to *hercules,* a son of *jupiter;* but 'tis not for us to expect the same, who each of us take whom we please for our patterns, and suffer ourselves to be drawn any whither, according as they lead us. we have most of us principles instilled by our parents, and follow their customs and manners of living: others are guided by popular opinion, and like that *best,* which takes with the *most.* however there are some, whether it be out of mere good fortune, or an happy temper and disposition of soul; or lastly, by the care and instructions of their parents, that pursue right methods and ways of living.

chapter 33.

few so happy, as to consider thoroughly what way of life they should choose. the principal thing to be regarded in choosing, is one's own genius: next to that one's fortune in the world. after a man has chose, he should stick to his choice, without great reasons to the contrary. how a change should be made. two cautions to be observed about imitating our ancestors. those men whose nature is not capable of some, should take the more care that they have other virtues. the best inheritance a father can leave his son, is the fame of his virtues. 'tis a mighty shame for a son to be unworthy of the fame of his ancestors.

but those of all are the most difficult to be found, who having sufficient natural parts, or sufficient improvements of learning and education, or both these together, have withal had due time to consider with themselves, what's the best course of life they can follow in the world. now in this deliberation, the principal thing which we ought to regard, is each man's peculiar nature and genius. for since the decorum of each particular action, as before was observed, is taken from the disposition of the person that does it; sure that disposition should be carefully consulted, before we determine upon our whole way of living; 'tis otherwise impossible we should keep a due tenour and consistency in our lives, and not sometimes faulter in the performance of our duty. but tho' nature in this case has much the greater sway, yet fortune comes in for a share next after her: both of them therefore should be duly consulted in making choice of a calling, but more especially nature: for fortune's unconstant and often changing, but nature is firm, and will always abide by us; so that for the *former* to oppose this *latter,* is like a mortal power's contending with an immortal. that man then, who has choose a way of living that's suitable to his nature, “provided *that* nature be no ways vitious” should make it his next care never to alter it; for nothing's less becoming than a humour of changing. but if upon trial he should find that he was mistaken in the choice of his method, “as 'tis possible such a thing sometime may happen” there's no way left but to unravel again what is already done. if the times themselves favour the making such a change, it may be the more easily and conveniently done; but if not, it must be brought about gradually and insensibly: according to that rule which is given by wise men, when e'er you design to break off any friendship or displeasing acquaintance, you should loosen the knot by little and little, and not try to cut it asunder all at once. and when by this means we have changed our course of life, great care should be taken that we may seem to have done it upon very good reasons. but having before recommended the imitation of our fathers and ancestors, i must here interpose an exception or two: in the first place then, we should take great care, not to follow them in any

thing that is vitious or blamable. nor, secondly, should we attempt it, when we find our constitution won’t carry us through' with it: thus, for instance, the son of the former *africanus,* “who adopted this *latter* being son to *paullus”* by reason of the weakness and indisposition of his body, could not so well tread in the steps of his father, as his father had done in those of his grandfather. but then if a man be in such a condition, as that he's unable to plead at the bar, to harangue the people, or conduct an army; he should take the more care that he do those things, which *are* in his power; such are the duties of justice and fidelity, of modesty, temperance and liberality; the performance of which may serve to make amends for his want of the others. now the noblest inheritance that can be left by a father to his son, and far exceeding *that* of houses and lands, is the fame of his virtues and glorious actions: and for a son to live for as is unworthy of the name and reputation of his ancestors, is the basest and most abominable thing in the world.

chapter 34.

the respective duties belonging to each age. old men should have an eye upon youth. vice is doubly evil in old men, because of the ill example given to the young. the duties of magistrates, private citizens, and strangers. nothing more becoming in all sorts of people, than consistency and regularity.

and since each age has its respective duties belonging to it, and the same things become not both young and old, i must add something also upon this distinction: 'tis required then of the younger sort of people, that they pay due reverence to those that are old, and choose out the best and most approved among them, by whose counsel and direction they may steer their lives. for indeed the unskilfulness and ignorance of youth, does stand in some need of the prudence of old age, to be its guide and director. this age especially should be kept from all loose and effeminate living, and be enured to labour, and enduring. hardships both of body and mind: that so they may be able to bear with the toils and fatigues of business, whether in peace or war. and if they do at any time slacken their minds, and give themselves up to their pleasures and refreshments, great care should be taken that they exceed not the limits of temperance and modesty: and in order to this, 'twould be very convenient, if some aged people would keep a constant eye upon their sports and recreations. as for old men, 'tis their duty to lessen the labours of the body, and employ more frequently those of the mind; and make it their business, by prudent and wise counsels, to do what good they can to the younger sort of people, to their friends and dependants, and more especially to the republic. and old men of all things should especially be careful, not to languish out their days in unprofitable idleness. luxury and riot is unbecoming in all, but is perfectly scandalous and intolerable in old age: but should lust and wantonness come into the bargain, those who are guilty of it are doubly faulty; for, first, they bring a shame and disgrace upon themselves, and withal make the young men more shamelessly wicked. beside these duties already mentioned, it mayn't be amiss to say something of those, which peculiarly belong either to magistrates, private citizens, or strangers. first then a magistrate ought to consider, *that* he does in his person represent the whole city, and accordingly's bound to maintain the credit and dignity of it: *that* he's to preserve the laws, and see that all people have their due rights; remembering that these things are committed to his trust, which he's bound to render up faithfully and honestly. 'to the duty of those in a private capacity, to live as the rest of their citizens do; neither debafing themselves below their just height, nor endeavouring to raise themselves up above it; and to follow those things which are honest and peaceable in the commonwealth: these are they, whom we usually call and account good citizens. and *lastly,* for strangers and sojourners in a place, 'tis their duty to follow their own business, and not intermeddle with any body's else; not to take upon them in what no way concerns them, or be curious in prying into the secrets of a state, which they have nothing to do with. by observing these rules we may, generally speaking, be sure to find our duty; whenever 'tis enquired what's suitable and becoming for such a *person,* such a *time,* or such an *age:* i shall only add, that in all our designs and all our undertakings, nothing's more becoming than constancy and regularity.

chapter 35.

decorum shews itself outwardly in three things. rules of modesty, taken from nature in the frame of our bodies. obscene talk discovers ill inclinations. the false reasoning of the cynicks, *and some* stoicks *upon this subject. rules of exterior decency in our carriage, postures,* &c. *the great care the old* romans *took of modesty.*

but seeing this decorum, of which we are speaking, is seen more especially, and discovers itself, in our actions, our words, and our carriage and exterior ornaments of the body; and consists in one of these three things, in a certain kind of natural beauty and comeliness; in pertinence and well-timing our words and actions; and such other kind of ornaments and outward embellishments, as are proper for the business one is going about; “things which 'tis no easy matter to express, but i hope i am understood, and that is sufficient; “ and seeing that care which we ought to take, of making our selves agreeable to those we converse with, consists in a due regulation of these; i shall proceed to discourse of them each in particular. in the first place then it may be worth our observing, how much care and concern has been shewn by nature, in ordering the frame and constitution of our bodies: those parts, which were handsome and agreeable to the sight, she has placed in view; but those which could *not* be so handsomely shewn, and were only given to serve certain ends and necessities of nature, these she has been careful to conceal and cover. a sence of shame and modesty in men has seconded this her diligence in framing their bodies; for all, that aren't wholly bereaved of their reason, keep those parts hidden, which *she* has concealed; and are always as secret as they can in those actions, which natural necessity forces them upon: neither do they call by their proper, and broad names, the parts that are given to serve such necessity, nor the uses of them; and modesty forbids us to mention those things, which may be done very honestly, provided it be in secret. therefore the plain and open *talking* of those things, as well as the plain and open *acting* of them, discovers immodest and wanton inclinations. the *cynicks* therefore are wholly to be rejected, and some of the *stoicks* little better than *cynicks;* who laugh at, and blame us for calling those things by their proper names, which are really dishonest and scandalous in themselves; while we count it a shame to speak plainly of those, in the doing of which there's no manner of dishonesty. to *rob,* for example, to *cheat* and *whore,* are actions in themselves the most shameful and scandalous, and yet it is not counted immodest to name them; whereas to *make one's self a father of children,* is an action that is honest and creditable in itself, and yet, forsooth, must not be plainly mentioned, for fear of its giving offence to chaste ears. this, and much more to the same purpose, they commonly urge against modesty and bashfulness: but let us follow where nature has shewed us the way, and whatever may offend either the eyes or ears, *that* let us shun in our carriage and conversation. in all our postures and gestures of body, such as standing, walking, sitting and leaning; nay, in our very countenance, in the cast of our eyes, and motions of our hands, we should be careful to keep and observe what's becoming: in which there's a double extream to be avoided, *that* of too much niceness and effeminacy on the one hand, and *that* of meer clownishness and want of breeding on the other. nor let anyone imagine, that these things do well in an actor or orator; but that we are left free to observe, or not observe them. the actors indeed have had always so much regard for modesty, as that, time out of mind, it has been their custom, never to appear upon the stage in public, without something on to conceal those parts, which ought to be kept secret; for fear least their cloths being opened by any accident, something might be seen, which modesty bids them hide. and our common custom forbids the son, when grown toward man's estate, to bathe with his father; and likewise the son-in-law with his father-in-law. we should therefore take care to be strict observers of these rules of modesty, especially being such as even nature herself has directed us to.

chapter 36.

two sorts of beauty, one proper for men, to other for women. men should avoid niceness, &c. *nothing affected can become. rules about cloths, walking, and outward ornaments. outward carriage discovers the inward dispositions of the mind. more care should be taken to keep decency in the motions of the soul. how this may be done. two sorts of motions in the soul, the sensitive appetite and reason. how each should be managed.*

but since there are two sorts of beauty in the world, to the *one* of which belongs prettiness or neatness, to the *other* comeliness and majesty; the former of these should be left to the women, and the latter only be thought proper for the men. from hence it follows, that *these* should avoid all unmanlike ornaments and niceness in their habits, and the same in the motions and gestures of their bodies. for all people hate the affected motions and carriage of those, who would be taken for masters of a gentile air; and your actors on the stage have a great many foolish impertinent gestures, which are very displeasing and offensive to the spectators: and in each of these kinds what is simple and unaffected, is always best liked of and approved by the world. if you would have a true comeliness, you must endeavour to keep a good colour in your face, and the way to do that, is to use frequent exercise. nor do we forbid men the use of all ornaments and graces to recommend them, but only of those that are too exquisite and affected: so far they are allowable, as they are necessary to keep a man from being thought a clown, and from shewing a disrespect for the persons he has to do with. and the same rule may serve very well for our cloths; in which to be moderate, as in most other cases, is certainly the best way. we should also avoid an effeminate softness and slowness in our gate, like those that are marching along in procession; and no less an over-great hastiness and speed, which only begets a deep panting and breathing, distorts the face, and perfectly changes the whole air of the countenance, which discovers a lightness and inconstancy of humour. now if the motions of the body deserve all this pains and concern about them; how much care should we take to keep those of the mind, within the limits prescribed them by nature and right reason? which never can be done any other way, than by keeping the soul in such an even temper, as not to be concerned or dejected at anything ; and by a constant care and application of thought, so as to nothing but what is honest and becoming. now the motions of the soul are of two sorts, some of them proceeding from the reasonable or thinking, others from the sensitive and passionate part: the former is busied in nothing but searching and finding out of truth; by the latter we are pushed and driven forward to action 'tis our duty therefore to employ our thoughts about laudable objects; and so to reduce and over-rule the passions, as that they may ebb and flow in obedience to reason.

chapter 37.

decorum shews itself in speaking. two sorts of speech. there might rules be given about our ordinary discourse. two things required in the voice and pronunciation. how each of them may be gotten. several examples of good speakers. rules about the manner, subjects and measure of our common talk.

another great instance in which this becomingness shews itself, is our speech and discourse. but whereas of this there are two sorts, the *one* proper only for argument and contention, the *other* for common and ordinary talk; we should make use of *that,* when we plead at the bar, or speak in the senate and publick assemblies; of *this* when we meet and discourse with our friends; when we walk in any of the public places; or are sitting at table, and over a glass of wine. there are teachers of rhetoric who give rules about the *former;* but there are no rules to be given about the *latter.* not but that i think there might some be invented; but the business is, there's no body to be found that would study them, if they were; otherwise masters would never be wanting, if there were but learners that would study, and employ them. hence we are almost over-run with rhetoricians; tho' no small part of the rules which they give, *viz.* those that concern either the words or the sence, may be very well applied to our ordinary discourse. 'tis the voice is that, whereby we can talk, and convey our inward thoughts from one another; in which there are two things chiefly required: first, that it be *clear.* and, secondly, *harmonious.* each of these must be the gift of nature, and is not attainable any other way; but where they are naturally, practice and exercise will encrease the one, and imitation of those, who speak sweetly and agreeably, better the other. this was the principal thing in the *catuli,* which made them be counted men of judgment and learning: tho' they had some skill in the matter 'tis true; and so had some others as well as they; but this one thing recommended them so much that they were esteemed the most perfect masters of the *roman* language. the sound of their voices was pleasing and harmonious; they neither slurred over things negligently in their pronunciation, nor yet were too exact in expressing every letter: the former of which would have made their speech obscure, and the latter affected. they never spoke so as to strain their voices, but equally avoided the double extream, that of faintness and sickliness “as it were” on the one hand, and of too much loudness and elevation on the other. *crassus*'s discourse was full out as witty, and not near so barren as that of the *catuli;* yet these had as great a reputation as he, upon the score of good speaking. *caesar,* who was brother to the elder *catulus,* was far more facetious and witty than any of them; so that in court, when before the judges, heed do more by his easy, familiar way of talking, than others could do by all the powers of their eloquence. each of these things should be diligently taken care of, if we desire to act decently on all occasions. our common discourse then led have to be such, as that wherein the followers of *socrates* excel; easy and good-natured, without any stubbornness or stiffness in opinion: let it be seasoned with mirth and pleasantness; and not be too tedious, pert, and assuming, as tho' it had a right to the attention of the hearers, and nobody else had anything to do with it: but think it reasonable, as in all other cases, so in this of discourse, to let every man fairly take his own turn. but especially in the first place it ought to be considered, what is the nature of the subject we are discoursing upon: if it be *serious,* we should handle it with seriousness; but if it be *merry,* with gaiety and briskness. but the most important thing to be taken care of, is, that our talk don't discover any viciousness in our manners; which is apt to appear by nothing so much, as by falling too foul upon those that are absent, either by turning them into ridicule, or misrepresenting them by malicious, reproachful language. now the subject of discourse in common

conversation is usually one of these three things; either our own private domestick concerns; or those that relate to the commonwealth in general; or lastly, some matter of study and learning; therefore when our talk begins to ramble from these, we should always be careful to fetch it back to them again. but whatever subjects present themselves “for we aren't all pleased with the same things, nor with anything equally at all times; “ but whatever subject, i say, we are upon, we should consider how far our discourse may be entertaining, and as we could find a time when to begin, so we should learn when to make an end.

chapter 38.

discourse should be free both from passion, and heaviness; and shew a respect for those we converse with. chiding and correction sometimes necessary: rules to be observed in it. in quarrels with adversaries we should avoid flying out into passion. to talk great of one's self very unbecoming.

'tis a general rule for the conduct of our lives, that we make it our business to be free from passion; that is, from all violent motions of the soul, which reject and cast off their allegiance to reason. this should be applied to the matter now before us, and all our discourse should be calm and unpassionate, without any transports of anger or desire; as also on the other hand, without deadness, and heaviness, or any such vice: and in every company we should carefully endeavour, to shew a sort of kindness and respect for those persons, with whom we converse. it sometimes comes to pass, that *chiding* is necessary; in which we may be allowed a little to raise our voices, and to use more sharpness and authority in our expressions: however we must be careful that we do not discover any passion; but let it rather be seen that we come to such corrections, as physitians do to cutting and scarifying wounds, but seldom, and with a great deal of regret and unwillingness. and indeed we should never come to them at all, unless it be necessary, and when no other methods will do any good. and even then, when we're forced to it, we must be sure “as was said” to avoid all anger; for whatsoever is guided by its influence and directions, can never be done with any prudence or moderation. our rebukes should be generally mild and gentle; but nevertheless such, as may carry some weight and authority along with them; observing a mean betwixt too great easiness, and breaking out into angry and contumelious language. and whatsoever sharpness we may express in our reproofs, we should let the person so corrected know, that we do it altogether for his good, and not for any ends or self-designs. in the quarrels we have even with our greatest adversaries, whatever dirty language may be thrown at us, 'tis the best way to keep our minds calm and sedate, and never let anger break in upon them: for whatever is spoken or done in a passion, can neither be consistent with the rules of gravity, nor be approved of by those who are present in the company. lastly, 'tis a very unbecoming thing for a man to talk great of himself in discourse, and especially when that which he says is false: which is but to imitate *braggadocchio* in the comedy, and make himself the laughing-stock and jest of the hearers.

chapter 39.

what sort of house is fitting for a person of honour. what should be the end of building. the examples of octavius *and* scaurus. *a great house brings a reproach on its master, if his worth be not answerable to it; and if he don't keep up the laws of hospitality. measures to be observed in building. three rules to be observed for the keeping a decorum in our actions.*

and since we take in “or desire at least to take in” all the several branches of duty, we must not forget to add a word or two, about what sort of house is becoming a gentleman, or a person of honour. now the main end of building is lodging, and the necessary uses of an house, and therefore the draught, or contrivance of it, should be suited accordingly. but we should not so much regard bare necessities, as not to have an eye to convenience and magnificence. *cneius octavius,* the first of that family that was ever consul, built himself a noble and magnificent house upon the *palatin* hill, which is said to have gained him a great deal of reputation; insomuch that the people coming usually to see it, the very house was supposed to have gone a great way toward advancing its owner “tho' a kind of an upstart” to the dignity of consul. this sometime after was pulled down by *scaurus,* that so he might make his own somewhat the bigger by it: but whereas *octavius,* by building *his* house, had made himself consul; this man, on the contrary, by enlarging of *his,* “tho' the son of a great and most eminent citizen” not only caused himself to be put by that office, but was moreover brought into shame and dishonour, and at last utterly ruined. 'tis well if a man can enhance that credit and reputation he has got, by the splendor of his house; but he must not depend upon his house alone for it: for the master ought to bring honour to his fine seat, and not the fine seat bring honour to its master. but as, in all other cases, a man should not have respect to himself alone, but to other people also; so 'tis in this of a noble

man's house, which ought to be made very large and capacious, because he must keep up the laws of hospitality, and entertain multitudes of all sorts of persons in it. for a fine and large house that gives entertainment to no body, serves but to reproach and upbraid its owner; and especially if 'twere used to be frequently visited under its former master: for 'tis an odious thing to have passengers cry, as they go along,

ah! good old house, alas thy present lord is not like thy former one!

which may justly be said of but too too many in our own days. care should be taken, especially when a man builds himself, that he be not too extravagant in his magnificence and expenses: which is a very ill thing tho' it had no other harm in it, but only *that one* of giving a bad example: for most men are apt, more than in anything else, to imitate the great ones as to this particular. where, for example, shall we find the man, that rivals the famous *lucullus* in his virtues? whereas how many have done it in the stateliness and magnificence of his country-houses? but there certainly ought to be *some bounds* fixed and prescribed to these things, and *those* to be according to the rules of moderation: but the measure whereby we are to judge of their being moderate, is their subserviency to the ornaments and conveniencies of life: and so much may suffice upon this head.

as for our *actions,* the way to maintain this decorum in *them,* is constantly to observe these three following precepts: first, *that we keep all our passions and appetites under the government and direction of reason,* than which there is nothing of greater efficacy toward the constant preservation of our duty. secondly, *that we consider the quality and moment of the thing, which we go about;* that so we may proportion our endeavours accordingly, and take neither more nor less pains about it, than it really deserves. and lastly, *that in all those exterior circumstances, which are only designed for a gentile show and grace of the action,* we should keep within the measures of prudence and moderation. now the best measure we can observe is this, to keep our eyes fixed on those rules of decorum i've before laid down, and never to transgress them. but of these three rules the first is the most important, *that the sensitive part be kept obedient to the reasonable*.

chapter 40.

order to be observed in our words and actions. wherein it consists. the duties arising from it. an excellent saying of pericles *to that purpose. of how great moment the due timing a thing is. we should be particularly careful to avoid little indecencies. harmony and agreement more necessary in our lives, than our music.*

it remains in the next place that we should speak of that *order,* which is to be observed in our words and actions; and of the proper seasons and opportunities of them. and here will fall under our consideration, that which by the *greeks* is called, 〈 non-latin 〉; by which i don't mean that〈 non-latin 〉, which by us is most commonly rendered *moderation,* and signifies the *keeping within due bounds:* but that which contains in the notion of it, *the preservation of order.* we shall crave leave, however, to call even this latter by the name of *moderation,* which is thus defined by the *stoick* philosophers, *moderation is the knowledge of putting whatever we say, or do, in its proper place.* from whence it appears, that *order* and the *well-placing* of things are but different words to express the same notion, for *order* is defined by the same sect of men, to be *the ranging of things in their fitting and proper places.*

now the place of an action they tells us is, *the season of time for doing it;* and by the *season of time* they mean nothing else, than that which the *greeks* call 〈 non-latin 〉, and which we express by the word *occasio:* so that, in short, by *moderation* here “in the sence of the word which i have just now given” we mean no more than *the knowledge of well-timing whatever we do.* prudence may be defined the same way too, about which we have spoken at the entrance of this work: but now we're discoursing of temperance, moderation, and such like virtues. what the duties of prudence are, is sufficiently explained in its proper place; what those of modesty and such other virtues, as serve to recommend us to those we converse with, and make up the subject of our present enquiry, remains now to be considered. *in the first place then,* we ought to observe a due regularity and *order* in our actions, as that the several parts of our whole lives, like those of a regular and coherent discourse, may agree and be suitable one with another. for what is more unseemly, and contrary to good manners, than when we're engaged about serious business, to bring in some pleasant and merry discourse, that's proper for a feast or over a glass of wine? 'twas a very good answer to the present purpose, which *pericles* once gave to *sophocles* the tragedian: they were both of them praetors of *athens* together, and meeting one day about some business of their office, it happened a beautiful boy passed by; whom *sophocles* espying, *heavens!* said he, pericles, *what a delicate youth is there!* to which he replied, *a magistrate,* sophocles, *should keep a strict guard, not over his hands only, but his eyes too.* now had *sophocles* happened to say the same words, at a time when they were choosing of wrestlers or racers, such a rebuke had been wholly undeserved: so much may the merit, or demerit of an action, depend upon the circumstances of time and place. suppose, for example, a man had some considerable cause upon his hands, or business that required attentive thinking: could anyone blame him for being very thoughtful as he walked or rid? but should he shew himself so at a feast among company, it would be counted a great piece of rudeness and ill-breeding, and this for not observing the difference of seasons. now as for those things, which notoriously offend against the rules of good manners, such as for a man to sing openly in the streets, or any other gross and apparent absurdity, these are so easy to be observed by all, that we need give no rules or directions about them; but we ought more especially to employ our care, in avoiding those little unheeded indecencies, which are hardly understood by the generality of mankind. and as the least fault or disagreement in the notes, is immediately perceived by a skilful musician; so we should take all imaginable care, that there be no disagreement in our lives and actions: and that so much the more, as the harmony in our lives is of much greater consequence, than that in our musick.

chapter 41.

decency to be kept even in the least things, as the moving of the eyes, &c. *we should observe what's unhandsome in others, and correct it in our selves. we should ask the advice of experienced persons. cautions in taking this advice. we should follow custom and civil constitutions. some things allowable in some great men, which aren't so in others. nothing immodest is becoming. some particular duties to be observed by all good men.*

as therefore the delicate ear of the artist can quickly discover the least fault in his musick; so would we take as much care in detecting and censuring our vices, we might from the least and most trivial matters, make several observations that would be much to our advantage. from the moving of our eyes, for example; from our way of smoothing or wrinkling our brows; from the merry or sorrowful air of our countenances; from our laughter, freedom or reservedness in discourse; from the rising or falling the tone of our voices, and a great many other such little kind of circumstances, we might easily judge what is handsom and becoming us, and what is repugnant to the rules of our duty, and to that which our nature or character requires. now in this particular 'tis a very good way, to observe first in others how each of these suits, that so we may avoid and correct in *our selves,* whatever we see bad and misbecoming in *them.* for, i know not how, we can sooner 'spy faults out in other people, than we can in our selves; upon which account there's no better way to correct any learner, than for the master to mimic his faults before him; that so he, perceiving their deformity in another, may the sooner be brought to amend them in himself. another good way is, whenever we are in doubt and suspense about a duty, to go to some learned or experienced person, and ask his advice upon the matter in question, before we resolve and determine with our selves: because, generally speaking, when left to themselves, men are apt to be guided too much by their own inclinations and natures. and in asking this advice we should diligently observe, not only what everyone tells us in words, but what his real inward opinion is, and what reasons and grounds he may have for such opinions. for *as* your statuaries, painters and poets, use to set their works out to be publicly viewed; that so they may be able to correct such faults, as are generally found by spectators in them: and *as* they consider with themselves and their friends, what oversights or mistakes they have been guilty of in them; *so* should we make use of other people's judgments as well as our own, and do or not do, correct or alter a great many things upon their advice. as for those things that are settled by custom and civil constitutions, i shall give no directions at all concerning them; for they are sufficient directions of themselves: i shall only observe, that 'tis a great mistake in anyone to think, because such men as *aristippus,* and *socrates,* have ventured to say, or do a great many things, which are contrary to rule and received custom, that therefore he may be allowed the same: for these are persons of extraordinary merits, and almost more than human perfections; and on that account might demand some privileges, which aren't to be granted to the rest of the world. but as for the practice and manner of the *cynicks,* 'tis wholly to be discarded; for 'tis a plain offence against the rules of modesty, without which nothing can be virtuous and becoming. 'tis our duty to pay a respect and deference, as to all those that are virtuous and couragious, who design for the good and advantage of the republic, and serve or have served her in any of her interests; so to those also, who bear any office or command in the state. we should pay in like manner a peculiar regard and reverence to old age: never resist any public magistrate: make a distinction between citizens and strangers; and of strangers themselves, between those in a private and public capacity. in fine, not to mention any more particulars, we ought in all cases both to keep *our selves,* and endeavour to uphold and maintain among *others,* that common correspondence and universal society, that's among all mankind.

chapter 42.

of the several sorts of trade which are creditable, and which not. all those that administer to vice and debauchery, scandalous. lying in tradesmen abominable. how far merchandise is creditable, husbandry particularly commended.

as for trades and the ways of getting money, which of them are creditable, and which otherwise, i have only these very few things to observe: *first,* all those are unworthy ways of gaining, which procure one a general hatred and ill-will; as that of the *userers* and *tax-gatherers,* for instance. *secondly,* those arts are mean and ungentle, in which a man is paid for his *work* not his *skill;* for the very receiving a reward for one's labour, is like taking of earnest to bind himself a slave. nor are they to be esteemed as better than mean and ordinary people, that buy things up by the lump of merchants, to sell them out again by little and little; for what they gain is but a very poor business, unless they are guilty of abominable lying; than which there is nothing in the world more scandalous. again, all handicrafts-men have but a mean sort of calling, and 'tis impossible that a work-house should have anything that's gentile in it. *further yet,* all those trades are pitiful and low, that purvey and cater for the satisfying men’s pleasures; fishmongers, butchers, cooks, poulterers, *&c.* as *terence* reckons them up; to which we may add, if you please, perfumers, dancing-masters, and those who supply us with dice or cards. but arts that have something of knowledge and skill in them, or those that are useful and necessary for the publick; such as physick, for instance, or architecture, or the instruction and education of youth in good-manners, these are very creditable and commendable in those, whose rank and condition is suited for such employments. as for merchandise, 'tis sordid and mean, when the trade that is driven is little and inconsiderable: but when it takes in a great quantity of business, and bringing home goods from every country, sells them out again without lying or deceiving, we can hardly say but that 'tis creditable enough: nay, 'tis most certainly very commendable, when those who're concerned in it only design “after they are *sated,* or rather *consented,* with what they have gained” to betake themselves wholly from the *haven* to the *country,* as before they have done from the *sea* to the *haven,* and there enjoy quietly their private possessions. but among all the methods of enriching one's self, there's no one better; no one more profitable, pleasant and agreeable; no one more worthy of a man and a gentleman, than *that* of manuring and tilling the ground: concerning which i have spoken at large in my *cato major,* from whence you may borrow what's necessary to be said upon this subject.

chapter 43.

the comparing of two parts of honesty one with another. the duties of prudence or finding out truth, and those of justice or maintaining human society compared; and the preference given to the latter.

and thus have i finished what i had to say upon the first question, and, i think, sufficiently made it appear, how the particular instances of duty are to be drawn from the several heads of honesty. but it often comes to pass, that those very things themselves which are honest, *rival* as it were, and come into competition with one another, so as to make it be another question, *of two that are honest, which is the most so?* which is a point not mentioned at all by *panaetius.* for the whole of virtue receiving its rise from those four fountains: first, *prudence,* or the knowledge of truth. secondly, *justice,* or or doing good to the community and society of mankind. thirdly, *fortitude,* or greatness of soul. and, lastly, *temperance,* or *moderation;* it can't but happen, that several of these must be compared together, before we can be able to satisfy our selves, which 'tis our duty to prefer before which. *first then,* if the duties of *justice,* or preserving the community, and those of *prudence,* or the knowledge of truth, should come into competition one with another; the former, i think, should take place of the latter, as being more consonant to the dictates of nature, which may easily be proved by this following argument: suppose a wise man to be in such a place, as afforded him all the conveniencies of life, and all the opportunities of leisure in abundance, so that he might study and contemplate everything, that was any ways worthy his knowledge or contemplation; *yet* were he wholly deprived of all company, and had no body ever come near him to be seen, heed quickly be tired and grow weary of his life. again, the principal of all the virtues is that sort of wisdom which the *greeks* call 〈 non-latin 〉; “for as for *that* which they call 〈 non-latin 〉, and we *prudentia,* 'tis a thing of a perfectly different nature, as being no more than *the skill of discerning what 'tis that we ought, or ought not, to do:”* but that sort of wisdom which i said was the principal, is, *the knowledge of things both divine and human;* and so comprehends the *society* and *relation* of men with the gods, and with one another. if then this, as most certainly 'tis, be the greatest virtue; it follows that the duties, which flow from society, must as certainly be the greatest: for the deepest knowledge and contemplation of nature, is but a very lame and imperfect business, unless it proceed and tend forward to action: now the occasions wherein it can shew itself best, consist in maintaining the interests of men, and of consequence belong to the society of mankind: from whence it follows, that the maintaining of *this* should in reason take place before learning and knowledge. nor is this any more, than what all good men shew they judge to be true, by their actions and practices: for who's there so wholly addicted to contemplation and the study of nature, as that, if his country should fall into danger, while he was in one of his noblest researches, he would immediately throw all aside, and run to its relief with all possible speed; nay, tho' he thought he might number the stars, or take the just dimensions of the whole world? and the same would he do in case of any danger to a friend or a parent. from all which things it undeniably appears, that the duties of *knowledge* and searching for truth, are obliged to give way to the duties of *justice,* which consist in upholding *society* among men; than which there is nothing we should be more concerned for.

chapter 44.

even those, whose business is the search after truth, are serviceable to the society of mankind, and how. speaking well preferable to the highest speculations, and why. man by nature a sociable creature. knowledge of little use, unless it tend to action, and do some good to the world. necessity not the reason of men's joining into societies.

nay those very men, who have spent their whole lives in philosophy and learning, have yet always endeavoured, as much as they could, to be serviceable to the interest and good of mankind. for many brave men, and very useful members of their several states, have in great part been made such by their institutions. thus *epaminondas,* the famous *theban,* was indebted for his education to *lysis,* the *pythagorean: dion* of *siracuse,* for *his* to *plato;* and the same may be said of a great many others; even i myself, whatever service i have done the republic “if at least it may be said i have done it any service” must wholly ascribe it to

that learning, and those instructions i received from my masters. neither is their teaching, and instructing others, determined to the time of their living here; but they continue to do it even after they are dead, by the learned discourses which they leave behind them: for there's no one point they have left unhandled, relating either to the laws, customs, or discipline of the commonwealth: so that they seem to have sacrificed their leisure and opportunities of study, to the benefit of those who are engaged in business. and thus we see how those men themselves, whose lives have been spent in the pursuit of wisdom, have nevertheless endeavoured by their learning and prudence, to be some way profitable to the community of mankind. and for this one reason, persuasive speaking, if joyned with prudence, is a greater accomplishment than the acutest thinking, if destitute of eloquence: for *thinking* is terminated in itself alone, but speaking reaches out to the benefit of those, with whom we are joyned in the same society. now as bees don't *therefore* unite themselves together, that so they may the better prepare their combs; but *therefore* prepare their combs, because they do by nature unite themselves together: so men, and much more, being creatures that naturally love society; in consequence of that, seek how they may find methods of living happily in it. from hence it follows, that the knowledge of things, unless 'tis accompanied with that sort of virtue, which consists in defending and preserving of men, *i. e.* in the maintenance of human society, is but a barren and fruitless accomplishment; and even *greatness of soul,* without a regard to this society and conjunction, is very little better than savageness and barbarity. thus we may see, that the getting of knowledge is a duty of much less concern

and moment, than the preserving this society and union amongst men. 'tis a very false notion that hath been advanced by some people, *that* necessity alone was the motive to this society, which we have so often mentioned; and *that* men would never have associated together, but that they weren't able, in a solitary life, to furnish themselves with the necessaries of nature; and *that* every great and exalted genius, would providence supply him with food and the other conveniencies of life, would withdraw from all business and entercourse with men, and give himself wholly to study and contemplation. this is not so; for he would avoid solitude, endeavour to find a companion in his studies, and always be desirous of teaching and learning, of hearing and speaking. from all which things 'tis abundantly evident, that the duties belonging to human society, should in reason take place before those which relate to *unactive* knowledge.

chapter 45.

the duties of maintaining society not always preferable to those of temperance, modesty, &c. *what duties of justice ought to take place of others.*

perhaps it may be asked, whether the duties of this society, which is thus agreeable to the dictates and principles of nature, ought always to be preferred before the duties of temperance, decency and moderation? indeed i think not: for

some things there are so highly scandalous and abominably wicked, that a wise man would hardly be guilty of them, supposing he could bring safety to his country by it. *pesidonius* has heaped up a great many instances of things of this nature; some of which are so very filthy, and intolerably obscene, that 'tis a shame even so much as to repeat them after him. these then must never be done for one's country; nor will one's country ever desire that they should; for the best on't is, 'tis impossible such a conjuncture should happen, as that it should be profitable for any republic, to have wise men be guilty of such abominable actions. we may lay down this then for a certain conclusion, that when several duties come into competition, those should take place before any others, which relate to the maintenance of human society. for wise and considerate *acting* is the end of all *knowledge* and prudent thinking; and by consequence *that* is more valuable than *this.* and so much may suffice upon this subject; for, i think, i have sufficiently cleared the way, so that hereafter there will be no difficulty, to know which duties are to be preferred before which. but those very duties which relate to society, are of different rates and degrees among themselves; but 'tis no hard matter to see in what order they

ought to be performed: as in the *first* place, those to the immortal gods. *secondly,* to our native country. *thirdly,* to our parents; and so on to all others in their respective places. what has been said in a few words on this last head, i hope, is sufficient to make it appear, that 'tis usual for men not only to doubt, *whether such and such an action be honest or dishonest;* but also, *of two, that are both of them honest, which is the most so.* this is one of those two heads, which i at first observed were omitted by *panaetius:* let us now pass on to the remaining part of our proposed division.

the end of the first book.

the second book.

chapter 1.

what will be the subject of this second book. he applies himself to the study of philosophy, as his greatest consolation in the midst of the publick calamities of his country.

what those duties are, son *mark,* which *honesty* and *virtue* require of us, and how they arise from their several fountains, is, i think, plain enough from the former book. i am now in the next place to speak of those others, which wholly regard the convenience of life, and are requisite for the getting and enjoyment of those things, which serve for our comfortable subsistence here; such as interest, riches, *&c.* and here i told you, the common heads of deliberation were, *what is profitable, and what unprofitable?* and, *of several profitables, which is more, and which most of all such?* concerning which i shall begin to speak, after i have premised but a word or two, in vindication of myself, and my present undertaking. for tho' my books have excited several both to the reading, and even writing of philosophy; yet i am now-and-then apt to be afraid, least some, who are otherwise very good men, should hate and despise the very name of that study; and wonder at me, for bestowing such portions of my time and pains, in so very fruitless and insignificant a manner. to whom i answer, that so long as the republic was governed by those, to whose care and management she had intrusted herself, i was ever diligent and employed all my thoughts, for her good and preservation. but *when* one man had seized of her wholly to himself, and there was no place left for my counsel or authority: and *when* i had lost those extraordinary persons, who had been my companions in labouring for her interest: i resolved not to sink into anguish and despair, which had wholly over-whelmed me, if i had not resisted them; nor to follow such pleasures or idle ways of living, as were improper and unbecoming a man of learning. i could heartily wish, had it so pleased the gods, that the republic had continued in its ancient condition, and never fallen into the hands of those men, who aren't so much for changing, as overturning everything! i should then, as i did in its flourishing circumstances, spend my time rather in business, than writing; and what i did write, would not be things of this moral nature, but my publick orations, as i have often done. but when the poor state, which had taken up all my care and thoughts, and for which i had laboured with all my power, was utterly ruined and sunk into nothing, there was quickly no room left for such orations, either at the bar, or in the senate-house: and my active mind, which had always been employed in that kind of studies, now not being able to lye wholly idle; i thought i could not find out a better way to get rid of those troubles which oppressed my mind, than by returning again to the studies of philosophy. i had spent a good part of my time in these, whilst i was young, for the improvement of my reason: but when i came once to be a candidate for places, and devoted myself to the service of the publick; i had little time left for philosophical enquiries; only so much, as could be spared from the business of my friends and the state; which was wholly taken up in nothing but reading, without any leisure at all for writing.

chapter 2.

some advantage to be drawn out of evils. the commendation and definitions of wisdom and philosophy. 'tis the only way of obtaining virtue and happiness. the opinion of the academics, *and why they dispute against everything.*

however then we have this advantage, in the midst of all our miseries and calamities, that by them we are brought to the writing of those things, which were not sufficiently known amongst us, tho' nothing in the world more deserves our knowledge. for what is there, o ye gods! more desirable than wisdom? what more excellent and lovely in itself? what more useful and becoming for a man? or what more worthy of his reasonable nature? now those who are busied in the pursuit of this, are called philosophers; and the word *philosophy* signifies no more, if you'd take it literally, than *a certain desire and love for wisdom:* and wisdom's defined by the old philosophers, *the knowledge of things both divine and humane, together with the causes upon which they depend:* the study of which whosoever finds fault with, i confess i can't perceive what 'tis he would commend. for what study is there, that brings so much quiet and tis faction to the mind, "if these are the things which we long after" as theirs who are always a-searching out something, which may contribute to the welfare and happiness of their lives? or if it be virtue and constancy that we desire, either 'tis *this* is the method of obtaining them, or else there is not any to be found in the world. to say there's *no* art of those weightier concerns, when none of the most trivial matters is without art, becomes only those who talk without thinking, and deceive themselves in their most important business: but if there *is* an art of attaining virtue, in what other way we do hope to find it, if this be forsaken, of which i am now speaking. but these things use to be more fully handled, when we excite and persuade men to cultivate philosophy: which i have endeavoured to do in another work. my design at present was only to shew, why i particularly chose this study, being thrust from all business and concern in the government. there are others, and those men of no small learning, who object against me, and ask, *if i am not inconsistent with myself, who affirm that nothing at all can be known, and yet have discoursed upon several subjects, and at this very time am laying down rules and directions about duty:* i could wish these persons had understood our opinions a little more thoroughly; for we are not of *those,* whose minds are perpetually wandering in uncertainties, and have nothing whereby to determine their assents; "for what sort of mind must a man needs have, or rather what life must he needs lead, when he's utterly debarred from all liberty of disputing, and observing any regular conduct in his actions?" nor yet of *those others,* who call some things *certain* and others *uncertain:* but rejecting both these, *we* say some things are *probable* and others *improbable.* is there anything then that should hinder me, from approving of that, which i think most probable; and laying aside that, which i think the contrary? or where's the inconsistency, if leaving that arrogant pretence of *demonstrating,* i am neither too rash, nor presumptuous in my opinions, which of all things in the world are the farthest from wisdom? now this is the reason why we *academics* dispute against everything, because what is probable could not appear, without comparing the arguments upon either side of the question. but these things are cleared, i think, accurately enough, in my books entitled *academical questions.* but you, my son, are already engaged in the study of a most noble and ancient philosophy; and have gotten *cratippus* for your master and instructor, who is hardly inferior to its most glorious founders: however, i would have you acquainted with our doctrines, which are very little different from those of your own sect. but it's high time now to return to our purpose.

chapter 3.

the knowledge of honesty is of greatest moment. profit and honesty really the same, and distinguished only by an act of the mind. the customary opinion to the contrary very pernicious. the division of things that are profitable, and hurtful to men. the good we receive from inanimate beings owing to man's industry.

there being then, as was before observed, five general heads of deliberating and consulting for the finding out our duty; two of which relate to what is honest and becoming; two to the uses and conveniencies of life, such as plenty, power, riches, *&c.* and the fifth to the teaching us how we ought to choose, if any of the former should seem to contradict and run counter to one another: we have gone through' with that, wherein *honesty* is the question; with which i desire you'd be more especially acquainted. the point which now comes under consideration, is what usually goes by the name of *profitable;* concerning which, custom is mightily in the wrong, and by little and little has brought it to such a pass, as to make a distinction between profit and honesty; and settle it as a constant and received maxim, *that a thing may be honest without being profitable; and again may be profitable without being honest:* the most pernicious error, and most destructive of all goodness, that ever could have crept into the minds of men. the greatest however, and most eminent philosophers, have been always so strict and severe in their writings, as to make the three natures of *justice, profit,* and *honesty,* be blended and interwoven together in reality, and distinguishable only by an act of the mind. for whatever is *just,* say they, the same is also *profitable;* and whatever is *honest,* the same is also *just;* from whence it follows, that whatever is *honest,* the same must be also *profitable.* did people but consider this matter as they ought, they would not, as now they commonly do, admire a crafty and subtle sort of fellows, and esteem that wisdom, which in truth is roguery. this error therefore should wholly be rooted out of the minds of men, and all should be taught, that if ever they hope to obtain their ends, they should not set about it by the ways of knavery and underhand dealings, but by justice and integrity in their designs and actions. now all things that tend to the good and preservation of the life of man, are either *inanimate,* such as gold, silver, the productions of the earth, and other such like; or *animals,* which have natural powers, inclinations and appetites. of these some are *unreasonable* and others *reasonable:* the *unreasonable* are horses, oxen, and other sorts of cattel; to which we may add bees, which produce and make something, that contributes to the convenience of the life of men: the *reasonable* are gods and men. the means for procuring the favour of the gods, is to live a religious and holy life: next to the gods, there's nothing so capable of contributing to the happiness and welfare of men, as men themselves. the same distribution may serve for those things, which tend to the hurt and inconvenience of men. but because 'tis believed, that to hurt is incompatible with the divine nature, the gods for that reason are excepted here, so that men are supposed, of all things in nature, to do both the most service and disservice to one another. for *first,* those things which are called inanimate, are most of them owing to the industry of men; which we neither could *get,* if it weren't for their labour and art in procuring them; nor afterwards *use* without their assistance. for where should we have such a science as physick; as navigation or agriculture? how should we gather and preserve our corn, and the rest of our fruits, if it were not for men? and then how should those commodities, which we want, be imported; or those, with which we abound, be exported, if there were not men to do each of these works? in like manner, how could stones be fetched out of the quarries for our necessary uses? how could iron, brass, gold and silver, be dug and drawn out from the bowels of the earth, did not men set their hands to work for these purposes?

chapter 4.

other conveniencies from inanimate beings, and unreasonable animals, received by men's industry. the advantages arising from men's joining in society.

so houses, which serve to defend us from the extremities of heat and cold, could neither at first have been made by mankind; nor afterwards, if by earth-quake, tempest, or length of days, they had fallen to decay, have been repaired or rebuilt; had not men, joyned together in one common society, learnt to beg help and assistance of one another. to this industry of men we are also indebted for conveyances of water, for making new channels and arms to rivers, and for turning the streams after such a manner, as thereby to water and fatten our grounds; for throwing up banks to defend us from the waves, and making of new harbors in convenient places. from all which instances, and a great many others that might easily be produced, 'tis abundantly manifest, that the fruits and advantages reaped from those things, which are called *inanimate,* are entirely owing to men's labour and industry. *secondly,* those we receive from *unreasonable* animals, how very little and inconsiderable would they be, if they were not augmented by the same peoples industry? for who was it but men that first discovered the uses, to which beasts in their several kinds might be serviceable? and how at this time could we feed or break them? how could we keep them, and get the most profit and advantage by them, without the endeavours and assistance of the same men? 'tis *they* that destroy us those creatures which are hurtful, and procure for us those which may be serviceable to us. why need i mention a multitude of arts, which are absolutely necessary to our wellbeing here? for what help or succour could those that are sick, or what pleasure those that are healthy find? how could mankind be supplied with victuals, and other conveniencies or comforts of life; if it weren't for that number of callings in the world, which are wholly designed to provide them of such things? by which men are brought to live better and more handsomely, and are raised to a condition so far above that of unreasonable animals. again, cities could neither have been built nor frequented, without a community and society of men: from hence have arisen all laws and customs; the bounds of equity and justice have been settled; and a certain and regular method laid down for the conduct of men's lives. this has brought modesty into request, and filled off the natural roughness of men's tempers; has contributed to the greater security of their lives, and established such a commerce and correspondence among them, as by mutual giving and receiving of benefits, by bartering and changing one commodity for another, one convenience for another, supplies them to the full with whatever they stand in need of.

chapter 5.

nothing extraordinary either in war, or peace, can be done without the help of men. nothing the cause of so much evil to men, as they themselves are to one another. what is the office of virtue. the whole business of it consists in three things.

we dwell much longer, than we needed to do, upon this subject: for who does not *set,* which *panaetius* has spent many pages to *make out,* that neither a general in war, nor a statesman in peace, could ever perform any glorious exploits, or do any notable service to the publick, without the concurrence of other men's endeavours? to confirm this assertion, he brings *themistocles, pericles, agesilaus* and *alexander;* and tells us, that no one of all these, without the assistance of others to support them, could ever have achieved such glorious actions. what he tells us is undoubtedly true, and such a number of witnesses altogether superfluous. and as *men* thus receive most extraordinary benefits, from agreeing and conspiring to lend mutual assistance; so we shall find, upon changing the scene, that there are no misfortunes or calamities so great, as those which they bring upon one another. *dicaearchus,* a learned and eloquent *peripatetick,* has written a whole book *concerning the destruction of men;* where first *having* reckoned up all other causes of it, such as inundations, pestilences, and famines, and even sudden incursions of furious wild beasts, "by which he assures us some whole nations have been devoured; " and then placing on the other side wars, seditions, and such-like misfortunes, which men were the occasions of; he endeavours to shew at the foot of the account, that a great many more have been destroyed by *these,* than by all other accidents or calamities whatever. this then being indisputably true, that the *goods* men enjoy, and the *evils* they suffer, proceed for the most part from men themselves; i say 'tis the principal office of virtue, to procure the good-liking and favour of men, and so to engage their endeavours and affections, as to make them still ready to do us any kindness. 'tis the business therefore of laborious callings, to supply us with all the conveniencies of life, which may be had from the use of inanimate beings, and unreasonable animals: but to gain the affections of *men* on our side, and beget in *them* always a readiness and desire to advance our interest, is a work that requires the wisdom and virtue of the greatest men. for the whole work and exercise of virtue in general, consists in some one of these three things: the *first* is a knowledge, in all we undertake, of what is agreeable to truth and sincerity; what's becoming and suitable to every one's character; what will be the consequence of such or such actions; what are the materials out of which things are made, and what the causes that first brought them into being. the *second,* a restraining the violent motions and passions of the soul, which by the *grecians* are termed 〈 non-latin 〉; and bringing the irregular inclinations of the appetite, which by the same are called 〈 non-latin 〉, under the power and government of reason. the *third* is a skilfulness of address in our carriage, and a winning demeanour toward the rest of men, with whom we are joyned in one common society; that so by their help we may be supplied in abundance, with all those things which our natures stand in need of; and by the same may be enabled, should any injury be offered us, to keep our selves secure from the violences of it; and not only so, but to revenge ourselves also upon the guilty person, and inflict such punishments, as are according to the rules of humanity and justice.

chapter 6.

how far the power of fortune over men reaches. the several reasons why men favour anyone; or submit to his authority.

what means should be used for the gaining, and securing men firm to our interests, we shall mention immediately; but we have one observation to make before-hand. there's no one but knows that the power of fortune is very great, both as to the *good,* and *ill* success of our actions: for when she favours us, we quickly arrive at our desired haven; but when she turns against us, we as quickly are shipwrecked and run a-ground. now of those events which depend upon fortune, there are some which come to pass but extraordinary seldom; such as storms, tempests, shipwrecks, ruins, fires, *&c.* which proceed from *inanimate beings;* and from *brutish animals* kicks, bites, pushes, *&c.* all which, as i said, do but rarely happen: but the *overthrows of armies,* as of three but a while ago, and a great many others at several times; *the deaths of commanders,* as lately of a great and extraordinary person; *the hatred and violence of the enraged multitude,* and, as a consequence of that, the banishments, flights and utter undoing's of well-deserving citizens: as also on the other, *prosperous successes,* such as honours, commands, victories, *&c.* tho' they are all truly fortuitous things, yet they can't succeed either the one way or to other, without the assistance and endeavours of men. this being noted, we are now to discourse of those ways and methods, whereby men are drawn and inclined to be for us, and to endeavour all they can for our interest and advantage: upon which if we seem to dwell longer than we should do, i desire the usefulness of the subject may be considered, and then we may possibly be thought too short. whatsoever then is contributed by men, toward anyone's advancement in riches, honours, power, *&c.* is always done upon some of these motives: *first, that* of kindness, benevolence, or good-will; when for some reasons they *love* any person. *secondly,* honour or admiration; when they *respect* anyone for his virtues, and think he deserves to be highly promoted. *thirdly,* confidence, trust, or reliance; when they think they may safely *confide* in a man, as one that will certainly take care of their affairs. *fourthly,* fear, when they stand in any *aw* of his power and authority. *fifthly,* hope, when they expect to get something from him; as when princes or popular men promise great donations. and, *last of all,* hire, when they are drawn to it by money or presents; which is much the most pitiful and sordid way, as for those on the one hand that are taken by it, so likewise for those that endeavour to make use of it: for 'tis never well when people shall attempt to get that by money, which ought to be the reward of virtue and merit. however seeing sometimes one must have recourse to this method as a refuge, i shall give some rules for our direction in the use of it; but first speak of those, that are more nearly related to virtue and honesty. in much the same manner, and for several such reasons, men submit to the power and authority of another: either because they have a *kindness* for him; or have formerly received some obligations from him; or *respect* him for his worth; or *hope* they shall get something by it; or *fear* they shall be forced to it, if they don't do it voluntarily; or are drawn by fair *promises* and large donations; or, lastly, "as we see it too often practised in our own republic" are downright *hired* to it.

chapter 7.

a governor should endeavour to make himself loved, and not feared. the fates of several, who have taken the contrary method.

now of all those methods, which tend to the advancement and maintenance of our interest, there is none more proper and convenient than *love,* and none more improper and inconvenient than *fear.* for, as 'tis very well observed by *ennius, whom men fear, they also hate; and whom they hate, they wish out of the world.* but that no force of power or greatness whatever, can bear up long against a stream of public hate, if it were not sufficiently known before, was of late made appear by an instance of our own. and not the murther of that tyrant only, who by force of arms oppressed the city, which now most obeys him, when taken out of the world; but the like untimely ends of most other tyrants, who have generally been attended by the same ill fate, is a manifest token that the hatred of people is able to min the most absolute authority: for obedience proceeding from *fear* can't possibly be lasting; whereas that which is the effect of *love,* will be faithful for ever. 'tis well enough in those, who by open force have reduced any nation, and accordingly rule it with an high hand, if they *do* sometimes use rigour and severity, like masters towards their slaves, when there's no other way of holding them in subjection: but for those who are magistrates in a *free* city, to endeavour to make themselves feared by the people, is one of the maddest, and most desperate attempts upon the face of the earth. for tho' a man should by his power and greatness oppress the laws, and over-awe liberty by terror and threatening's, yet still they will find time to recover again, first by the private resentments of the citizens, and afterwards by their choosing in secret consults, some worthier person to free them from the oppressor. and liberty, after she has been chained up a while, is always more curst, and bites deeper, than she would otherwise have done if she had never been restrained. let us therefore embrace and adhere to that method, which is of the most universal influence, and serves not only to secure us what we have, but moreover to enlarge our power and authority: that is in short, let us rather endeavour to be *loved* than *feared;* which is certainly the best way to make us successful as well in our private, as our public business. for those who desire to have others be afraid of them, must needs be afraid of those others in their turns: what, for instance, shall we imagine of the elder *dionysius?* with what eternal fears and apprehensions must he needs be racked, when daring not to venture his throat to any razor, he was forced even to singe off his beard with coals? or what of *alexander,* who was surnamed the *pheraean?* in what torment, think we, must he perpetually live? when "as 'tis usually reported of him" he dared not so much as to rise from table, and go to his own wife *thebe*'s chamber, one whom he loved with an entire affection, without a *barbarian,* and him "as 'tis said" to a branded *thracian,* to lead the way with his naked sword? and would always dispatch some of his guards before him, to search all the cloths and coffers of the women, for fear least any weapon might be concealed within them. o miserable and unhappy man! who could think a *barbarian,* one that carried the marks of his condition in his forehead, would be faith fuller to him than his own wife. neither, it seems, was he mistaken in it; for he was afterwards murthered by her procurement, upon suspicion of having to do with some other woman. nor indeed can any authority, how absolute soever, subsist very long when 'tis thus generally feared: *phalaris* himself, who is particularly remarkable for his barbarous cruelties, may serve for a witness to this truth; who was not destroyed by domestick treacheries, like that *alexander,* whom i just now mentioned; nor yet by some *few* men conspiring his death, like our late tyrant; but by a general insurrection of all the *agrigentines* falling upon him at once. again, did not the *macedonians* revolt from *demetrius,* and all with one consent march over to *pyrrhus?* and when the *lacedaemonians* grew insolent and tyrannical, did not their allies upon a sudden forsake them, and shew themselves idle and unconcerned spectators of their ruin at *leuctra,* without ever stirring one foot to their assistance?

chapter 8.

the just and gentle government of the old romans: *when changed, and the fatal consequences of that change.* caesar *and* sylla*'s unjust cruelties. one cause of civil wars is men's hoping to raise themselves by them. all have occasion for some friends, tho' not for general love.*

i much rather choose, upon such a subject, to bring instances from foreign, than our own nation. however, i can't but observe thus much, that so long as our empire supported itself, not by ways of injustice and violence, but rather by actions of kindness and gentleness; wars were undertaken to protect its allies or defend its honour, and accordingly their issues were attended with mercy, or at least no more rigour than was absolutely necessary. the senate then was a kind of port or refuge, for princes and nations to have recourse to in their need; and our officers and commanders made it their greatest glory, to defend their provinces, and assist their allies, with justice and fidelity. this city therefore was not then the *empress,* so properly as the *protectress* of all the world. this conduct and method of managing the state, began by little and little to *wear off* before, but utterly *vanished* immediately after the victory of *sylla;* for people began to think nothing could be unjust to their confederates and allies, when once they had seen so great cruelties exercised even upon their very citizens. this man therefore was in a just cause, but which was followed by a cruel and most unjust victory: he having had the boldness and impudence to say, when in full market he was selling the goods of some honest and wealthy men, and whom he himself knew to be *roman* citizens, *that he was going to make sale of his own booty.* but there has come *one* after him, whose cause was impious, and his victory yet more scandalous and inhuman: who did not stop at selling of private men's estates, but involved all our countries and provinces together in one common calamity. hence we have seen, after havoc and devastation made in other countries, as it were by way of prelude to the loss of our own empire, the city *marseilles* drawn along in triumph; and that very place, without whose assistance our former generals never brought triumph from beyond the *alpes,* has now found one that could have so much impudence, as to triumph over its own destruction. i might bring a great many other examples, of most impious treatment that hath been shewn towards our allies; but this single instance is abundantly sufficient, being one of the basest that was ever committed before the face of the sun. the truth on't is we have deserved these misfortunes; for if *others* had not 'scaped without punishment for their wickedness, *this man* could never have arrived at that insolence; who tho' he has left but few heirs of his estate, i am afraid will have a great many wicked ones of his ambition. for as long as some dissolute and profligate fellows remember that former inhuman auction, and are in hopes one day of seeing the same again, they'll always be for propagating civil dissentions. thus *publius sylla,* who was so busie in *that* mentioned, when his kinsman was dictator, was never contented till he had managed a worse and more inhuman auction six and thirty years after: and another, who was *scribe* in that former dictatorship, in this latter was advanced to be *treasurer* of the city. by all which 'tis easy enough to perceive, that we are never to hope we shall be free from civil wars, when people expect to make their fortunes by them. we have therefore only the walls of our city remaining entire, and even *they,* as 'twere, expecting to feel the effects of their abominable wickedness; but as for the republic 'tis absolutely sunk into ruins and nothing. and all these misfortunes have fallen upon us "that i may return to the subject which occasioned this digression" by our choosing to govern rather by *fear* than *love.* what then ought particular persons to expect, when tyranny and oppression could bring all these evils upon the whole *roman* empire? this then being so manifestly plain, that *love*'s a most powerful motive to obedience, but *fear* a most weak and dangerous one; it follows in the next place that we should discourse of those means, whereby such a *love,* joyned with *honour* and *confidence,* may most easily be gotten. now this is what all men don't equally stand in need of; but each should consider his own way of living, and accordingly judge what's conveniences for him; whether to be *beloved* by the generality of men, or only by some few and select persons. this however we may lay down for certain, as a first and most necessary rule in this case, to procure at least *some* faithful and sincere friends, who may have a true kindness and esteem for us. as far as this reaches, there's very little difference between even the greatest and meanest of people, and all sorts of them are almost equally concerned to endeavour after it. as for honour, glory, and the general good-will of *all* the citizens, these indeed are things, which aren't alike useful and necessary for all. however for those that have been able to get them, they are very good helps, as for most other purposes, so for the obtaining of faithful friends: but of friendship i have treated in another work, which is entitled *laelius.*

chapter 9.

what the ingredients of true glory are. by what means the love of the people may be obtained. how men may be brought to place a confidence in us. justice more powerful than cunning to this end.

let us now proceed to discourse of *glory;* tho' *that* too is a subject, upon which i have two books already extant; however i shall touch upon it here in short, because 'tis a thing of such weight and moment toward the successful management of the most important affairs. true and perfect glory then is always made up of these three ingredients: *first,* the love and good-will of the multitude. *secondly,* their trusting and reliance upon a man. and, *lastly,* their valuing and admiring him so, as to think him a person that really deserves honour. the means of getting these three from the multitude, "to give one short and easy rule" are very much the same as from particular persons. however there's another peculiar way of approaching the people, and gaining admittance into the hearts and affections of all men in general. of those three then, which i just now mentioned, let us first see the ways of obtaining *love.* now the love of the people is moved by nothing so much, as by bounty and doing kindnesses: next they are pleased with an hearty desire and inclination toward it, tho' a man have not wherewithal to exercise it. thirdly, the very name and reputation of having beneficence and liberality, justice and fidelity, with the rest of those virtues, which give a kind of smoothness and agreeableness to our conversation, is of very great efficacy in getting us the favour and love of the multitude: and the reason of it is, because honesty and *decorum* delight us of themselves, and by their own native beauties and excellencies move, and engage the hearts of all men: which seeing they appear with more lustre in the virtues, which i just now mentioned; it follows that by nature we must love those people, in whom we suppose such virtues to reside. and these are the principal causes of men's loving us: there might, i confess, be some others given, but not of equal weight and importance with these. we are to speak in the next place of their *trusting* or *confiding* in us; for the compassing of which, 'tis necessary we should be supposed to have two qualifications, *viz. prudence* and *justice.* for we trust those men, whom we believe, *to* understand matters better than we do; *to be* wise enough to see things before they are arrived, and in the management of them, if any danger should happen, *to be* ready at finding out ways and expedients, to disentangle themselves from the perplexities of it: in which men imagine that all true and profitable wisdom consists. but when a man is found really *just* and *faithful,* that is *good,* we place so much trust and confidence in such a one, as not to entertain any the least suspicion of deceit or injury. to such a man therefore we think we may wisely, and with a secure confidence, entrust our safeties, our children and our fortunes. justice therefore, of these two virtues, has much the more strong and effectual tendency, to procure this credit and confidence from the people. for *that,* even without wisdom, can go a great way toward the obtaining of this end; whereas wisdom, without *that,* is unable to do anything : for the more shrewed and cunning any person is, the more he's suspected and hated by the world, if he be not counted honest and upright withal. justice therefore, in conjunction with wisdom, can make a man be trusted as far as he pleases: justice without the other can do a great deal; but the other without *that* is of no force at all.

chapter 10.

why he talks of wisdom and justice as separate from one another, tho' really there's a mutual connexion between them. what will make men admire anyone. the difference between despising *and* having an ill opinion *of a man.*

some men perhaps will be ready to admire, since 'tis so generally agreed on by philosophers, and has been so often asserted by me myself, that whoever has *one* must have *all* the virtues; why i should speak of them separately now, as tho' it were possible for a man to have prudence, without having justice at the same time. i answer, that the way of expression is highly different, according to the difference of the subjects we are treating of; whether they are such as require a niceness and subtilty in handling, or be suited to the capacities of ordinary people. i do but speak here with the vulgar therefore, when i call one man *couragious,* another *just,* and a third *prudent;* for in treating upon a subject which concerns the people, we must make use of common and ordinary expressions; which is what has been done by *panaetius* himself—. but to return to our purpose: of the three ingredients, which we said were required to the making up of glory; the third was this, that men should admire and value us so, as to think we are persons that really deserve honour. now generally speaking they are apt to *admire* whatever they see great, and beyond their apprehensions; and likewise in particulars, if they discover any excellency, which they never expected. they admire those therefore, and extol them even to the skies, in whom "as they think" they have found any rare and extraordinary qualities: but as for those others, who have neither virtue, spirit, nor courage in them, these men they wholly despise and set light by. for they can't be said to *despise* all those, of whom they entertain but *an ill opinion.* they're *far from thinking well* of your roguish backbiting, cozening sort of fellows, who are never unprepared for the doing man an injury: but by no means *despise* them for all that; their contempt "as was said" lighting only upon those, who neither do good to themselves, nor others "as we commonly speak; " that is, who spend all their lives in meer idleness and sloth, without ever minding or taking care of anything . those, who are esteemed to excel in virtue, more especially draw men to wonder and admiration; who keep themselves free, as from all other things that are base and unbecoming, so more especially from those sorts of vices, which the rest of mankind can't so easily stand against. *pleasures,* for instance, are very alluring. and charming mistresses, which are apt to ensnare the better part of the soul, and entice it aside from the paths of virtue; and *pain* on the contrary racks and torments us, so that the dread of it carries most men beyond the bounds of reason. thus again, when *life* and *death, riches* and *poverty,* are the things in question, there are very few men but are wholly transported with *desire* of the one, and *abhorrence* of the other. when a man therefore has got such a great and exalted soul, as that he can look upon all these with indifference; and closely pursues and adheres to honesty, in whatever shape she presents herself; then 'tis that virtue appears with such a brightness, as that all the whole world must admire her beauties.

chapter 11.

justice, and a contempt of riches, are especially causes of men's admiration. justice alone procures all the three things, which make up glory; and how. 'tis a necessary virtue for all sorts of people. even robbers and pirates can't subsist without it. some examples to this purpose.

such a constitution of soul therefore, as can make a man despise all these goods or evils, begets him a mighty esteem and admiration: but especially *justice* "which single virtue serves to give men the name and denomination of *good"* seems much the most admirable to the generality of people. and not without reason; it being impossible for anyone to be just, who is afraid at the approaches of death, of pain, of banishment or poverty; or prefers those things, which are contrary to these, before the great duties of justice and honesty. and more particularly yet, men admire those, whom they find unconcerned as to the matter of *money;* and count them tried, as it were like gold in the fire, who have been able to withstand the temptations of it. justice therefore of itself is sufficient to procure those three things that are requisite to glory: in the *first* place, the love and good-will of the people; because of the kindnesses it shews to very many. *secondly,* their confidence. and *thirdly,* their admiration, both for the same reason, *viz.* because it neglects and despises those things, which the rest of men pursue with such eagerness and passion. now, in my opinion, not only the being in a public station, but every method of living whatever, requires the helps and assistances of men; as for other designs, so particularly for this, that we may have some familiar friends to converse with; which 'tis no easy matter for a man to obtain, without at least the shew and reputation of honesty. from hence it follows, that 'tis necessary even for those men themselves, who have withdrawn from the world, and chosen the quiet and retirements of the country, to be reputed at least men of honesty and integrity: and that so much the more, because otherwise they'll certainly be counted dishonest; and then, having nothing of guard or defence, they must needs be exposed to perpetual injuries. the same justice also is necessary for those "if ever they hope to succeed in their business" who buy, sell, lett, hire, and are concerned in the commerce and affairs of the world: nay 'tis a thing of such powerful moment and universal influence, as that those who live only upon villainies and wickedness, can never subsist without something of justice: for should any thief steal from another that belonged to the same confederacy, heed immediately be expelled, as unfit to be a member even of a society of robbers; and should the leader himself not distribute their booty, according to the measures of justice and honesty, heed either be murthered or deserted by his company: nay 'tis said that your robbers have some certain statutes, which they are all of them bound to observe amongst themselves. *theopompus* tells us of a certain rogue, one *bardylis* and *illyrian,* that got a great power by the fame of his justice in dividing the prey: and *viriatus* the *lusitanian,* got a much greater, to whom even some of our armies and generals were forced to yield; till at last he was conquered by that *caius laelius,* who was surnamed the *wise,* in the time of his praetorship; who brought down his courage and fierceness so low, as to render the war easy for those that came after him. if justice then be of so great efficacy, as that it can raise and support even pirates; of what mighty force must we suppose it to be, in the midst of laws, and in a well-constituted republic?

chapter 12.

what made men at first choose kings, and make laws. the justest men usually made kings; and why. how to make use of the glory he hath been discoursing of. an excellent rule of socrates*'s. glory must be founded upon solid virtue. whatever is counterfeit will sometime be discovered.*

'twas for the sake of enjoying the benefits of *this justice* "the great use of which we have now been discoursing of" that the *medes* heretofore, as we are told by *herodotus,* and i am apt to imagine our own ancestors too, chose always the honestest persons for their kings. for the poorer sort of people, being oppressed by the richer, had recourse to some one of remarkable virtue, to save and protect them from violence and injuries: who constituting measures of equity and justice, bound the greatest to observe them as well as the meanest. and that which was the reason for their choosing kings, in like manner put them upon enacting laws: for men have always desired to enjoy such a right, as all sorts of them might have an equal share in "for otherwise indeed 'twould be no *right* at all" which when they *could* get by the justice and honesty of some one person, they were contented with him, and never looked any further; but when they *could not,* they were put upon a necessity of inventing laws, which could never be partial, but use the same language to all ranks and conditions. 'tis very plain therefore, that those men were usually chosen to be kings, who were counted by the people men of honesty and integrity: but if they were held prudent and wise withal, the people thought there was nothing they might not obtain by their conduct and management. by all means therefore let us constantly follow, and stick close to justice; as for its own sake, "for otherwise indeed 'twill not be properly *justice"* so for the increase of our honour and reputation. now as 'tis not sufficient for a man to get riches, unless he has the wisdom to dispose of them so, as thereby to furnish out all his expenses; not only those of his bare necessities, but those of his bounty and liberality too: so neither is it enough for a man to get glory, unless he knows how to make use of it with discretion: tho' what *socrates* says is very excellent to this purpose, *that the readiest way, and, as it were, shortest cut, to arrive at glory, is* really to be, *what one desires* to be accounted. those people therefore are highly mistaken, who think of obtaining a solid reputation, by vain shews and hypocritical pretences; by composed countenances and studied forms of words: for true glory takes deep rooting, and grows and flourishes more and more; but *that* which is only in shew and meer outside, quickly decays and withers like flowers; nor can anything be lasting that is only counterfeit. i might bring a great many pregnant examples for the proof of these assertions; but, for brevity sake, i shall content myself with those of but one single family. *tiberius gracchus,* the son of *publius,* will always be praised and had in admiration, as long as there shall any memorials remain of the *roman* achievements: but his sons, on the contrary, were not in their lives-time approved of by good men; and since their decease have been numbered among those, who were justly slain.

chapter 13.

what young men should do to make themselves known, and taken notice of in the world. courage in war the first thing that sets off young men. another, temperance, sobriety, &c. *keeping often company with wise and good men another thing that very much recommends them.*

'tis the business therefore of those, who desire to get true glory, strictly to discharge all the duties of justice: what those are we have shewn already in the former book. i shall now proceed to lay down some directions, how a man should do to appear before the world what he is in himself; tho' that of *socrates* is certainly the wisest that can possibly be given, *to make sure in the first place, that he* really *be in himself, that which he desires to* appear *before the world.* for when a young gentleman is just come into the publick, and is already known and remarkable in it; either by the fame of his father's actions "which i think, son *marcus,* may be your case; " or by any other means or accident whatever; the eyes of all are immediately upon him, and every one's enquiring after what he does, and how he steers his life; and, as tho' he were set in the public view, so none of his actions, or so much as his words can be long kept in secret. but those, who at the beginning and entrance of their lives, by reason of their meanness, are unknown to the world; as soon as ever they come up to years of discretion, should set before their eyes the most honourable places, and bend all their studies and honest endeavours toward the obtaining of them: which they ought to do with so much the more boldness, because men are so far from envying youth, that they rather encourage and forward them in their progress. the first thing then, that sets a young man off, and recommends him to the publick, is courage and bravery in martial affairs; by which a great many amongst our forefathers, who were scarce ever wholly disengaged from wars, very nobly distinguished and signalized themselves. but you, my son, have had the misfortune to light upon the times of a civil war, wherein the one party was wicked and detestable, and the other unfortunate and unsuccessful:

in which however, when *pompey* had given you the command of one wing, you got much praise from that great commander and all his army, by your riding, darting and patiently abiding all the fatigues of war. but as for this piece of your rising glory, *that,* and the whole constitution of the republic, are both of them fallen to the ground together. but i never designed so to model this discourse, as that it should be proper for none but you; but as that it might be applicable to all men in general: i shall go on therefore to the remaining part of it. as then in all things the functions of the soul are more noble and excellent than those of the body; so the effects of our reason and understanding are greater, and more powerful as to this particular, than those of meer strength. now of these there is none that can more recommend and adorn a young man, than temperance and sobriety, duty and respect to his natural parents, love and good-nature towards his friends and relations. another good way for young people to get known, and have a good reputation, is often to attend on some great and wise men, who are thought to design for the good of the publick: for when they're observed to be frequently with such, the people are presently apt to imagine, that they'll be like those men, whom they choose for their patterns thus *pub. rutilius,* when he was young, had the general vogue of a very honest man, and an able lawyer, because he frequented the house of *mutius.* as for *crassus,* whilst he was very young, he was not beholden to anyone else, but obtained of himself everlasting honour, by undertaking that noble and glorious accusation: when at that term of years, wherein others are commended if they begin but to study and exercise the art; "as we have it recorded of the famous *demosthenes"* at that age, i say, did *crassus* make it appear, that he could perform *that* laudably in the open courts of justice, which he might without disparagement have been studying at home.

chapter 14.

discourse of two sorts. affability very powerful to obtain men's love, &c. *but eloquence much more. several occasions of shewing a man's eloquence. to defend more laudable than to accuse; but the latter in some cases honourable enough. several examples of brave accusations. 'tis lawful in some cases to defend the really guilty; but never to accuse the innocent. the judges and advocates duties. defending the accused, especially honourable, when 'tis against some powerful oppressor.*

but of speaking or discourse there are two sorts; the one proper only for common conversation, the other for pleadings and debates in the publick. of these two the latter, which is what we call eloquence, is apparently most powerful towards the procurement of glory; but yet 'tis inexpressible of what influence courtesy and affability are, in the business of obtaining men's love and affections. there are extant letters of *philip* to *alexander, antipater* to *cassander,* and *antigonus* to *philip;* in which these most *wise* and *prudent* princes "for *such* we are told they really were" advise each his son to speak kindly to the *multitude,* and try to win the hearts of both *them,* and the soldiers, by gentle words and familiar appellations. but that other discourse, which is proper for pleadings and harangues in publick, does oftentimes more and transport the whole multitude: for when a man speaks to them plausibly and fluently, they are presently rapt in a strange admiration• and can't but conclude, as soon as ever they hear him, that he's wiser and more knowing than the rest of men are. but if there be modesty joyned with the power and weight of his eloquence, there's nothing in the world can more raise their admiration; and especially too, if he be a young man that speaks. now the subjects and occasions, that stand in need of eloquence, are more than one; and several young gentlemen, in our own republic, have made themselves eminent in several of them: some, for example, by speaking in the senate-house, and others by pleading in the courts of justice. of these ways the latter is most fruitful of admiration, the duties of which are only two, *defending* and *accusing.* 'tis much more commendable to defend than to accuse; however this *latter* has oftentimes brought men a considerable reputation. we mentioned the example of *crassus* but just now,

marcus antonius, when he was a young man, did the same; and nothing got *sulpitius* so much credit for his eloquence, as his brave accusation of *caius norbanus,* a very seditious and troublesome citizen. this nevertheless must be done but seldom, or indeed never, unless it be undertaken on the behalf of the republic, as 'twas by those three whom i just now mentioned: or secondly, upon the account of some injury received, as by the two *luculluses;* or else for the sake of those under our protection, as was formerly done by myself for the *sicilians;* and by *julius* for the *sardians* against *marcus albutius:* in like manner *fusius* made his industry be taken notice of, by his accusing of *aquilius.* once then or so, 'tis allowable enough; but by no means often. however, should the commonwealth call a man to it, he may do it oftner upon her account; it being no disgrace to be often employed in taking vengeance on her enemies. yet, even in this case, 'tis still the best way to be moderate and cautious: for he shews himself a man of a very unnatural and merciless temper "or rather indeed not a man at all, but a savage monster" who can endure to make it his business and employment, to bring many people into danger of their lives: beside that 'tis dangerous to the person himself too; and not only so, but even scandalous and shameful, to get himself the odious name of *an accuser:* which of late was the fortune of *marcus brutus,* a person that was sprung of a noble family, and son of that *brutus,* who was so particularly famed for his skill in the civil laws. 'tis another rule of duty more especially to be taken notice of, and which can't be broken without manifest villainy, *never to bring an innocent person into danger.* for since kind nature has given us eloquence, to serve for the good and preservation of all men; what can be more, either wicked, or inhuman, than to turn it to the ruin and destruction of the best of them? 'tis our duty then, never to accuse the innocent: but we need not, on the other hand, make any conscience, of speaking sometimes in behalf of the guilty, provided he be not wholly villainous and abominable. for this is no more, than what the people desires, than what custom authorizes, and the common bowels of humanity incline us to. 'tis the duty of a *judge,* to endeavour after nothing but the real truth; but an *advocate* sometimes may speak up for that, which carries no more than an outward appearance of it: which, i think, i should hardly have ventured to say, "especially in writing a philosophical discourse" but that i perceive 'twas the opinion of *panetius,* a person of as great and considerable authority, as any among the *stoicks.* but *defending* is that, which brings the largest returns both of glory and interest; especially if one happen to be assistant to those, who seem injured and oppressed by the power of some great one. this was my fortune, as a great many times, so more especially in my younger days; when i stood in defence of *roscius amerinus,* against all the greatness and authority of *sylla:* and you know the oration, which i then spoke, is at this time extant.

chapter 15.

two sorts of liberality. better to help men by our labour and industry, than by our money. phillip's *reproof to his son* alexander *to this purpose. the inconveniencies of the second sort of liberality. measures to be observed in it.*

having given this account of the particular duties, which young men must do for the attainment of glory; we are next to discourse of beneficence or liberality. of this there are two sorts; the one of which consists in obliging those, who need it by our *labour and industry;* the other, by our *money.* the latter of these two is much the more easy, especially for those who have plentiful fortunes; but the former, on the other hand, more glorious and magnificent, and more suitable to the character of a brave and exalted soul. for tho' there's a good-will, and generous readiness to oblige shewn in either; yet in the one case we are beholden to the *chest,* in the other to the *virtues* and abilities of the person. besides, those sort of kindnesses, which are done by the assistance of money or the like, within a short space of time, draw their own fountain dry; so that this liberality doth, as 'twere, eat out its own bowels, and the more you have formerly obliged in this kind, the fewer you'll be able to oblige for the future. but now, on the other hand, he whose generosity shews itself in labour, that is, in virtue and being active for another's good, the more men he hath formerly shewn himself kind to, the more he'll have ready to assist him ever after: beside that by the custom of doing good offices, he gets a kind of habit, and grows much more expert in the art of obliging. *philip* the father of *alexander* the great, reproves his son sharply in one of his epistles, for endeavouring to purchase the good-will of the *macedonians,* by giving them donations; *in* the name of wonder, *says he,* what reason could you have, to hope that those people would ever be faithful to you, whom you yourself had *corrupted* with money?

what! do you design to be thought not the king, but only the *steward* and *purse-bearer* of the *macedonians?*

that *steward* and *purse-bearer* is admirably well said; because 'tis so scandalous a business for a prince; and that calling donations a *corrupting the people,* is better yet; for those that receive them are perpetually the worse for it, and only made readier to expect the same again. *philip* writ this to his son alone, but it may serve for a direction to all men in general i think we may take it for granted therefore, that *that* sort of bounty, which consists in doing kindnesses by our labour and industry, is more virtuous and creditable, can oblige more people, and has more ways of doing it, than that other has. not but that *sometimes* a man should *give,* nor is this sort of bounty to be wholly rejected; nay, one ought oftentimes to distribute some part of one's money to those, who are well-deserving persons, and stand in need of such assistance: but still it must be done with great prudence and moderation. for some men have squandered away whole estates by inconsiderately giving; which is certainly the foolishness thing in the world; for so a man disables himself ever after, from doing of that, which he takes most delight in. but the worst thing is this, that profuseness in giving is usually accompanied by unjust ways of getting: for when by this means men have parted with what's their own, they are forced to lay hands upon that which is another's. and by this means they miss what is their principal design, *viz.* the obtaining men's love, by their bounty and generosity; for they get more hatred from those whom they injure, than good-will from those whom they hoped to oblige by it. we ought not therefore *so* to lock up our riches, *as* that even liberality itself can't open them; nor *so* to keep them open, *as* if they were common to all men in general: the best way is, always to observe a due medium, and give more or less in proportion to our estates. in fine, weed do well to remember a saying, which is now grown so common as to be a proverb amongst us, *bounty has got no bottom:* for how indeed is it possible, there should ever be any end on't, when those, who are used to it, look to receive again; and others, from seeing them, are taught to expect the same?

chapter 16.

two sorts of givers. how liberality and prodigality differ. what the chief advantage of riches. publick shews to the people very foolish. several examples of magnificent aediles among the romans.

of those who give largely, there are two sorts, the one of which are *prodigal,* and the other *liberal.* the *prodigal* are those who consume vast sums in making public feasts, and distributing portions of meat to the people: or in providing gladiators to fight with one another; or with wild beasts in the theatres; or in making preparation for other such sports, and recreations of the multitude: things that are forgotten in a very short time, if ever at all thought on, after once they are over. but the *liberal* are those, who dispose of their money in redeeming poor prisoners; in helping their friends and acquaintance out of debt; in assisting them toward the marrying their daughters; or putting them into some method of making, or increasing their fortunes. i admire therefore, what should come into *theophrastus*'s head, who in a book of his, which he wrote *concerning riches,* amongst several noble and excellent things, has been guilty of one very grievous absurdity: for he runs out mightily in commendation of magnificence, and giving public shews or donations to the people; and thinks the supplying of such expenses as these, the very principal fruit and advantage of riches: but in my opinion 'tis both a much greater, and more durable advantage, to be furnished with money for these acts of bounty, of which i have just now been giving some instances. but *aristotle,* with much more reason and judgment, reproves us for not being amazed at those sums, which are daily thrown away to caress the people:

should anyone "says he" when a city's besieged and reduced to great straights, give a large sum of money for a little cup of water; people would wonder and admire at it strangely, and hardly be persuaded to believe it at first: but afterwards possibly, upon farther consideration, would be ready to pardon it, because 'twas a case of meer exigence and necessity: but yet *we can see,* without anything of admiration, those vast charges and infinite expenses, which men put themselves to for no reason in the world; neither for the relief of any want or necessity, nor yet for the encrease of their glory and dignity: and that pleasure of the multitude which is principally aimed at, is of short continuance; and only tickles and sooths up the meanest of the people, who themselves will forget the satisfaction they received, as soon as ever the shew and recreation's at an end.

he adds moreover with a great deal of reason,

that children indeed and some trifling women, together with slaves, and the more servile part of those who are free, might perhaps take a pleasure in such foolish kind of pastimes: but that men of true prudence, and those who judge of things by the rules of reason, can by no means either commend or approve of them.

i know 'tis a custom in our republic, and *has been* from the time of our good fore-fathers, to expect and demand, even from the soberest citizens, something that is splendid and magnificent in their aedileships. hence *publius crassus,* who was surnamed *the wealthy,* and really was such, in his office of aedile was very magnificent and noble in his entertainments: and *lucius crassus,* a little while after, was full-out as generous, tho' colleague of *mucius* the most moderate man living. next after these came *caius claudius,* the son of *appius;* and a great many others, *viz.* the *luculli, hortensius* and *silanus.* but *publius lentulus,* when i was cos. exceeded all others that ever went before him: who was afterwards followed and copied by *scaurus.* but of all these shews, that have been given to please and entertain the people, those of my friend *pompey* were the greatest and most magnificent, exhibited when he was the second time consul. in all which cases 'tis easy to see what is my opinion.

chapter 17.

expenses to please the people allowable in some cases; and what they are. some examples of laudable ones. upon what one may best lay out his money in this kind.

no man however should be so far moderate, as to draw upon himself the suspicion of avarice. *mamercus,* a person of very great riches, was put by the consulship for no other reason, but because he refused to be aedile first. if such things therefore are demanded by the people, and *allowed* of, tho' perhaps not *desired,* by good men, they must even be performed; but so as to keep within the compass of your estate, as i myself did. nay, tho' they should not be demanded by the people, yet they might wisely enough be presented them, upon a prospect of gaining some more considerable advantage by it. thus *orestes* of late got a great deal of credit, by giving the people a dinner in the streets, under the notion of paying his tenths to *hercules.* nor did anyone ever find fault with *m. seius,* for selling out corn at an easy rate, in the time of a very great dearth and scarcity: for he got himself free from a great and inveterate hatred of the people, by a cost, which "considering he was at that time aedile" was neither dishonest, nor yet extraordinary great: but of all my friend *milo* got the greatest honour, by purchasing gladiators for the defence of the publick, which was wholly included in my single safety, and thereby defeating the mad and pernicious attempts of *clodius.* such charges therefore are not to be shunned, when either they are *necessary* or *very advantageous:* but even when they are so, we must still not exceed the due limits of *mediocrity. luc. philippus,* the son of *quintus,* an extraordinary ingenious and eminent man, was wont, i confess, to be making his brags, that he got all the honours the republic could give him, without ever spending one farthing that way: *caius curio* used to say the same: and even i myself have some reason to boast upon this account: for considering the greatness of the honours i got, and that too by every one of the votes, and the very first years i was capable of them, "which is more then can be said by anyone of those two whom i just now mentioned" the charge of my aedileship was very inconsiderable. but the best way of laying out money in this kind, is to repair the city-walls, make docks, havens, aqueducts and the like; things that may serve to the general use, and advantage of the publick. for tho' things which are present, and given down upon the nail, are more acceptable for a time; yet the memory of these will be more lasting, and continued even down to posterity. i forbear to speak much against theatres, portico's, new temples and the like, out of respect to my old friend *pompey:* but i find them not approved of by the famousest men; particularly not by *panaetius* himself, whom i have very much followed, but not quite translated in this work. neither are they liked by *demetrius phalereus,* who blames *pericles,* one of the greatest men amongst all the *grecians,* for squandering away such a vast sum of money, upon that noble structure at the entrance of the *acropolis.* but i have spoken sufficiently upon all this subject, in those books i have written *concerning the republic.* to conclude therefore, all such profusions are *generally speaking* "i think" to be blamed; but yet at *sometimes, and upon certain occasions,* may be rendered *necessary:* however even then they must be proportioned to one's estate, and kept within the limits of reason and moderation.

chapter 18.

liberality to be varied according to the variety of circumstances. the merits of the receiver especially to be considered. what acts of bounty we should more particularly exercise. measures to be observed in receiving money. 'tis profitable sometimes to part with one's right. when a man uses an estate as he ought. hospitality deservedly commended.

in that other sort of giving, which proceeds from *liberality,* we should not keep constantly to one certain measure; but vary according to the variety of circumstances in the persons that receive. his case "for instance" who struggles at present under some pressing necessity, is different from his, who is well enough to pass, and only desires to improve his fortune. we should lend our assistance in the first place to those, who are under the burden and weight of some misfortune; unless they are such as deserve to be miserable: we should be ready however to forward those likewise, who desire only our helping-hand, not so much to save them from being unfortunate, as to raise them to some higher degrees of fortune. but here we must be careful to acquaint ourselves thoroughly with the fitness of the persons: for that of *ennius* is admirably well said,

i take good actions, when ill applied, to become ill ones.

now that which is given to a truly honest and grateful person, is paid us in the acknowledgment he himself makes, and in the good-will that's got by it from the rest of the world. for nothing's more pleasing to all mankind, than bounty bestowed without rashness and precipitancy: and the generality of men praise it so much the more, because the liberality of every great man, is a common kind of sanctuary for all that are needy. we should endeavour therefore, as far as we are able, to oblige many men by such acts of generosity, as may not be forgotten as soon as ever they are over; but be remembered by the children and posterity of the receivers, in such manner as to lay a necessity upon them of shewing their gratitude: i say *necessity;* for all people hate one, that takes no care of being grateful to his benefactors, and count him that is such injurious to themselves; because he discourages bounty and liberality, and so is a common enemy to all the poorer sort. besides, this way of giving, whereby captives are ransomed, and the meaner folk enriched, is useful and advantageous to the publick itself; and has frequently been practiced by those of our order, as appears very fully from the oration of *crassus.* that other way therefore of expending money, which consists in making shews for the entertainment of the vulgar, ought "i think" by no means to be compared with this: the *one* comports well with the character of a great, and a prudent person; the *other* of such as cajole the people, and look out for pleasures to tickle the fancies of the unstable multitude. and as 'tis a duty to be generous in giving, so is it not to be too rigorous in demanding; but in every transaction of buying, selling, letting and hiring, to behave ourselves towards our neighbours and chapmen, with all the fairness and courtesy imaginable; to let go something of our strict and just rights, upon certain occasions; to avoid all suits and contentions at law, as far as can reasonably and fairly be expected; perhaps i might add, *and even something farther;* for in several cases to deliver up one's right, is not only generous, but advantageous too. however a man should have a decent regard to his estate and fortune; for 'tis not over-reputable to let *that* be ruined by his easiness and neglect; and yet on the other hand should carry himself so, as to avoid all suspicion of a sordid, mean or avaricious temper. for 'tis then a man uses his money as he ought to do, when he shews himself liberal, without ruining his fortune. *theophrastus* commends, and with very good reason, another sort of bounty, which we call *hospitality:* for there's nothing, in my mind, more handsome and becoming, than constantly to have the houses of noble men open, and ready to entertain all strangers of fashion; and 'tis no small credit and reputation to the publick, that strangers never fail to meet with that sort of bounty, and liberality in our city. beside that there's nothing can be more useful for those, who design by honest means to get an interest in the world, than to recommend themselves to the esteem and good-liking of foreign nations, by the help of those people whom they thus entertain. *theophrastus* tells us of *cimon* the *athenian,* that he shewed his hospitality even to all his brethren of the *lacian tribe;* and not only made it his own constant custom, but also commanded his bailiffs the same, to keep open house for anyone of the *laciadae,* that should pass that way.

chapter 19.

the liberality which consists in doing good offices for others: two sorts of it. what sorts of study afford most opportunities of it. the ruin of civil law and eloquence. all men may do kindnesses of this nature if they please. we should be careful of not offending some, by obliging others.

i come now to speak of that other sort of bounty, which consists not in *giving,* but in *labouring* for another's good; and extends itself as to the republic in general, so to each member of the city in particular. the civil law principally gives us opportunities of exercising this: for there's nothing more proper to get a man interest and credit in the world, than the managing the law-suits of a great many persons, the assisting them with his advice, and doing for them all that he can by his knowledge, and skill in that learning. and therefore i admire the wisdom of our ancestors, as for several reasons, so particularly for this, that the knowledge and interpretation of their excellent civil law, was counted a matter of the highest credit and reputation among them. this the greatest men have kept constantly among themselves, till this late sad disorder and

confusion of everything: but now the glory of this sort of learning, together with all honours and degrees of dignity, is utterly ruined and fallen to just nothing. and to make the matter still so much the worse; all this has happened in the days of one, who, as he equalled in dignity all that have gone before him, so was he far above them in the knowledge of the laws. this study then is approved of by most people, and puts it in one's power to assist a great many and oblige them by kindnesses. there's another sort of knowledge near related to this, the art, i mean, of persuasive speaking, which carries more majesty and ornament along with it, and is more pleasing and liked of, by the generality of men. for what is there in the world more extraordinary than eloquence, whether we consider the admiration of its hearers, the reliance of those who stand in need of its assistance, or the good-will procured by it from those whom it defends? our ancestors therefore held this among the chief of their civil professions. anyone then must oblige a great many, and have a large number of clients and dependants, who is able to speak well, and willing to take pains, and "as 'twas the custom of our good fore-fathers" is ready to undertake many men's causes, without ever expecting to be rewarded for his trouble. and here i have a fair opportunity offered me, to bemoan the great downfall, that i mayn't say the utter extinction of eloquence; but that i am afraid i shall seem to complain for my own sake only. however i can't but with some concern take notice, what a great many excellent orators we have lost; how few there are arising, whom we can expect anything from; and how much fewer who are able to perform and do anything ; and for all that, how many, who are brim full of impudence and vain presumption. now it is not for all, nor indeed very many, to be either skilful lawyers, or eloquent pleaders: however there's no one, if he'd make it his business, but may do friendly offices to several people; either by begging some kindnesses for them; or by recommending their cases to the judges and officers; or by being industrious in promoting their interests; or lastly, by using his endeavours with those, who either are able lawyers, or eloquent orators: which whoever shall do, will make a great many be beholden to him, and get himself a general interest in the world. there is one thing however i would advertise him of, "tho' i think 'tis so obvious, that i hardly need do it" which is to have a care of offending *some,* whilst he's endeavouring to be serviceable to *others.* for it often comes to pass, that such do a diss kindness, either to *those* whom they ought to have obliged; or to *those* who are able to make them suffer for it afterwards: which shews carelessness and negligence, if done undesignedly; but if designedly, rashness and imprudence. and if it should happen that we are forced, tho' unwillingly, to disoblige any person, we must endeavour to excuse it as well as we are able; by shewing the necessity we lay under of doing so, and how 'twas utterly impossible for us to avoid it: and must be careful and industrious to repair the injury, by making some reasonable amends for it afterwards.

chapter 20.

men are readier to assist one that's wealthy and great than one that is poor and honest. reasons why they ought to do the contrary. the evil effects of men's love of riches. never to do an injury to one, for the sake of obliging another.

now whenever we do a *kindness* or friendly *office* to another, we usually regard one of these two things, *viz.* either the *honesty,* or the *greatness* of the person. 'tis easily said, and every one's ready enough to profess, that in placing their favours, they have much more respect to the *merits* of the person, than to his fortune in the world. this is very fairly and honestly spoken: but yet led be glad to be shown that man, who is more willing to help one that's honest and poor, than to get the favour of one that is wealthy and powerful. for who is not readiest to be serviceable to those, from whom he expects the most speedy requital? but people would do well to consider more thoroughly the natures of things: for tho' a poor man, 'tis true, can't make a requital, yet if he's honest, he will acknowledge the obligation: and 'twas no unhandsome saying, whoever was the author of it,

that in case of a *debt,* the man who *acknowledges* it doth not thereby *pay* it; and the man who *pays* it does no longer *acknowledge* it: but in case of an *obligation,* both he who *returns* it still continues to *acknowledge* it, and he who *acknowledges* it thereby sufficiently *returns* it.

but now those, on the contrary, who value themselves upon their riches, honours and flourishing condition, will scorn to acknowledge they're obliged for any kindness; nay, will think they vouchsafe you a signal favour, even whilst you are doing them some considerable service; and will always be jealous and suspicious over you, as tho' you demanded and expected something from them: but to have it ever said they were defended by you, or to be numbered among your dependants or clients, is as insupportable to them as even death itself. whereas your *mean person,* when anyone does him a friendly office, considers 'twas done out of respect to himself, and not out of regard to his fortune or condition; and endeavours to shew himself sensible of the obligation, not to him only who has done him the kindness, but "as standing in need of some other men's assistance" to those others also, from whom he hopes for the like. and if he should chance to do another any service, he does not endeavour to cry up and magnify it, but rather to lessen it as much as he is able. another thing worth the considering is this, that if you defend one that's wealthy and powerful, the obligation remains in the person himself, or perhaps just his children; but if you protect one that's needy and forsaken, provided withal he be virtuous and modest, all the lower sort of people immediately that aren't wicked "which is no inconsiderable part of the multitude" will look upon you as their safe-guard and protection. upon all which accounts i am wholly of opinion, that a kindness is better bestowed upon *an honest,* than 'tis upon a *wealthy* and *fortunate* person. we should endeavour, 'tis true, to the utmost of our power, to be serviceable to all men of whatsoever condition: but if there should happen a competition between them, i am clearly for following *themistocles*'s advice, who being once asked, *how heed marry his daughter, whether to one that was poor, but honest; or to one that was rich, but of an ill reputation?* made answer, *led rather have a man without an estate, than have an estate without a man.* but the mighty respect, which is paid to riches, has wholly depraved and corrupted our manners. and yet what does it signify to anyone of us, that such or such a person has got a plentiful fortune? perhaps it may be useful to him that has it; tho' not *so* neither always: but allowing it to be so: suppose he has got the world more at his command; yet how "led fain know" is he ever the honester for it? but and if a man be honest, as well as wealthy, tho' i would not have him helped for the sake of his riches, yet i would not have him hindered upon their account neither: but in every case have it fairly considered, not how wealthy and great, but how good and deserving a person he is. i shall conclude this head with only one rule more, which is, never for the sake of doing anyone a kindness, to venture upon that which is unjust in itself, or injurious to a third person. for no credit or esteem can be solid and durable, unless built upon the foundations of justice and honesty; without which nothing can be virtuous or commendable.

chapter 21.

two sorts of that bounty, which relates to the publick. nothing to be done for the sake of the members in particular, which may any ways damage the publick in general. the first duty of the governors of a state, to secure each particular in the possession of his own. levelling all estates very destructive. why men first built cities. not to burden the people with taxes, a second duty. a third, to furnish the people with necessaries. covetousness in a governor pernicious to any state. the unhappy effects of it in the roman *empire.*

having thus discoursed of the one sort of kindnesses, which are done to *particular members* of the city; we are now in the next place to speak of those others, which are done to *them all,* and to the commonwealth in general. now these again are of two sorts, the one more immediately relating to the community; the other reaching down to each member in particular; which latter, of the two is more grateful and acceptable. we should shew our beneficence, as far as we are able, in both these ways; but especially in this latter, which relates to each one of the particular members:

in which however one caution must be observed, that nothing be done in behalf of particulars, but that which is useful, or at least not prejudicial, to the commonwealth in general. *c. gracchus,* for instance, made a large distribution of corn to the people; and the effect of it was, that the treasury was exhausted by it. *marcus octavius* made one that was moderate, which was a kindness to the multitude, and no ways a burthen or grievance to the state; and accordingly both the publick, and all the members of the city received benefit from it. but the principal thing for a governor to take care of, is, *that* each individual be kept in the quiet possession of his own, and *that* private men be not dispossessed of their lands, under a pretence of taking care of the publick. for nothing's more destructive to the peace of any kingdom, than to bring in a new distribution of estates, which was attempted by *philip,* in the time of his tribuneship: however he quickly gave over his design, and did not persist stubbornly in defence of it, as soon as he found it was so vigorously opposed: but in his public speeches and harangues to the people, among a great many things to obtain their favour, he was heard to say one of very dangerous consequence, that the whole city had not two thousand men in it, that were masters of estates: a very pernicious and desperate saying, directly tending to bring all things to a level; which is the greatest misfortune that can befall any people. for to what end were cities and commonwealths established, but that every one might be safer and securer, in the enjoyment of his own? for tho' men by nature are sociable creatures, yet 'twas the desire of preserving what they had, that first put them upon building of cities for a refuge. 'tis a *second* duty of the governors of a state, to see that the people be not forced to pay taxes; as they often were in our fore-fathers time, partly because they were always in war, and partly by reason of the lowness of the treasury. this is an inconvenience, which ought, as far as possible, to be provided against before-hand: but if *any state* should be under such circumstances, as that it must be forced to make use of this expedient, "i say *any state,* because i'm unwilling to suppose so unhappy a thing of *our own;* beside that i speak here of all of them in general" but if, i say, any state should be brought to such a pinch, due care must be taken to let the people know, that 'tis absolutely necessary as affairs now stand, and that otherwise they must needs be inevitably ruined. again, 'tis yet further required of those men, who govern and preside in a commonwealth, to see that it be furnished with all the conveniencies and necessaries of life. to tell what *these* are, and how to be provided, would be altogether needless in this place, since 'tis sufficiently known already; i only thought fit just to touch upon it by the *bye.* but in all kinds of business, and managing affairs of a public nature, there's nothing more necessary, than always to keep one's self clear and untainted, so as not to lie under the least *suspicion of avarice.* i could heartily wish, "said *caius pontius* the *samnite"* that fortune had reserved me to those times, and that it had been my fate to be then born, whenever the *romans* shall begin to take bribes; i should quickly have put an end to their flourishing empire. truly he must have waited a pretty many ages; for that's a kind of evil, which but lately has begun to infest this republic. if *pontius* therefore were so great a man as he pretended to be, i am very well satisfied with his being born when he was; and not in those times, which have lately happened. 'tis not yet an hundred and ten years ago, since *lucius piso* got a law to be enacted against the corruption of magistrates, whereas there had never been anyone before. but since that time there have been so many laws, and still ev'ry new one more severe than the former; so many persons accused and condemned; such a war stirred up in the bowels of *italy,* by those who were afraid of being brought to punishment; such shameful extortion and pillaging our allies, by those who have defied all laws and courts of justice; that we're rather beholden to the weakness of others, than our own strength or virtues, that we are not utterly ruined.

chapter 22.

examples of contempt of money among the ancient romans. *the danger,* &c. *of the opposite vice. the honour gotten by this virtue. the danger, folly,* &c. *of the project of levelling estates.*

panaetius's highly commends *africanus,* for his being uncorrupt as to the matter of money. 'tis a virtue that very well deserved his commendation: but i think there were others in that great person, which deserved it much more: to be untainted with money being not so properly a virtue of that man, as of those times in general. *paulus aemilius* had all the wealth of *macedonia* in his power, which amounted to almost an infinite value: so that he brought such a sum into the treasury, as that the single booty of that one general superseded the necessity of all taxes for the future: and yet he brought nothing into his own house, but the eternal memory of his name and achievements. *africanus* followed the example of his father, and returned nothing richer from the overthrow of *carthage.* so *mummies,* who was afterwards his partner in the censorship; did he make himself ever a farthing the wealthier, by razing one of the wealthiest cities in the world? no; he rather chose to make *italy* fine with the spoils of his enemies, than his own house; tho' in my opinion the fineness of *italy* reflects a bright lustre upon his own house too. there is no vice then "that i may return to the subject, from which i have digressed" more detestable than avarice; more especially in great men, and such as bear sway in the government of a state. for 'tis not only *mean* for a man to make a prey and advantage of the commonwealth, but even impious and abominable. that oracle therefore of the *pythian apollo*'s, *that nothing but avarice should be the ruine of* sparta, doth not seem designed for the *lacedaemonians* only, but for every wealthy and flourishing nation. and as avarice is thus very destructive to a state; so to appear upright and regardless of money, is the certainest method those in power can make use of, for procuring the love and good-liking of the *people.* but those, who, designing to curry *their* favour, attempt new laws about the levelling estates, so as to force the right owners from their lawful possessions; or propose to make creditors remit all the debts, which in justice are due to them; plainly undermine the two principal pillars and supports of the government: in the *first* place, concord and unity among the citizens, which can never be kept up, whilst some are deprived of what is justly their due, and others discharged from the necessity of payment. *secondly,* justice, which immediately must sink into ruins and nothing, if men can't be secured in the possession of what's their own: for *that* "as we before remark d" is the chief end and aim of men's gathering into societies, and building of cities, that each one might freely enjoy what's his right, without any danger or fear of being deprived on't. beside this, the authors of these pernicious designs never get that good-will, which they propose, from their citizens: for, as for those men, who are *losers* by the bargain, 'tis certain that they'll be their enemies for it; and those, who are *gainers,* will be sure to pretend that they never desired it: especially in the business of having debts forgiven; *there* ev'ry one dissembles how glad he is of it, for fear it should be thought that he was not able to pay them. but those men, to whom such designs are prejudicial, will hardly forget them, but shew a perpetual grudge and resentment. and tho' the number of those, who are thus wickedly befriended, be greater than of those, who are injuriously robed; yet it doth not follow, that therefore they are more powerful: for 'tis not the number, but the quality of the persons, that must carry it in this case. besides, what reason or equity is there, when estates have been held for a great many years, or perhaps ages, that the rightful owners should be thrust out from them, and others, that never had any, should come and possess them?

chapter 23.

several examples of the unhappy effects of taking away men's estates, in order to bring things to a level. the wise conduct of aratus *the* sicyonian *in doing the contrary. what a magistrate's duty in such cases is.*

for such kind of partial, injurious proceedings, the *spartans* once banished *lysander,* one of their ephori; and put to death *agis* their king for the same reason: an action unheard of before in that city. this was succeeded by such grievous contentions and discords in the state, as that tyranny and oppression got the upper-hand amongst them; the nobles were banished from their native country; and the best constituted republic upon the face of the earth was utterly dissolved, and brought into confusion. nor did this mischief end with the *spartans* only, but, like a contagion, spreading itself farther, involved all *greece* in the same miseries and calamities. pray what was it ruined our own two *gracchi,* sons of the famous *tiberius gracchus,* and grandsons of *africanus,* but only these controversies about levelling estates? *aratus* the *sicyonian* is deservedly commended as much on the other hand: he, when his county, for fifty years together, had been greatly oppressed and over-run by tyrants, went secretly one night from *argos* to *sicyon,* and made himself master of the city by suprise; and unexpectedly falling upon *nicocles* the then tyrant, he put him to flight. this being done, he recalled six hundred of the wealthiest citizens, who had all been formerly banished by the tyrants, and by this his arrival delivered the city from slavery and oppression. but he afterwards found 'twould be a great deal of trouble, to settle the business of their estates and possessions; for he thought on the one hand 'twas very unreasonable, that those men, whom he had restored, should want, whilst others enjoyed what in equity was theirs: and yet it seemed hard on to other side, that men should be thrust out of those possessions, which now they had held for these fifty years: if more especially 'twere withal considered, that it could not but happen in so long a time, that they must have gone, a great part of them, from one to another, either by inheritance, purchase, dowry, or the like; and therefore were possest by the *present incumbents,* without *their* having injured the rightful proprietors. upon these considerations he judged it necessary, both to bear with the *latter* in the enjoyment of what they had, and yet to satisfy the *former,* whom it justly belonged to. and finding a large sum of money was requisite, to settle this business as it ought to be; he told them he had occasions to go to *alexandria,* and ordered they should not concern themselves about it, till his return. he goes accordingly with all possible speed to his old friend *ptolomy,* who at that time was reigning in *alexandria,* being second king after the founding of that city. having told him his design of settling liberty in his country, and the reasons that put him upon undertaking of that voyage, he quickly obtained of that wealthy prince, to supply him with a quantity of money for his assistance. with this he immediately returns to *sicyon,* and choosing out fifteen on thy principal citizens, to help him with their counsel upon this occasion; he heard both the causes of those who possessed what had belonged to others, and of those who had lost what had been formerly their own. at last he so managed the whole business, as that, the estates being set at their true values, *some* were persuaded to part with what they had, and take an equivalent in money for it: and *others* to neglect the recovery of their own, and rest themselves content with being paid its full value. by this means the controversy was fairly determined, and all went home satisfied without grudging or complaining. here was a great and extraordinary man now! here was one, that deserved to have been born in our republic! this is the true way of dealing with citizens; and not "as hath been practised amongst us twice" to make sale of their goods in the public markets, and have them cried by the voice of the common cryer. but this famous *grecian* "as was the duty of a wise and extraordinary person" thought it became him to provide alike for all: and indeed every magistrate, who proceeds upon principles of reason and prudence, will always take care not to make any difference between the interests of his people; but will govern them all by the same rule and standard of justice and equity. here's one man shall dwell in what belongs to another: what *reason* is there, i beseech you, for this; that when i have bought, built, repaired, and laid out a great deal of money, another should come and enjoy all the fruits of it, in spite of my teeth?

is not this plainly to take away from one that which justly belongs to him, and give to another what he has nothing of right to? as for the project of forgiving debts, i can see no reason in the world for it, unless it be reason, that another should buy land with my money, and that he should have the land, but i never have my money.

chapter 24.

care should be taken to prevent peoples running too much into debt. faith *the cement of publick society.* cicero*'s conduct in his consulship about the matter of debts. the duties of a good magistrate. how one's health and estate are to be taken care of.*

care ought therefore to be taken before-hand "which 'tis easy to do by a great many ways" to keep people from running so much into debt, as may bring any damage or inconvenience to the publick: and not, *when they are in,* to make the creditors lose what's their own, and let the debtors gain what in justice is another's: for nothing so cements, and holds together in union all the parts of a society, as faith or credit; which can never be kept up, unless men are under some force and necessity of honestly paying what they owe to one another. this design of having debtors excused from payment, was never attempted with greater eagerness, than whilst i was consul: men of all ranks and degrees in the state, took up arms and formed camps for the bringing it about; whose endeavours i resisted with so much vigour, as that the republic was quickly delivered from so pernicious an evil. there never were known greater debts in the city, nor ever more easily and faithfully paid: and pray what was the reason of all this? why because when their hopes of defrauding were cut off, they found themselves under a necessity of payment. 'tis true there is one, who has since been a conqueror, "tho' then he was conquered by my vigilance" that has found out means to effect these designs, at a time when they'd bring *him* no manner of advantage; but such an inclination had that man to villainy, that the bare doing of it was a pleasure to him, without any other invitation in the world. the sum then of what has been said is this, that such as design for the good of the republic, *must* be sure to avoid *this* sort of liberality, which takes away from one what it gives to another; and *must* constantly make it their principal care, to uphold each member in his proper rights, according to the principles of justice and equity; so as neither to suffer the *poorer* sort of people to be wronged or oppressed, by reason of their poverty; nor the *richer* to be hindered from keeping or demanding what's justly their own, by the envy of the others: and in fine *must* apply their most earnest endeavours, whether in war or peace, to encrease the power, and enlarge the bounds and revenues of the republic. these are the duties and exercises of great men: these are the things which were practiced by our ancestors; and whoever goes on to perform the same, will not only bring great advantage to the republic, but gain a mighty interest and reputation to himself. in these rules of duty relating to things profitable, *antipater* the *tyrian,* a *stoick* philosopher, who lately dyed at *athens,* thinks that two things have been omitted by *panaetius: first,* the care of getting or preserving one's health. and, *secondly,* of an estate. i believe *that great philosopher* might omit them on purpose, because they are so easy and obvious to everyone: however 'tis certain they are both of them profitable. now *health* is preserved *by* considering the peculiar temper of one's body, and observing what agrees or does *not* agree with it; *by* temperance and moderation in meats and drinks, and other things relating to the welfare of the body; *by* forbearance and abstinence as to the matter of pleasures; and lastly, *by* the skill of physicians, and the like. an *estate* should be *gotten* by nothing that's any ways scandalous or dishonest; *preserved* by diligence and prudent management; and lastly, by the same means *bettered* and *augmented.* but this whole subject is excellently handled by *xenophon* the *socratick,* in his book *of o economics;* which i formerly translated from the *greek* into *latin,* when much about as old as you are at present.

chapter 25.

the comparing of things profitable one with another. an answer of cato*'s upon this head. who are best able to teach how to get estates.*

the fourth chief head we proposed to speak of, was the *comparing things profitable one with another;* which is oftentimes necessary, however neglected or forgotten by *panaetius.* for we use to compare either the goods of the *body* with those of *fortune;* or *these* back again with *those* of the body; or lastly, those both of *the one* and *the other* amongst themselves. *first,* the goods of the body are compared with those of fortune, as, *'tis more eligible,* suppose, *to be healthy than rich. secondly,* these back again with those of the body, as, *'tis better to be rich, than of a robust constitution. thirdly,* those of the body with one another, as *health is preferable to pleasure,* or *strength to activity.* and *lastly,* those of fortune with one another, as if *glory should be preferred before riches,* or *an estate in the city before another in the country.* to this latter sort of comparing may be referred that answer of the *senior cato*'s, who being once asked, what he conceived most profitable in the management of an estate? said, *to feed cattle well.* and what the second? *to feed cattle pretty well.* and what the third? *to feed cattle, tho' but ill.* and what the fourth? *to till the ground.* and then the enquirer proceeding still to ask, *pray what do you think of letting money out to usury? pray*

what do i think, replies *cato, of killing a man?* from what has been said, and a great deal more, that might easily be added, 'tis sufficiently manifest, that profits are often compared with one another; and that we had reason sufficient on our side, in making *this* a fourth head for the finding out our duty. but as for the business of getting an estate, and placing out money to the best advantage, and i wish i might add of applying to the best uses, there are certain honest men who attend at the *exchange,* that can better inform you than any of the philosophers, that dispute in the schools. 'tis worthwhile however to know these things, because they relate to the business of *profit,* which has made up the subject of all this book. let us now pass on to what remains behind.

the end of the second book.

the third book.

chapter 1.

an excellent saying of the elder scipio africanus. cicero *betakes himself to a life of leisure and retirement, the republic being quite ruined. the difference between his retirement, and* africanus*'s. some good to be drawn out of evils.*

cato, son *mark,* who was near of the same age with *publius scipio,* the first that had the surname of *africanus* given him, tells us 'twas an usual saying of *his, that he never was less idle, than when he was idle; nor ever less alone, than when he was alone.* a noble and excellent sentence indeed, and worthy of so great and so wise a person; by which it appears, that in the midst of leisure he could think of business, and was used when alone to converse with his own thoughts: so that he never was properly idle, and needed no company to entertain him in his solitude. the two things therefore, which bring a kind of dullness and heaviness upon others, served but to sharpen and invigorate his mind, *viz.* solitude and leisure. i wish i could truly say the same of myself! but tho' i'm not able to arrive at that inimitable temper of soul, i desire at least to come as near it as is possible; and being excluded by open violence, and impious arms, from having ought to do with affairs of the senate, or business of the bar, i wholly betake myself to a life of retirement; and for that very reason have abandoned the city, and am often alone, only going from one seat to another in the country. but alas! my leisure is not to be compared with that of *africanus,* nor my solitude with his solitude! for he was employed, at that very time, in places of the greatest reputation in the publick; and his *leisure* was only a voluntary retirement, to give himself respite from business for a season; and his *solitude* only a kind of port or haven, into which he withdrew himself from the disturbances of company. whereas my leisure proceeds not from any desire of respite, but from a want of business to employ myself about; for what proper work can i find to do, when there's no more a senate, nor any courts of justice remaining entire, in which i might honourably shew myself? therefore, whereas 'twas my former custom to appear much in publick, and in the eye of my citizens; i now on the contrary hide myself from them, to avoid the very sight of such packs of villains, as are everywhere abroad; and as much as is possible confine myself to solitude. but since this is given us for a rule by the learned, *that when several evils are threatening us at once, we should not only choose to undergo the* least, *but extract some advantage out of* them *if 'tis possible:* i therefore, in the midst of all these present misfortunes, gain the small advantage of quiet and retirement, "tho' not such a quiet as *he* might have expected, whose wisdom had formerly procured the peace of the publick" and endeavour not wholly to languish out that solitude, which not choice, but necessity has laid upon me. tho' *africanus* indeed, i myself must confess, has got much greater glory by his solitude and retirement: for none of his thoughts are committed to writing, nor any monuments remain of what he did in his leisure, and when he was alone; whereby we are given to understand, that he never was idle, nor ever properly alone; because he was always employed in meditation, and in searching out those things, which by thinking he became master of. but i, who hadn't got such a strength of genius, as to be content, when alone, with the company of my bare thoughts, am forced to apply all my studies and endeavours to the drudgery of writing: i have written more therefore within a very short time, since the ruin of the state, than i did for some years, while 'twas in its flourishing condition.

chapter 2.

the subject of duties the most useful part of all philosophy. an exhortation to his son to be diligent in his studies. the subject of this third book. panaetius *neglected to treat of it, tho' he did at first design it. a saying of* rutilius rufus.

now tho' all philosophy "my dear *cicero"* be a rich, as it were, and plentiful soil, which has not any part of it wast and uncultivate: yet there's no place that's more fruitful in it, or from which more advantage accrues to the husbandman, than that which is employed about *offices* or *duties;* from whence those precepts and directions are drawn, which lead toward a steady and virtuous way of living. wherefore tho' i doubt not but that *cratippus,* the greatest philosopher of our age, is daily inculcating these things to you, and you are receiving them with that attention they deserve; yet i have thought it not wholly unnecessary, myself to remind you of so important a matter; and could wish that your ears might continually ring, as it were, with such precepts, and not hear "as far as possible" anything else. and as this is a method which is useful for all men, who design to lead virtuous and creditable lives; so for no one living, perhaps, more than yourself. for consider you're the son of an industrious father, one who has born the greatest honours in the republic, and has gotten himself some credit and reputation in the world; people therefore will expect that you should follow my steps, and 'tis your part to see that you answer their expectation. beside 'tis no small thing you have taken upon you, by being at *athens,* and under the great *cratippus;* whither since you are gone as it were to a *staple* and mart of good literature, 'twill be scandalous for you to return again empty, and bring a reproach both upon the place and your master. wherefore, dear son, be industrious and diligent, and spare no manner of pains and labour "if i may call it a *labour,* and not rather a *pleasure,* to study and learn" that you may make a good use of these advantages before you; and when all things are thus plentifully supplied on my part, let it never be said, that you your self are wanting to your own greatest interest. but i shall say no more upon this at present, having heretofore written again and again to you, by way of exhortation. let us now proceed to the fifth and last part of our proposed division. *panaetius* then, who without all controversy has written most accurately upon the subject of *duties,* and whom in this work, with a little alteration, i have hitherto followed, lays down "as was said" three general heads, which men use in consulting or deliberating concerning their duty: in the *first* 'tis questioned, *whether the action they are going about be honest or dishonest.* in the *second, whether it be profitable or unprofitable.* in the *third, how a good man ought to determine the case, if that which seems honest should come into competition with that which seems profitable.* of the two former heads he has given us an account in his three first books, and therein has promised to go on with the third of them; but has failed, it should seem, of being so good as his word. which i wonder at the more upon this account, because we are told by his scholar *possidonius,* that he lived thirty years after those books were published. and i can't but admire at the same *possidonius,* that having an occasion, in some of his writings, to discourse upon this argument, he should do no more than just touch upon it in short; especially seeing he himself has observed, that in all philosophy there's no one subject more necessary and important. some indeed think, whom i cannot agree with, that *panaetius* did not *forget* this part, but *omitted* it on purpose; and that in plain truth, it ought to be omitted, since profit can never be *really* contrary to honesty. whether it *ought* to be omitted or not, may perhaps be a question; but whether *panaetius* designed it or no, and afterwards neglected it, i think can be none: for a writer certainly, that proposes three heads, and goes through' with but two of them, must needs design to discourse upon the third; nay he tells us himself in the close of his third book, that heed afterwards proceed to this remaining part. beside we have the authority of *possidonius* to vouch it, who in one of his letters has given us a saying of *rutilius rufus,* who was scholar to *panaetius* as well as himself; *that has never any painter had been yet so bold, as to venture upon finishing that piece of* venus, *which* apelles *left imperfect at the island* cos; *"the beauty of the face making all men despair, ever to paint a body that should be answerable to it" so the excellency of that, which* panaetius *had writ upon this subject, made others afraid of attempting to add that which he had omitted.*

chapter 3.

whether panaetius *did well in making this third head. reasons why he did not. the danger of separating profit from honesty. what the* stoicks *mean by* living according to nature. *two sorts of virtue, the* perfect *and* ordinary. *the former belongs to the* wise *only; the latter is common to all. the most perfect virtue "as 'tis counted by the multitude" is really imperfect.* that *panaetius* therefore did think he was obliged to discourse upon this part, is beyond all question: but whether he was mistaken in his judgment or not, when he laid down this head, as the *third of deliberating for the finding out our duty,* may perhaps be disputed. for whether according to the opinion of the *stoicks,* we take *virtue* or *honesty* to be the *only good;* or, according to that of *your peripateticks,* acknowledge it so to be the *chiefest good,* as that all things else are just nothing against it; 'tis certain, upon either of these suppositions, that profit can't be put in the ballance against honesty. we are therefore told, that *socrates* used even to *curse* those people, who disjoined these things in thought and conception, which are one and the same in nature and reality. and the *stoicks* are so far of his opinion, as constantly to maintain, that whatever is honest must be also profitable, and whatever is profitable must be also honest. 'tis true had *panaetius* been one of those, who assert that virtue is therefore only desirable, because it brings something of profit along with it; like some, who think nothing any further worth a-seeking for, than as it begets pleasure, or exemption from pain; we could then have allowed him the liberty of saying, that profit is sometimes repugnant to honesty. but seeing he was one of a different sect, and thinks *nothing* to be *good* except that which is *honest;* and avows that whatever is contrary to *honesty,* and appears to us under the notion of *profit,* can neither, if we have it, make life ever the better; nor, if we have it not, ever the worse; he should not, methinks, have brought in such a deliberation, wherein that, which seems profitable, comes into competition with that, which is honest. for that, which the *stoicks* call their *sovereign good* [to live in conformity with the dictates of nature] means, i suppose, no more than this, that we should always live agreeably to the rules of virtue; and should use other things, which are suited and adapted to our natural inclinations, no further than virtue permits and allows them. now this being so, there are several of opinion, that this general head, wherein profit and honesty are compared with one another, was improperly brought in; and that there ought not to have been given any rules or directions upon this subject. now your *perfect honesty,* which is truly and properly called by that name, is only to be found in your *perfectly wise* men, and can never be possibly separated from virtue: but those men, who have not this perfect wisdom, must by no means pretend to such a perfect honesty, tho' they may have some shadows and resemblances of it. for all *those duties,* of which we are treating in these books, have the name of *middle ones* given them by the *stoicks,* which are common indifferently to all men in general, and are not confined to any particular number of them. but several get them either by the peculiar happiness of their natures, or by a constant progress in study and learning. whereas *those others,* which they call *right ones,* are perfect and consummate, or "as they themselves express it" *have all their numbers,* which none can attain to, but the *perfectly wise.* 'tis true that the vulgar, as soon as they see any action of such a nature, as indeed is no more than a *middle* kind of duty, are immediately thinking it a *perfect* and *compleat* one: for the common sort of people can't tell what is perfect, and by consequence don't know how much any virtue or excellency comes short of it: but finding it answer the highest of their conceptions, they imagine it wants nothing of being as perfect as can be. just as it happens in judging of poems or pieces of painting, and other such like; those who aren't judges, are generally pleased with and praise those things, which by no means deserve any praise or commendation: because, i suppose, there may be something that's good in them, which serves well enough to take with those that are ignorant, and who hadn't so much skill as to be able to discover their several imperfections: therefore when they are instructed by those who understand it, they are brought with no great difficulty to forsake their opinions.

chapter 4.

the greatest men that have been in the world, were not perfectly wise. profit ought not to be compared with the middle, any more than with the perfect honesty. how men come to compare them together, or to doubt upon this subject. this illustrated by an example. one certain rule necessary for our guidance in this case. the doctrine of the stoicks *preferable to that of the* peripateticks.

those duties therefore, which make up the subject of this enquiry, by the *stoicks* are counted a kind of *second-rate honesty,* which is not confined to their wise men only, but is common and open to all mankind: and therefore all those, who have any kind of sence or inclination for virtue, are very sensibly touched and affected with *it.* for you aren't to imagine, when we call the two *decii*'s or *scipio's magnanimous,* and give *fabricius* and *aristides* the appellation of *just,* that we set them for patterns of such justice and magnanimity, as we supposed to be in those who are perfectly wise. for they were none of them *wise* in that exalted sence, which we would here be understood to mean by *that word.* nay those who were counted and surnamed the *wise,* such as *cato,* for instance, and *laelius,* and particularly the famous seven; yet in truth and reality were not such: but by frequently practising that *middle* sort of duties, had gotten a sort of shew and resemblance of *true wisdom.* as no profit therefore ought ever to be put in opposition to that, which is *truely and perfectly* virtuous and honest; so neither should any interest, or convenience of life, be set up against that, which is *ordinarily* called so, and which is followed by those, who desire to be counted men of honesty and integrity: and *we* should be as careful of living up to that honesty, *whereof we are capable;* as the *perfectly wise* are of keeping close to that, which is truly such, and may in strictness of speech be called by that name. for whatever attainments we have made in virtue, they will never stand us in any mighty stead, if we be not thus careful of holding constantly to our duty—. what has hitherto been said can be applied to those only, who make goodness consist in living according to their duty: but those men, who measure the goodness of things by some *profit* or *advantage* they bring along with them, and who let *these* prevail more with them than virtue and honesty; frequently in deliberating use to put that, which they take to be profitable, into the ballance against justice and honesty; but good and wise men never offer to do it. i'm therefore of opinion, when *panaetius* tells us, *that men use to deliberate, in considering which of these two they should chuse;* that he meant no more than what his words strictly signify, *viz.* that they *use* to do this, and not that really they *ought* to do it. for 'tis infinitely scandalous, not only to prefer a pretended advantage before duty and conscience; but so much as to bring them to the contest and competition, and to *doubt* whether the one of them should be chosen before the other. if this be so, you'll be ready to ask me, *how then comes there to be any doubt at all? and what is it that requires consideration upon this subject?* i suppose 'tis this, that it sometimes happens men are not so very certain, *whether the action deliberated upon be honest, or not honest:* for that which is usually counted a piece of villainy, is frequently changed by the times or circumstances, and is found to be the contrary. to lay down one instance, which may serve to give some light to a great many others: pray what greater wickedness can there be upon earth "if we speak in general" than for anyone to murder, not only a man, but a familiar friend? and shall we therefore affirm that he's chargeable with a crime, who has murdered *a tyrant,* tho' he were his familiar? the people of *rome* i am sure won't say so, who count it one of the gloriousness actions in the world. you'll say then, *does not interest here carry it against honesty?* no, but rather honesty voluntarily follows interest. if therefore we would, upon all emergencies, be sure to determine our selves aright, when that which we call our advantage or interest, seems to be repugnant to that which is honest; we must lay down some general rule or measure, which if we will make use of in judging about things, we shall never be mistaken as to point of duty. now this *measure* i would have to be conformable to the doctrine and principles of the *stoicks,* which i principally follow throughout this work. for tho' i confess that the ancient *academics,* and your *peripateticks,* which were formerly the same, make honesty far preferable to that which seems one's interest: yet those who assert, *that whatever is honest must be also profitable,* and *nothing is profitable but what is honest,* talk much more bravely and heroically upon this subject, than those who allow, *that there are some things honest, which are not profitable;* and *some things profitable, which are not honest.* and we have very great liberty given us by our *academy,* so as never to be tied up to such and such tenets, but are left free to defend what we think most probable.

chapter 5.

the rule or measure mentioned in the former chapter. the ill effects of men's injuring others for their own advantage. everyone allowed to take care of himself in the first place; but not so as to injure any other, tho' to save his own life. two errors, that occasion men's acting contrarywise, and the absurdity of them.

but to return to our general rule or measure: there's nothing upon earth then so contrary to nature, neither death, nor poverty, nor pain, nor whatever other evil can befall a man either in his body or fortune, as to take away anything wrongfully from another, and do one's self a kindness by injuring one's neighbour. for, in the first place, it ruins all manner of society and entercourse amongst men; since 'tis plain, that if once men arrive at such a pass, as to plunder and injure the rest of their neighbours, out of hopes to procure some advantage to themselves, there must follow of course a dissolution of that society, which of all things in the world is most agreeable to nature. should we suppose, for example, that the bodily members had, every one of them, gotten an opinion, that to draw to its self all the vigour of its neighbours, would very much serve to encrease its own; 'tis certain the whole body must decay and perish: and just so, should every one amongst us deprive other people of their profits and advantages, and take away all he could get from them, with design of applying it only to his own use; the general society and fellowship of mankind must of necessity be broken. for tho' 'tis no more than what nature will allow off, that each man should look after himself in the first place, and furnish himself with the necessaries of life, before he takes care to provide for other people; yet the same nature will by no means permit, that anyone should rise by his thrusting down another, and encrease his own fortune by the spoils of his neighbours. and not only nature, that is the universal law or consent of nations; but particular laws, by which several countries and commonwealths are governed, have commanded likewise, *that no one be suffered to do an injury to another, for the sake of procuring any advantage to himself.* for the very design and end of laws is to keep up agreement and union amongst citizens; which whoever destroys is by them punished, not with the loss of his goods alone, but with prisons, banishment, or even death itself. but nature and right reason, as being at once both an human and divine law too, command this duty with much greater authority; and whoever obeys them "as all men must, who propose to live according to the rules of nature" will never be guilty of coveting what's another's, or applying to his own use what had first been injuriously taken from his neighbour. for certainly greatness and elevation of soul; as also the virtues of courtesy, justice and liberality, are much more agreeable to nature and right reason, than pleasure, than riches, than even life itself; to despise all which, and regard them as just nothing, when they come to be compared with the publick interest, is the duty of a brave and exalted spirit: whereas to rob another for one's own advantage is "as has been shewn" more contrary to nature, than death, than pain, or any other evil whatever of that kind. again, those men live much more according to nature, who suffer perpetual troubles and labours, for the good and preservation, were it possible, of all men; "like *hercules* of old, whom men, as a grateful requital for his benefits, report to be placed among the number of the gods" than those who consume all their lives in retirement, where they're not only free from disturbances and vexations, but are furnished with all the pleasures and conveniencies of life; and have moreover the advantages of strength and comeliness superadded to them. and accordingly we find it to be so in effect, that all the most great and extraordinary geniuses, have preferred all the troubles and difficulties of the *former,* before the quiet and ease of this *latter* way of living. from all which laid together it unanswerably follows, that whoever lives agreeably to the dictates of nature, can never be guilty of injuring another. in fine, he that injures another to do himself a kindness, either thinks he does nothing that's contrary to nature; or that the *doing an injury* is a less degree of evil, than death, or poverty, or pain, or loss of children, friends, or relations. if he thinks that in wronging and abusing of others, he doth not do anything that is contrary to nature; 'tis in vain to dispute any longer with such a one, who takes away from man the distinguishing part, and very characteristic "as it were" of his nature: but if he allows that 'tis indeed an evil, only thinks that some others, such as poverty, pain, or death, may be worse; he's grossly mistaken in being of opinion, that the ills which touch nothing but the body or fortune, can be greater than those which affect the soul.

chapter 6.

the interest of particulars inseparable from that of the whole community. the rule of not wronging another for our own advantage, extends not only to relations, or fellow-citizens, but to all mankind. the breaking of it, ruins all justice, liberality, &c. *several cases about it, put and resolved. tyrants no members of human society.* we should all of us therefore propose the same end, and every one think his own interest in particular, to be the same with that of the republic in general: which if each one endeavour to draw solely to himself, all union and agreement amongst men will be dissolved. and if *nature* enjoin us, that *every man* should desire and procure the advantage of another, whoever he be, tho' for no other reason than because he is a man; it necessarily follows, that *all* men are joyned, by the self-same nature, in one common interest: which if it be true, then all men are subject, and live equally under the *same* law of nature: and if this be true too, then certainly they're forbid by that *same* law of nature, any ways to injure or wrong one another: but the first of these is undoubtedly certain, therefore the last must needs be so likewise. for as to what is usually said by some men, that they would not take anything away from a father, or brother, for their own advantage; but there is not the same reason for their *ordinary* citizens; 'tis foolish and absurd: for they thrust themselves out from partaking of any privileges, and from joining in common with the rest of their citizens, for the publick good: an opinion that strikes at the very root and foundation of all civil societies. others there are, who are ready to confess, that they ought to bear such a regard to fellow-citizens; but by no means allow of it in relation to strangers: now these men destroy that universal society of all mankind; which if once taken away, *kindness, liberality, justice* and *humanity* must utterly perish; which excellent virtues whoever makes void, is chargeable with impiety towards the immortal gods: for he breaks that society, which they have established and settled amongst men; the closest cement or bond of which, is the being of opinion, that for men to injure and wrong one another for their private interests, is an evil that nature is much more a verse from, than all those which happen either to the *body* or *fortune;* nay, and i might add to the *mind* also, provided only they be not contrary to justice; for that one virtue is as 'twere, a kind mistress and queen of all the rest.

but what? "perhaps some men will be apt to say" if a wise man be ready to perish for hunger, must not he take away victuals from another; tho' a perfectly useless and insignificant fellow? not at all; for life itself is not so dear to me, as a settled resolution of doing no wrong for my private advantage. but suppose this good man, almost dead with cold, should have it in his power to take *phalaris*'s cloths away, one of the most savage and inhuman of tyrants; would not you have him to do it? there's no great difficulty in determining such cases: for 'tis certain if you take away anything from another, tho' never so useless and insignificant a creature, *for no other end but to benefit yourself by it;* 'tis an inhuman action, and plainly contrary to the laws of nature: but if you are one, who by living will do very great service to the republic, or perhaps to the society of mankind in general, and *for that only reason take something from another;* 'tis an action that is not to be found much fault with. but in all other cases, every man's bound to bear his own misfortunes, rather than to get quit of them by wronging his neighbour. you'll say then, is not it more contrary to nature, *to covet or seize what belongs to another, than to be in sickness, or want, or any such evil? yes; but withal 'tis as contrary to nature, to abandon all care of the public interest;* for 'tis a piece of injustice: from whence it follows, that an *honest, prudent* and *valiant* person, whose death would bring a great disadvantage on the publick, may take from an idle and useless citizen, such things as are *necessary* for the maintenance of life, without any offence against the laws of nature; which aim at the preservation and interest of the publick: *provided that* he don't make the love of himself, and conceit of his own more than ordinary merits, an occasion of injuring and oppressing others. for he'll perform but the duties which justice require of him, by thus taking care to be serviceable to the publick, and upholding that "which i am often forced to mention" universal society between all mankind. as for the question proposed about *phalaris,* 'tis easily answered: for tyrants aren't members of human society; but rather its greatest and most pestilent enemies; nor is it unnatural, if it lie in one's power, to *rob* that man, whom 'tis even a virtue and a glory to murder. and 'twere heartily to be wished, that this whole destructive and impious race, were utterly banished and excluded from amongst men. just as we cut off those members of the body, which have got no longer either bloud or spirits in them, and serve but to infect and corrupt the rest; so should those monsters, which under the shape and outside of men, conceal all the savageness and cruelty of beasts, be cut off, as it were, and separated from the body and society of mankind. of much the same nature are all those questions, in which the knowledge and understanding of our duty, depends upon the knowledge of times and circumstances.

chapter 7.

cicero *will finish what* panaetius *left imperfect. all his decisions taken from this principle,* that honesty alone, *or at least* chiefly, is desirable for its own sake. *the true meaning of* panaetius, *in making profit and honesty be compared with one another.*

i believe then *panaetius* would have discoursed upon such things as these, but that some accident, or perhaps other business, put a stop to his designs. however there are precepts enough laid down in his former books, to resolve all scruples and doubts concerning them; from which we may learn, *what that is which is wicked, and therefore to be avoided;* and what *that,* which therefore is not to be avoided, because not at such times, and in such cases wicked. but since i am going "as it were" to *crown* a work, which was left imperfect by the author of it, tho' wanting but little of being brought to perfection; i shall follow the method of the *geometricians:* and as they don't use to demonstrate everything, but demand to have some things allowed them before-hand, by the help of which they more easily explain and demonstrate their designs: so i demand of you, son *mark,* if you can, to grant me this following *postulatum, that nothing is desirable for itself alone, but that which is honest:* or however, if *cratippus* won't permit you to do that; yet at least, i am sure, you must grant me this which follows, *that honesty is desirable for its own sake, above all things in the world:* either of the two is sufficient for my purpose, and the one is *probable* as well as the other, and nothing else beside them is so upon this subject. and here in the first place we must do right to *panaetius:* who does *not* say, "as indeed he ought not" that *that,* which *is* profitable, could ever be contrary to that, which is honest; but only *that,* which has the *appearance* of such. and he often avows, that nothing is profitable, but that which is honest; and, that whatever is honest is at the same time profitable: and declares their opinion, who first made a difference between those two, to be the greatest evil that ever yet spread itself abroad amongst men. therefore when he speaks of a contrariety between them, he means an *appearing,* and not a *real* one; which he therefore laid down for one of the heads of his discourse, not as tho' 'twere lawful for men ever to give *profit* the preference before *honesty;* but only that they might be able to determine themselves aright, if these two at any time should seem to interfere and be inconsistent with one another. this part therefore, which he has omitted, i shall now supply; not with any borrowed assistance from others, but purely "as we say" by my own strength. for i never had anything come to my hands upon this subject, that i could any ways approve of, since the time of *panaetius.*

chapter 8.

what we ought to do, when anything presents itself under the appearance of profit. proof that whatever is profitable must also be honest, and whatever is honest must also be profitable. the contrary opinion the great source of all wickedness. infamy a certain punishment of villainy. 'tis a wickedness even to deliberate whether profit should be preferred before honesty, or not. nothing to be done out of hopes of being concealed.

whenever therefore anything comes in our view, which carries the appearance of *profit* along with it, we can't but immediately be somewhat affected with it: but if, upon taking a nearer view, we find there is anything base and dishonest, in that which appeared to be profitable at first, 'tis our duty to reject it: which is not to deprive us of what is *really* profitable, but only to let us understand, that nothing dishonest can possibly be such. now if nothing be so *contrary* to nature as baseness, and nothing so *agreeable* to nature as true profit, "which is certainly so; for she always desires what is right, and becoming, and consistent with itself, and abhors the contrary" then it necessarily follows, *that whatever is profitable can never have any baseness, or dishonesty annexed to it.* again, if we were born for virtue or honesty, and this be the *only* desirable good; "as *zeno* would have it" or at least *so much more,* so, than everything else, as to outweigh all that can be put in the scale against it; "which was *aristotle*'s opinion" it must certainly follow, *that honesty's the only,* or however *the greatest good:* now whatever is good must certainly be profitable; from whence it follows, *that whatever is honest must also certainly be profitable.* 'tis a villainous error of some naughty men therefore, when anything strikes them with *an appearance* of profit, to seize it immediately and enjoy it as such, without ever considering its relation to honesty. hence come assassinations, poisonings, and making of false wills: hence stealing, embezzling the publick monies, plundering and oppressing both citizens and confederates: hence the unsufferable power and insolence, which some men exercise, who are grown too great for the rest of their citizens: in fine, hence ambition, and the desire of rule, have produced their most cursed and deplorable effects, even in free commonwealths; than which nothing can be thought of more odious and detestable. for men look upon the fancied *advantages* of things through' a false perspective; but as for the *punishment* appendant to them, "i don't mean of the laws, which they frequently break through'; but of baseness and dishonesty, which is much the more grievous" *that,* i say, they never so much as think upon at all. such people therefore are impious and abominable, and deserve to be excluded from all society, who deliberate with themselves, and make it matter of doubt, whether they should choose what they see to be honest, or wilfully commit what they know to be a villainy. for the very making a question of such a thing is criminal, tho' one should not proceed so far as to execution. those things therefore ought not to be deliberated at all upon, where the very deliberation is scandalous and dishonest. and whenever we do deliberate upon any kind of subject, we should never do anything out of hope, and expectation, that our actions will be concealed: for we ought to take this as a constant maxim, if we pretend to have made any progress in philosophy, *that tho' we could hide from the eyes of all men, and even of the gods themselves, whatever we go about; yet we should be careful to abstain from the vices of covetousness and injustice, of lasciviousness and incontinency.*

chapter 9.

he illustrates his rule laid down in the former chapter with the story of gyges, *taken out of* plato. *he shews himself a villain, who acknowledges he would do wickedly, if he could with secrecy.*

to this purpose *plato* brings in that remarkable story of *gyges:* a gaping in the earth being made by reason of some violent showers, as the story tells us, *gyges* went down into the hollow of it, and found there lying a brazen horse, with a door in his side. this he opened, and looking in, discovered a dead man's body, of an unusual bulk, with a ring of gold upon one of its fingers. this he pulls off, and puts it upon his own finger; and then coming up, goes and joins himself to the rest of the shepherds; "for he was shepherd to the king at that time." here he observed, that upon turning the stone toward the palm of his hand, he became invisible to everybody else, tho' others did not become so to him; and that upon turning it to its proper place, he immediately became visible again, as before. making use therefore of this lucky opportunity, he found out a way to enjoy the queen, and by her assistance to murder the king, his lord and master, and to make away those, who might prove any hindrance or stop to his designs; nor could anyone possibly see or discover him in any of these villainies; so that he quickly, by the help of this ring, from a simple shepherd became king of *lydia.* now had a truly wise man had the keeping of this ring, he would not have thought himself ever the more privileged to be guilty of any action that is wicked or detestable: for good men desire to be virtuous and honest, and not to be secret, that so they may sin without danger. and here some philosophers, men of more honesty, than acuteness or subtilty, cry out, *that this story of* plato*'s is a meer fiction:* as tho' he had said either that it *really* was, or indeed *could be* done. no; the meaning and design of this example of *gyges,* and the ring, is this: suppose you could do any dishonest action, for the gratifying a lustful, covetous or ambitious desire, so as that no one living could either know or suspect it, but both gods and men must be kept perfectly in ignorance; whether in such case, would you do it, or no? *ay, but,* say they, *this is an impossible case:* tho' 'tis not perhaps so impossible neither: but that which i ask them is, *what they would do, supposing that possible, which they deny now to be so?* the manner of their arguing is somewhat odd and illiterate; for they still deny the possibility of it, and that they will stand to; not it seems, understanding what the force and true import of this supposition is. for when we put the question to them, whether they would do such an action, or not, *supposing they could conceal it?* we don't ask them, whether they *can conceal it, or not?* but put them, as 'twere, to the rack or inquisition; that so, if they say *they would* gratify such desires upon assurance of impunity, we may know them to be villains by their own confession: but if they deny it, they may be forced to grant, that every base and dishonest action, is, barely as such, to be shunned and detested. but to return to our purpose, from which we have digressed.

chapter 10.

several cases, wherein men doubt, whether that which appears to be profitable be not honest. the case of brutus *banishing* collatinus; *of* romulus *murdering his brother* remus. *men may do what's for their own advantage, provided they do no injury to another. an excellent saying of* chrysippus *to that purpose. how far a man may honestly, and ought to go, upon a friend's account: illustrated by the example of* damon *and* pinthias, *two loving friends.*

there frequently happen a great many cases, which disturb men's minds, and put them into suspense, by the shew of some profit which they seem to contain in them. *not* when men deliberate, whether they should leave and abandon their honesty, for the sake of any profit, be it never so great; "for that's a piece of wickedness, as was before observed" *but,* whether that action, which appears to be profitable, mayn't safely be done without transgressing against honesty. it might not seem honest in *brutus,* for example, to depose *collatinus* his brother-consul from his office; whose wisdom and conduct he himself had made use of in expelling the kings. but since the chief men in the government had so ordered, that the kindred of *superbus,* and very name of the *tarquins,* should be banished the city, and no marks or footsteps be suffered to remain of monarchical government; 'twas not only profitable, thus to consult for the safety of his country, but so honest too, as that *collatinus* himself ought joyfully to have acquiesced in it. that which was profitable therefore prevailed, because 'twas honest withal; which had it not been, it could never have been profitable. i can't say the same in relation to that king, by whom this city was first founded: for a bare shew of profit got the better over him, when he imbrewed his hands in the blood of his own brother, because it seemed more profitable to reign by himself, than in conjunction with another: he broke all the ties both of brotherly affection and common humanity, for the obtaining of an end, which appeared to be profitable, and yet really was not so. he pretended however, for a shew of honesty, that 'twas done to revenge an affront of his brother's, who leapt with contempt over his new raised wall; a frivolous excuse, and if true, not sufficient to serve his turn: by his favour therefore, whether *quirinus* or *romulus,* i can't but think he did a very ill action. not that men are bound to be careless of their own interests, or to part with that to others, which themselves stand in need of; but ev'ry one may do what he thinks for his own advantage, provided it be no injury or prejudice to another person. *chrysippus,* amongst a great many very good sayings, has this one in particular:

he that's running a race ought to strive and endeavour, *says he,* as much as he is able, to get before his antagonist; but must not trip his heels up, or thrust him aside with his hands: so in life 'tis *allowable,* that everyone should get what is useful and convenient for his comfortable subsistence, but 'tis not *so* to take it away from other people.

but 'tis nowhere more difficult to keep to one's duty, than in the affair of friendship: for as not to do everything that one handsomely can, for the sake of a friend; so to do anything that's base or dishonest, are both of them equally contrary to one's duty. but there's one very short and yet easy rule, which may serve to direct us in all cases of this nature; and 'tis this, never to prefer that which *only seems* profitable, such as honours, riches, pleasures, and the like, before a kindness to a friend: but never to do anything for the sake of a friend, that's an injury to the publick, or a breach of one's oath, or other solemn engagement: for whoever does this, 'tis impossible he should ever be *a good man.* should such a one therefore be judge in his friend's case, he would not by any means be biassed in his favour, but would wholly lay aside the person of a friend, as soon as he took upon him that of a judge. perhaps he might do so much for friendship sake, as to wish that his friend may have the juster cause; and allow him as long time to speak for himself, as the laws will permit of: but when he's to give in his sentence upon oath, he'll then remember that he calls god to witness, that is, "i conceive" his own soul and conscience, the divinest thing that god has granted to man. 'tis a good custom therefore we have received from our ancestors, if we did but observe it, of *desiring the judge to be as favourable to us, as his oath will permit him.* the meaning of which request is no more than this, that he'd do so much for us, as i just now said might very honestly be done by a judge for his friend. for if men were obliged to do everything presently, that their friends should desire of them; such agreements as these ought to be counted not friendships, but dangerous conspiracies. i speak here only of the ordinary sort of friendships; for in those which are found between perfectly wise men, there can be no danger of any such thing. *damon* and *pinthias,* two of *pythagoras*'s followers, were so closely united to one another in their affections, that when *dicnysius* the *sicilian* tyrant had appointed a time wherein one of them should die, and the party condemned had begged a few days respite, wherein he might provide for his children and family, and recommend them to somebody, who would take care of them after his death; the other delivered up himself in his stead, voluntarily to die in the room of his friend, if he did not accordingly make his appearance. the prisoner came back at the day appointed, in order to his execution: which the tyrant perceiving, was so greatly amazed at their extraordinary faithfulness, as to desire he might be admitted a third man in their friendship. in friendship therefore, when that which seems *profitable* comes into competition with that which is *honest,* the latter should always be preferred before the former: but faith and religion should be preferred before friendship, whenever it demands anything that is not reconcilable with virtue and honesty. which one rule, if but carefully attended to, is sufficient for the purpose we are now upon; which is to discover, upon every occasion, what are those duties which friendship requires of us.

chapter 11.

in the management of publick affairs, the appearance of profit makes men relinquish honesty. several examples of it. examples of the contrary, when the appearance of profit is rejected for the sake of honesty.

the appearance of profit is also an occasion, in public affairs, of making false steps, and doing several things that are contrary to duty. thus our fathers, for instance, did ill in destroying and razing of *corinth.* the *athenians* yet worse in making an order, that the people of *aegina* should all have their thumbs cut off, because they were powerful with their navies at sea. this, no question, was thought a profitable decree; for *aegina* seemed to threaten their port *piraeum,* by reason of its nearness: but nothing can truely be profitable, that's cruel; for the nature of man, which we ought to follow as the guide of our actions, of all things in the world is most opposite to cruelty. those do ill likewise, who banish all strangers, and forbid them the city; as *pennus* did in the preceding age, and *papius* but lately. for tho' 'tis but fair, that he who's no citizen should not have the privileges of those who are; "which was made into a law by two very wise consuls, *viz. crassus* and *saevola"* yet wholly to exclude them from having anything to do there, is plainly against the dictates and laws of humanity. and as these things are bad in the government of a state, so nothing's more splendid and glorious on the other hand, than for that, which appears to be the interest of the publick, to be rejected in the comparison with justice and honesty. our own commonwealth can abundantly supply us with examples of this nature, as on other occasions, so more especially in the second *punick* war: when after the loss of that fatal day at *cannae,* it shewed more courage and bravery of resolution, than ever it had done upon the greatest successes. there was not any sign of faintheartedness seen, nor ever any mention of peace once heard of: so great is the glory and brightness of honesty, as that it utterly overwhelms the appearance of interest. the *athenians* knowing they should never be able to resist the *persians,* resolved by consent to abandon their city, and carrying their wives and their children to *troezene,* to defend by sea the liberties of *greece:* and when one *cyrsilus* tried to persuade them not to leave their city, but receive *xerxes* into it, they took him and stoned him. not but that the man would have drawn them to a thing, which was *seemingly* profitable: but that seeming profit was *really* none at all, being contrary to honesty. *themistocles,* after that notable victory in the *persian* war, told all the people in a general assembly, that he had thought of a thing, *which* might prove of great use and advantage to the publick, but *which* 'twas not convenient that everybody should know of: whereupon he desired they'd appoint him some person, to whom he might safely communicate it in secret. *aristides* was immediately appointed accordingly: *themistocles* told him, *'twould be no hard matter to fire in private the* spartan *fleet, which was laid up at* gytheum; *whereby the whole power of that republic must necessarily be ruined. aristides,* as soon as he knew the business, went back into the assembly, "which was big with expectation of what he had to say" and let them all know, *that* themistocles*'s counsel indeed was advantagious, but by no means honest or creditable for the city.* the *athenians* therefore, thinking what was dishonest not to be truly profitable, rejected immediately the whole proposal, without having heard so much as what it was, upon nothing else but this report of *aristides.* how much better and more honestly did they do, than we; who can suffer even pirates to live free from molestation, and yet demand tribute of our confederates and allies?

chapter 12.

the opinion, that a thing may be profitable, tho' 'tis not honest, very pernicious. a case put, wherein 'tis doubted, whether that, which seems to be profitable, be honest or no. *the arguments on either side, of two philosophers, differing in their opinions. the difference between* to conceal, *and* not to tell. *the society of mankind, how far it obliges.*

let us lay down this therefore as a standing maxim, *that whatever is dishonest can never be profitable: no, not tho' we should arrive at the full possession of all those advantages, which we proposed to obtain by it.* nay, this very persuasion, *that a thing may be profitable, tho' 'tis base and dishonest,* is one of the greatest misfortunes and calamities, that could ever have happened to the life of man. but there often fall out "as was before observed" some peculiar cases, wherein that which is honest has *a seeming* repugnance with that which is profitable; so that it requires some farther consideration, to know whether this repugnance be certain and real, or whether they mayn't be brought to a fair agreement. to this head belong such examples as these: suppose we, for instance, an honest merchant, when corn was scarce and extremely dear at *rhodes,* to bring a large quantity thither from *alexandria;* and withal to know, that a great many ships, well laden with corn, were in their way thither from the same city: should he tell this now to the people of *rhodes,* or say nothing of it, but sell his own corn at the best rates he could? we suppose him a virtuous and honest man, and don't here discourse of the deliberation of one, that would hold his peace if he thought 'twere dishonest; but of one, that doubts whether it be dishonest, or not. in such sort of cases *diogenes* the *babylonian,* a man of great credit and note among the *stoicks,* is of one opinion; and *antipater* his scholar, an extraordinary smart and ingenious man, of just the contrary. *antipater* would have everything be plainly told, that so the buyer might be ignorant of nothing in what he buys, that the seller himself knows of: *diogenes* thinks it enough in the seller, to tell the faults of his goods as far as the laws require it; and, as for the rest, tho' to use no cozening, yet, since he's come with design to sell them, to get as much money for them as ever he can. *here,* may the merchant say, *i have brought my corn; i have exposed it to sale; and sell it no dearer than other people do;* "nay perhaps he'll say *cheaper,* there being now a greater quantity, than there was before" *and pray where is now the wrong i have done to any body? antipater* argues upon a different principle: *what say you,* "quoth he" *are not you obliged to do good to mankind; and be serviceable to the society of all men in general? we're not you born under such an obligation? and had not you such principles ingrafted into you by nature, which 'tis always your duty to follow and obey, that your single interest should be the same with that of all men; and again that of all men should be the same with yours? and will* you, *this notwithstanding, conceal from the people what plenty there is a-coming, the knowledge of which might be of so great use and advantage to them? diogenes* perhaps will reply upon him thus: *'tis one thing to* conceal, *and another* not to tell; *nor can i be said* to conceal *from you now, tho'* i don't tell you, *what the nature and essence of the gods is, and what the happiness or chief good of men; things which 'twould do one much more kindness to know, than that quantities of corn are like to be here shortly. but if anything be profitable for you to hear, 'tis none of my duty to come and tell it you immediately. nay but you'll find that it is your duty,* "may the other reply" *if you'll please but to remember, that there's such a kind of thing, as a mutual relation, and society amongst all men. well, i do remember it;* "may the other reply again" *but, i pray you, is that society of such a nature, as that no man, who lives in it, must have anything that's his own? if this be so, then there's no more* selling, *but we must e'en* give everything away that we have.

chapter 13.

another case put, whether he that sells a bad house, be obliged to tell the purchaser 'tis so? *the arguments* pro *and* con *of* antipater *and* diogenes. cicero*'s determination of it, as also of that in the foregoing chapter. what 'tis properly to conceal.*

you plainly perceive, that 'tis never once said in all this dispute, *tho' such a thing's not honest, yet i'll do it because 'tis profitable:* but the one side defends the expediency of it, *no farther than 'tis honest;* and the other denies that it ought to be done, *because 'tis not honest.* again, suppose a good man were to sell an house, because of some defects which he himself knows of, tho' others do not: suppose it to be unhealthy, for example, but esteemed quite the contrary; serpents to annoy all the chambers of it, but no body to know this; made of bad materials, and ready to fall, but no one to discern this except the owner only: i demand, if he sells this for more than he expected, and don't tell the buyer of these several faults, whether he don't act like a knave and a villain? *yes undoubtedly,* answers *antipater: for what is this better, than* not to set a man right, when he is out of his way, *"which at* athens *was punished with public execrations" thus to suffer the buyer, as it were, to fall headlong, and run through' a mistake into very great mischiefs. nay, 'tis something worse yet than* not to shew a man his way; *for 'tis wilfully and designedly to draw him into mischief. diogenes* on the contrary vindicates the seller: *pray did he force you* "says he" *to buy his house, when did he so much as advise you to it? he set a thing to sale, which he did not like; and here you have bought a thing, which you* did *like. for if those men, who make it be published to the world,* here's a very good house, and very well built, to be sold; *are not counted deceivers, tho' the house be not* good, *nor at all* well built; *how much less should those who don't commend their house at all? for where-ever the buyer has the free use of his judgment, what fraud can there be upon the seller's part? and if a man is not bound to make good all he said, would you have him make good what he did not say? beside; what, i beseech you, could be more odd and foolish, than for the seller to tell the faults of his own wares? or what more ridiculous, than for the cryer to proclaim by the proprietor's order,* an infectious, pestilential house to be sold? and thus you see there are some doubtful cases, in which on the one hand men argue for honesty, and on the other are advocates for profit; so far as to shew, that 'tis not only *honest* to do that which is profitable, but even *dishonest* to neglect and omit it: and this is that *seeming* opposition we spoke of, which often falls out between profit and honesty. but let us now proceed to determine these cases; for we did not propose them for meer question sake, but that we might give them a fair decision. i am then of opinion, that the corn-merchant ought not to have concealed from the *rhodians,* nor this seller of his house from the purchasers of it, the several things that are mentioned in their cases. 'tis true *not to tell* a thing, *is not* properly *to conceal* it; but not to tell that, which people are concerned to know, merely for the sake of some advantage to yourself, i think *is:* and there's no body but knows what *concealing* this is, and who they are that make a custom of it: i am sure not your plain, sincere, ingenuous, honest and good sort of people; but rather your shifting, sly, cunning, deceitful, roguish, crafty, foxish, juggling kind of fellows. and must it not necessarily be unprofitable for any man, to lie under this, and a much longer catalogue, of such black and most odious names of vices?

chapter 14.

of those, who are so far from telling the faults of their wares, as that they invent lies to make them appear the better. an example of this kind. aquilius*'s definition of knavery, or* dolus malus.

and if those men are thus blameable, who keep the faults of their things secret; what shall we think of those, who add down-right lying to it? *c. canius,* a *roman* knight, one that loved to be pleasant, and a pretty good scholar, removing to *siracuse* for the sake of *retirement* and not of *employment,* “as he was used to say” gave out he had a great mind to buy some gardens, whither he might invite his friends and acquaintance, and enjoy their conversation without being interrupted. this coming abroad, there was one *pythius,* a goldsmith or banker at *siracuse,* who told him, indeed he had no gardens to sell, but such as he had were at *canius's* service, if he pleased to make use of them, as much as tho' they were his own: and withal he desired him to come next day, and take a dinner with him there. when *canius* had promised him to come accordingly, what does he do but send immediately for some fishermen, “having interest enough, by reason of his calling, with all sorts of people” and desires them the next day to fish before his gardens; giving them their instructions about what he’d have them do. *canius* came at the time appointed, and *pythius* had provided a very splendid entertainment for him: just before the garden, where he could not but take notice of it, was a company of fisher-boats; and every one of the men in particular brought the fish he had caught, and laid them down before *pythius. how now* pythius! “says *canius* to him” *what all these fish here? all these boats? o lack, sir,* “says to other” *that's no great wonder; all the fish that supply the city must be taken here: this is their common water; none of these people could ever live, if it were not for my house. canius* immediately was all on fire, and begged of *pythius* that he would sell him the place. he pretended abundance of unwillingness at first; but at length “to make short of it” was brought to a compliance. *canius* buys it, together with all that belonged to it; and being very rich, and desirous of the purchase, gives as much for it as *pythius* demanded. security's given and taken for the money, and the whole bargain finally brought to a conclusion. the next day *canius* invites some acquaintance thither, and he comes himself somewhat earlier than ordinary; but sees not one of the fishermen’s boats there. hereupon he enquires of one of the next neighbours, whether or no that were any holiday with the fishermen; because he saw none of them thereabouts. not that i know of, replies the other; but they none of them ever use to fish here, and therefore i wondered what the matter was yesterday. this put *canius* into a lamentable fret; but how could he remedy himself? for *aquillius,* my colleague and familiar friend, had not then published his court-forms about knavery; upon which when he was asked what he meant by the word *knavery,* he answered, *the making shew of one thing, while one's doing another:* a very perspicuous and plain definition as indeed he was a man very happy at defining. *pythius* then, and all others whatever, that make shew of one thing, and yet do the contrary, are perfidious, wicked and knavish rascals. 'tis impossible therefore that any of their actions should ever be profitable, when they're under the scandal of such a number of filthy and detestable vices.

chapter 15.

all hypocrisy and dissimulation to be taken away. knavery, or dolus malus *punished by the* roman *laws; and judgments of equity. a remarkable action of* scaevola*'s.* he is not a wise man, who is not wise for his own advantage; *in what sence true. a truly good man is not content with being as just, as the laws require. a definition of such a one. he's very hard to be found.*

if then this definition of *aquillius* be good, all hypocrisy and dissimulation must be banished from amongst men; so that no honest man will be guilty of either of them, for the sake of buying or selling to his greater advantage. nay this *knavery* or *cozenage* has always been punished by the laws of the city: witness the xii tables about the case of guardianship; and *laetorius*'s law about the over-reaching of *minors.* nay where there was nothing of a law against it, 'twas nevertheless punishable in those judgments of equity, the form of which was, *ex fide bona agitur, that all things be done faithfully and honestly.* and the same sort of words are in all other judgments; as when a wife, for example, enters an action for her dowry, upon a divorce from her husband, *melius aequius, that things be settled better and more equitably:* when anything had been mortgaged and pawned to another, *ut inter bonos bene agier, that among honest men there be nothing done, but only that which is honest.* and could there possibly be any knavery allowed of in that, where the very court-form was, *melius aequius, for the better and more equitable settling of things?* or anything done through' deceit and roguery, where these words are publicly read in court, *inter bonos bene agier, that amongst honest men there may be nothing done, except that which is honest?* now there's something of this knavery, as *aquillus* says, in all false shews and hypocritical pretences: lying therefore should wholly be banished from all sorts of business, and commerce in the world: nor should sellers bring people to bid high for their goods, and enhance their prizes; nor purchasers others to bid under-value, and so beat them down lower: but each of them, if they come to speak about a bargain, should say at a word what he'll give and take. *quintus scaevola,* the son of *publius,* going to buy an estate, desired the owner to tell him at one word, what 'twas he must have for it: the seller did so; and *scaevola* told him, he thought 'twas worth more than what he had demanded for it; and accordingly gave him a thousand crowns over. now there's no one but will grant this was done like an *honest,* but they will not allow 'twas like a *prudent* man; any more, than if he had sold a thing for less, than he might have had for it. here now, you may see, is that pernicious opinion, thus to make a distinction between *prudence* and *honesty. ennius* has a saying to this purpose, *that he would not give a farthing for a prudent man, that could not be prudent for his own advantage;* to which i am ready to set my hand; if he and i can agree upon one and the same meaning of the word *advantage.* i find that *hecaton,* a *rhodian* philosopher, and scholar of *panaetius,* in his book about *offices,* which he wrote to *q. tubero,* hath laid this down as a wise man's duty, first to conform to the laws, and customs, and practises of his country; and, when he hath done that, to make the best improvement he can of his estate: since we ought to seek riches not only for ourselves, but our children, friends, relations and especially the commonwealth; whose public riches must principally consist in the wealth and stock of its particular members. this man can by no means approve of that action, which i just now mentioned of *quintus scaevola;* and there's nothing, he tells us, that heed scruple to do for his own advantage, if it be but permitted and allowed off by the law; for which i think he does not much deserve to be thanked or commended. if then to make pretence of that which never was, and cunningly to dissemble the real truth, be pieces of knavery; there are but very few actions that are altogether free from it: and if he alone be an honest man, *who does all the good he can, and does no injury to anybody;* 'twill be no easy matter to find one in the world. the result of what has been said is this, to be knavish and wicked can never be profitable, because 'tis attended with baseness and dishonour; and it *always* must be profitable to be virtuous and good, because it *always* is honest and creditable.

chapter 16.

the care taken by the romans, *to make the seller tell the faults of the thing to be sold. an example or two of cases of this nature.*

in the matter of buying and selling estates, 'tis provided amongst us by the civil constitutions, that he who's the seller should tell all the faults, that he knows of, to the purchaser. for the 12 tables ordering no more than this, that the seller should be bound to make good those faults, which were expressly mentioned by word of mouth in the bargain; and which whoever denied was to pay double damages: the lawyers have appointed a punishment for those, who themselves don't discover the defects of what they sell. for they so decreed, *that if the seller of an estate, when he made the bargain, did not tell all the faults in particular, that he knew of it; he should afterwards be bound to make them good to the purchaser. titus claudius centumalus* "to give an example" had a house that stood upon the *coelian* hill, and hindered the augurs as they made their observations from the *capitoline* mount: who therefore gave him orders to pull that down, which was such an hindrance to their business. instead of this *claudius* puts a bill over the door, *that the house was to be sold;* and quickly put it off, *p. calpurnius lanarius* being the man that bought it. the augurs in a short time sent him the same orders, and he accordingly took care to perform them. but afterwards coming to understand, that *claudius* had not set the house to sale, till after he had been ordered by the augurs to demolish it; he brought in against him an action at law, *to receive such satisfaction, as in conscience and equity he was bound to make him. marcus cato,* the father of him that is now living “for as others are distinguished by the names of their fathers, so he that begot this incomparable person should be named from his son” sat as judge in the case; and gave this sentence upon the whole matter, that since *claudius* knew this inconvenience before-hand, and did not discover it when he sold the estate, he was obliged in equity to make it good to the purchaser. he judged it therefore to be a part of honesty, that the seller should fairly declare to the buyer, all the faults which he knows in the thing to be sold. if then this judgment were just and equitable, neither the merchant that brought the corn, nor the supposed seller of the infectious house did well in concealing what either of them knew. but all the particular sorts of concealing could never be taken notice of by the laws of the city; however such as could were very carefully provided against. *m. marius gratidianus,* a kinsman of mine, had sold an house to *sergius orata,* which he had bought of the same not many years before. the house, it seems, paid a duty to *sergius,* which *marius* never once mentioned in the bargain. the business came at last to a suit in law, where *lucius crassus* took part with *orata,* and *anthony* with *gratidianus. crassus* insisted very much upon the law, which says, that the seller shall make good those faults, which he himself knew of, and yet concealed them from the buyer: *anthony* on the other side argued for equity, that *sergius* could not but know that incumbrance, who had sold the house himself but a little while before; and therefore what need was there of telling him of it? that he could not complain of being any ways tricked upon, since he knew very well the condition of what he bought. i have brought you these instances only to let you see, that these cunning sort of men were never approved of by our ancestors.

chapter 17.

the different methods used by law and philosophy, for the rooting out of knavery. treachery to set up traps, tho' one don't drive the beasts into them. how the law of nature differs from the civil. the excellence of the roman *civil laws. the extent of that expression,* ex fide bona. *knavish cunning very different from true prudence. how the laws provide against fraud in selling of slaves. nature forbids one man to make his gain of another's ignorance. the ill effects of false prudence.*

but the laws take one way to root these frauds out, and philosophers another; the *former* meddling no further with them, than as they break out into open acts, and may “as 'twere” be laid hold on by the hands of justice: the latter endeavouring to hinder their breaking out, and to prevent them by precepts of wisdom and reason. reason therefore requires of us, that we do nothing treacherously, nothing deceitfully, nothing merely by outward shews and false pretences. now is it not treachery to set up a trap, tho' one does not raise and pursue the beasts into it; for the simple creatures of themselves will run into it, without being driven? just so you offer an house to be sold, because of some faults which you know to be in it; and put up your bill, as it were like a trap, in which some unwary sort of body will be taken. i know *that,* at present, the depravation of manners, and prevalence of evil custom, have made this be counted neither base nor dishonourable; and *that* 'tis tolerated by the laws and constitutions of the *publick,* but i am sure 'tis not tolerated by the laws of nature. for 'tis to be considered “i must repeat it again, tho' i have already mentioned it a great many times” that there is such a thing as natural society, which comprehends all men, and ties and unites them to one another: there's a nearer between those of the same nation; and a nearer yet, between those of the same city. therefore our fore-fathers made a distinction, between that law which is common to nations, and that which belongs to each city in particular. whatever we are bound, *by the civil constitutions,* to do to our citizens; we are not obliged, *by the law of nations,* to do the same to strangers: but whatever we are bound by this *latter* to do to others, the same we ought to do to our citizens also: but the law, which at present we use amongst us, is far from being an original piece, immediately taken from genuine right and true perfect justice; 'tis only a copy and faint representation of it. however i could wish we lived up even to this; for 'tis copied at least from some of the best originals, which were drawn from the truth and nature of the thing. for how excellent is that form in judicial proceedings, *uti ne,* &c. *that i mayn't be defrauded or brought to an inconvenience, by trusting to you, and your honesty!* and how incomparable that other, *that honest men do nothing, but that which is honest and without design.* but the great question is, who they are *that are honest men;* and what 'tis *to do nothing, but that which is honest! q. scaevola,* i remember, the high-priest, was used to say, *that* all those judgments which had *ex fide bona, faithfully and honestly,* put into their forms, were of marvellous force; and *that faithfully and honestly* were of very large extent, and belonged not only to *wardships, societies, trusts* and *commissions,* but to *buying's, sollings, lettings* and *hirings,* which relate to the society and entercourse of mankind; and *that* 'twas the part of an extraordinary judge, to determine exactly, all these cases, what one man ought to make good to another, upon only the bare principles of *conscience and honesty;* especially seeing men differ in their judgments about the greatest part of them. all craft therefore should utterly be banished, and that *knavish* sort of *cunning,* which would fain indeed be *counted,* but is the farthest *from prudence,* of anything in the world: for prudence consists in the making a right distinction between good and evil, but this kind of cunning gives the preference to evil; if, at least, it be true “as most certainly 'tis” that everything is evil, which is contrary to honesty. neither is it only in *farms* and *houses,* that the laws of the city, which are copied from nature, take care to have cheating and knavery punished; but in slaves they exclude all fraud in the seller: for he that's presumed to know what the slave was, if he does not declare whether he be healthy, a runagate, or apt to steal, is answerable to the buyer, by an order of the aediles: but this does not hold in the case of an heir. from what has been said, it apparently follows, since nature is the fountain from whence law is derived, that 'tis agreeable to the dictates and rules of nature, that no one should endeavour to make his own advantage from the ignorance of another. and indeed there is no greater mischief in the world, than this wisdom, *falsely* so named, joyned with baseness and knavery. from this have arisen innumerable cases, wherein profit is set up in opposition to honesty: for where almost is there a man to be found, that would scruple to injure and wrong any other, if he could do it with secrecy, and without fear of being punished?

chapter 18.

an example of a wickedness committed, when there was no fear of punishment. 'tis a wickedness to be a receiver of ill-gotten goods, tho' you have no hand in the getting them. 'tis dishonest to get estates by servile flattery. separating profit from honesty the cause of all mischiefs.

let us try, if you please, by some examples of that nature, wherein the common sort of people, perhaps, think there is no crime: for we don't speak here of such as cut throats, poison, *make* false wills, rob or embezzle the public treasures; who aren't to be repressed with nothing but words and philosophical discourses, but must be vexed and wearied out with chains and imprisonment: but let us consider here what is done by those, who pass in the world for men of honesty and integrity. a will that was forged, of one *minutius basilus,* a wealthy person, was brought by some people out of *greece* into *italy;* who, to make it the more easily pass for good, made *marcus crassus* and *lucius hortensius,* the two greatest men at that time in the city, joint-heirs with themselves: who, tho' they suspected the whole to be a forgery, yet having nothing of hand in it themselves, they made little scruple of getting an advantage by other peoples villainy. and what then? was that sufficient to excuse them from fault, *that they themselves had no hand in it?* truly i am fully persuaded not; tho' i always loved one of them while he was alive, and don't hate the other since he is dead and gone. but when *basilus* had desired that *marcus satrius,* his sister's son, should bear his name, and had appointed him his heir; *“i nominate him,* says he, *lord of my sabine and picenian mannors”* was it any ways a just and reasonable thing, and not rather an eternal blot upon those times, that some principal citizens should have a man's estate, and *satrius* the heir be put off barely with his name? for if he be unjust, that don't keep off injuries from any of his neighbours, and defend and protect them as far as he's able, “as i've shewn already in the first book” what sort of man shall we take him to be, who not only does not keep off an injury, but rather on the contrary helps to promote it? nay i, for my part, am wholly of opinion, that estates which are left men by *true* wills, if gotten by knavish and servile flatteries, not by a *real,* but pretended friendship, are scandalous and dishonest. but in such kind of cases it often comes to pass, that one thing seems *profitable,* and another *honest:* undoubtedly by a mistake; for the same thing is the measure both of the one and the other; which whoever perceives not, will easily be led into all sorts of roguery. for he that begins thus to argue with himself, *that* indeed is honest, but *this* is advantagious; impudently divides, by this gross mistake, those things which by nature are coupled and united: which is the deadly root, from which all frauds, wickedness's and villainies spring.

chapter 19.

the carriage of a truly honest man, when 'tis in his power to be dishonest, so as not to be discovered. the true notion of a good man. a saying of fimbria*'s in the case of* lutatius pinthia, *to this purpose. a proverb borrowed from the country, shewing, that nothing dishonest how secret soever can be profitable.*

if a good man therefore should have such a power, as that by snapping of his fingers he could slip his name cunningly into rich peoples wills, he’d never make use of it: no, not although' he were fully assured, that no one living could either *know* or *suspect* it: but give such a power to *marcus crassus,* that by doing the same thing he should make himself heir, where he *really* was not so, and heed dance, i dare warrant you, publicly in the market-place. but he that is *honest,* and answers to our notion of a *good man,* will never take anything away from another for the enriching himself, and filling his own coffers; which whoever admires at, let him e'en confess at the same time, that he does not understand what a *good man* is. for if anyone will trolly examine his own thoughts, and clear up a little his obscure conceptions, he'll quickly be able to tell himself, that a good man is one, *who does all the good that he can to others, but never any harm; unless necessarily forced upon it for his own security.* i desire to know then; is not that man guilty of *harming* another, that outs the rightful heirs, as it were, by a spell, and procures himself to be put into their rooms? how then! “will some men say” what, would not you have people consult their own interest? yes; but withal i would have them understand, that nothing can be so, that's base or dishonest: which is a necessary maxim for all those to learn, whoever design to be good men. i remember i heard my own father tell, as long ago as when i was a boy, that *fimbria,* one who had formerly been consul, was judge in a case of *lutatius pinthia*'s, a *roman* knight, and a very honest man; who, upon pain of losing a certain sum of money, was to prove himself to be a good man. hereupon *fimbria* plainly told him, that he’d never pass judgment upon such a matter; least either, by giving the cause against him, he should spoil the credit of a well-approved citizen; or else should be forced, by giving it for him, to pronounce that anyone was *a good man:* which he could not do, considering the infinite virtues and duties, that are requisite to the completing any person of that character. this *good man* then, of whom *fimbria* had a notion, as well as *socrates,* will never judge anything profitable, that's dishonest: from whence it follows, that such a one will always be *so* far from *doing,* as *that* he will *never* so much as *think* of anything, which he's afraid should be laid open to the rest of the world. and is it not a shame that philosophers should doubt of this, when there is not e'er a peasant in the country but assents to it? for from *them* we have gotten that common saying, which is now by long usage become a proverb among us, which they bring in to signify the faithful dealing and honesty of a man, *he's one* “say they” *that you may venture to play with at even and odd in the dark.* the meaning of which, what can it be but this, that nothing can be profitable, which is not honest and becoming, tho' a man could be certain of being never found out in it? you see then according to this proverb, that neither that *gyges,* whom we mentioned above; nor that other, whom we just now supposed to have a power, by the snapping of his fingers to become all peoples heir, can by any means be excused. for as that, which is scandalous and dishonest in itself, however it may be hid from the eye of the world, can never be brought to be honest and creditable; so also *that,* which is not honest and creditable, can never be brought to be profitable and advantagious; the very nature of the things resisting and opposing it.

chapter 20.

great rewards are very apt to make men forgetful of honesty. examples concerning this. an excellent rule for our direction in this case. a man loses more by doing an unjust action, than ever he can gain by it, be the reward what it will.

but when people expect great advantages from their roguery, 'tis a mighty temptation for them to be guilty of it. thus, for instance, when *marius* was far from any hopes of obtaining the consulship, and had lain seven years from the time of his being praetor, so that no one suspected his standing for that honour; being dispatched to *rome* by q. *metellus,* whose lieutenant he was, an extraordinary man, and a brave member of the republic; he accused his general to the people of *rome* for protracting the war; and told them, *that if they would but choose him consul, they should soon have* jugurtha, *either dead or alive, delivered into their power.* 'tis true by this artifice he got to be chosen consul, but he paid for it the price of his honesty and fidelity; who could thus bring an useful and excellent citizen, whose lieutenant he was, and by whom he was sent, into hatred and ill-will by false accusations? nor did my kinsman *gratidianus* act the part of an honest and fair-dealing man, in the time of his praetorship: the tribunes of the people held a common consultation with the company of praetors, about settling the value and rate of money; which at those times was grown to be so very unconstant, as that nobody could be certain how much he was worth. they made an edict by common consent, allowing an action against those who transgressed it, and appointing a penalty for those who were convicted. this being ordered, they agreed to meet again in the assembly after noon, and all of them together tell the people what they had done. the meeting broke up, and the rest all departed some one way, and some another: *marius* only directly from the court went down to the assembly, and by himself alone declared that to the people, which all of them had agreed upon by general consent. if you ask now what was the event of this; nothing in the world could have got him greater honour; statues erected for him about the streets; frankincense and tapers burnt at every one of them; and, in short, never was any man more adored by the multitude. these are the things, which do sometimes mislead men in deliberating about their duty; when the offence against honesty seems very trivial, but the advantage that's gained by it very considerable. thus *marius* thought it but a little piece of knavery, to steal the peoples love from the tribunes and his colleagues; but a mighty advantage to be made consul by it, which was what he at that time proposed to himself. but in all these cases there's only one rule, which i desire you’d constantly take along with you: *be sure in the first place, that what you count profitable be no way dishonest; and if it be dishonest, then assure yourself that 'tis not truly profitable.* and can we then esteem either the one or the other of these *mariuses* good men? consider a little and examine your own thoughts, that you may see what idea, what notion or conception you have of a good man. is it reconcilable then with the character of such a one, to lie for the sake of his own advantage; to deceive, to raise false reports and misrepresentations of others; to seize that before-hand, which others have a right to as well as himself? certainly nothing less. and is there anything then of such excellent worth? any profit or interest so very desirable, for the gaining of which one would forfeit the glory and reputation of a *good man?* can that, which we call by the name of profitable, bring us anything so good as what it takes away from us, if it spoil our being counted men of honesty and integrity? if it occasion the loss of our justice and faithfulness; that is, in plain truth, if it change us into brutes? for where's the great difference between altering our shapes and becoming real beasts; and carrying the nature and fierceness of beasts, tho' under the outsides and figures of men?

chapter 21.

to do anything dishonest for the sake of power and authority, *not profitable. a most detestable maxim of* caesar*'s. not profitable to make himself king in a free city. the unhappiness of a tyrant's life.*

again, those who contemn all justice and honesty for the sake of power, don't they do the same thing that a certain man did, when he chose to be son-in-law to none but one, by whose daring boldness he might encrease his own authority? he thought it a very great advantage no question, to enlarge his own greatness, by drawing hatred upon another; but he never considered how great a disservice he did to his country, and how much scandal and discredit he brought upon himself. as for the father, he had always a couple of *greek* verses in his mouth, taken out of *euripides*'s tragedy of *phaenissae;* which i'll endeavour to translate as well as i am able, perhaps it may be awkwardly, but however so as to make their sence appear,

if ever we may break the ties of right, 'tis when a kingdom is the glorious prize: in other things be strictly just—

'twas a villainous thing in *eteocles,* or rather in *euripides* indeed, to exempt that one breach of right from being criminal, which is certainly of all others the most wicked and detestable. why do we stop then at examples of lesser rogueries, such as making one's self heir by cunning and spells; cheats about buying, selling, *&c?* here's a man for you, that has made no scruple of desiring to make himself king of the *roman* people, and lord and governor of the whole earth; nay, and which is worse, hath accomplished his desire. if any man call this an honest ambition, he must be out of his wits; for he justifies the subversion of our laws and liberties, and counts the most base and detestable oppression of them, a virtuous, laudable and glorious action: but if any man, confessing that 'tis not honest, to get the dominion in that republic, which *has been* and *ought to be* always free, will yet say, 'tis profitable for him that can do it; what reproofs shall i use, or what reproaches rather, to recal such a one from so dangerous an error? good gods! can it be supposed then ever to be any man's interest, by the heinousness and most unnatural wickedness upon earth, to ruin and destroy his own native country; tho' perhaps the man, who is guilty of it, may afterwards be stilled by his poor oppressed citizens, *the father of it? interest* therefore should always be measured by *justice* and *honesty,* so that these two words, tho' of different sounds, should yet be understood to mean one and the same thing. i know the common people are apt to imagine, that nothing in the world can be better than to govern; but when i consider the real truth and reason of the thing itself, i find on the contrary that nothing can be worse, when people arrive at it by unlawful means. can it possibly be profitable for any man then, to live in perpetual cares and anxieties? to be day and night racked and tormented with fears, in a life full of nothing but treacheries and dangers? *many are treacherous and unfaithful to kings,* says *accius, and but few are faithful.* but of what sort of kings did he speak this? was it not of those, who by lawful succession had received the royal scepter from *tantalus* and *pelops?* how many more then must we supposed to be unfaithful to that king, who with an army of *romans* had oppressed and enslaved the *roman* people itself? and had forced that city, which was not only free, but even empress of the whole world, to submit her neck to his tyrannical yoke? what uneasiness of mind must such a one, think you, be continually under? what wounds and twitches of conscience must he needs feel? how, in short, can that life be an advantage to any man, which has this inconvenience inseparably annexed to it, that whoever is so happy as to take it away, will obtain the greatest glory and good-will from all the world? and if these things, which seem *most of all* to be profitable, yet are found to be the contrary when unworthy and dishonest; this certainly ought to convince us all, *that nothing can be profitable, which is not honest.*

chapter 22.

a brave example of the romans *preferring justice before a seeming profit. glory can never be gotten by wickedness. riches unprofitable, if accompanied with infamy. example of injustice in the* romans. *how an empire ought to be supported.* cato *too severe in exacting the tributes. an unjust saying of* curio*'s.*

but this has been determined, as at many other times by our wise fore-fathers, so particularly by *fabricius,* then a second time consul, and the whole *roman* senate, in the war with *pyrrhus.* for when *pyrrhus* had voluntarily made war upon the *romans,* and the contention was held about empire and mastery, with a no less powerful than generous adversary; a deserter came secretly into *fabricius*'s camp, and offered, upon condition he might be well rewarded, to return back again with the same secrecy that he came, and to poison *pyrrhus.* but instead of encouragement, *fabricius* ordered him to be sent back to *pyrrhus,* and was afterwards commended by the senate for so doing. if we look no further now than the outward appearance of what seems to be profitable, here's a dangerous war, and a powerful adversary of the growing empire, might soon have been removed by the single assistance of this one deserter: but then it would have been an eternal scandal, not to mention the villainy and wickedness of it, in an honourable war, which was managed with a fair and generous enemy, not to get the victory by virtue and courage, but only by base and treacherous practises. whether was more profitable then for *fabricius,* who was such in this city as *aristides* was at *athens;* or for the *roman* senate, which never thought anything dishonourable their interest; to contend with an enemy by valour or by poison? if empire be desirable for the sake of glory, why is not wickedness altogether banished, in which 'tis impossible there should ever be any glory? but if we're for riches at any rate, weed do well to consider, that they can never be profitable when accompanied with infamy. that counsel therefore of *lucius philippus,* the son of *quintus,* was far from being profitable, *that those very cities, which* sylla *had freed for a set sum of money by the senate's order, should again be brought under their former contributions; and yet not the money, which they had paid, be returned them.* this advice of his was followed by the senate, to the great disparagement and shame of the empire; for even pirates at this rate will sooner be trusted, than the *roman* senate. well, but the public revenues were increased by it, and *therefore* 'twas profitable: heavens! how long will men dare to call anything profitable, which is not honest! can hatred then and infamy be profitable to a state, which ought to be supported by glory, and credit, and the love of its confederates! in this particular i often disagreed from my old friend *cato;* whom i always thought to be somewhat too head-strong, in standing up for the interest of the publick treasury; and exacting the tributes with so much rigour, as not to make any allowances to the farmers, and very seldom or never grant anything to the confederates: whereas we ought always to be kind to the latter, and to deal with the former, as we would do with our own bailiffs; and that so much the more, because all the safety and welfare of the republic depends upon the agreement of the several orders in it. nor less ill than *philip*'s, was the counsel of *curio;* who, in the case of the people inhabiting beyond the *po,* tho' he confessed their demands were but just and reasonable, yet always added, *vincat utilitas; everything must give way to the interest of the publick.* he should rather have said that they were not just, because not comporting with the publick interest; than thus have declared that they did not comport with it, and at the same time confess them to be just and reasonable.

chapter 23.

several cases put by hecaton *the* rhodian. diogenes *and* antipater *oppose one another. whether bad money received for good should be put off?*

hecaton proposeth, in his sixth book of offices, several questions such as these which follow: whether a good man, in time of great scarcity, may refuse to give victuals to the servants of his own family? he discourses indeed upon either side the question, but at last concludes, that he should rather be guided by his interest, than humanity. he demands again, if a merchant in a storm be forced to throw his goods over-board, whether of the two should he choose to cast away, a very valuable horse, or a servant that's good for nothing? here interest, and the saving of his goods draws one way, and compassion of human nature another. should a *fool* in a shipwreck have gotten a plank, may a *wise* man take it away from him if he can? he answers, no; because it would be plainly a piece of injustice: but what if the owner of the ship should come? may not he take it away when it properly belongs to him? no, not at all; no more than he may throw a man out of the ship, under the pretence that the ship belongs to him: for till they are arrived whither the ship was hired for, it does not more properly belong to the owner, than it does to the passengers by whom it was hired. suppose two men, that are equally wise, should both of them in a shipwreck lay hold of the same plank; may either of them seize upon it forcibly to himself, or should one of them voluntarily yield it to the other? let one yield to the other; provided *that* other will be more serviceable to the publick, or there is more depending upon his life and preservation. but what if *these* are equal in either of them? why then there's no more to be said about it, but it must e'en be let alone for chance to determine, as tho' they should cast lots, or play at even and odd for it. what if a father should rifle temples, and dig passages under-ground into the treasury? should the son discover him to the publick magistrate? no; that were an horrid unnatural impiety: he should rather on the contrary defend his father, if anyone else should pretend to accuse him. but what! ought not the interest of my country to be consulted, before that of anyone else whatsoever? yes undeniably; but then it is very much the interest of your country, to have citizens that are dutiful and obedient to their parents. but if a father should attempt to make himself king, or any ways endeavour to betray his country; should a son in such a case hold his tongue and conceal it? in the first place, let him *beg* of his father to desist: if that does no good, let him proceed to rebuke and even to threaten him about it: but if at last he perceive that it *directly* tends to the ruin of his country, he should prefer *its* safety before that of his father. another of the questions he proposes is this, suppose a good man to receive, by an oversight, bad money for good, and afterwards come to understand that 'tis bad; may he pay it for good, if he owes another anything? *diogenes* thinks he may, but *antipater* not; whom i rather assent to. suppose a man be a selling a vessel of wine, which he knows won't keep; is he bound to tell of this? *diogenes* thinks he's under no such obligation; *antipater* will have it to be every honest man's duty. these are the things, which whether they are right and one's duty or not, is often controverted amongst the *stoicks.* in selling a slave is one bound to declare what his faults are or not? i don't mean those, which unless they are told, the law itself commands he shall be returned upon our hands; but his being a liar, a filcher, a player at dice, or a drunkard. one's of opinion we ought to declare them, and the other not. should an ignorant body sell a quantity of gold, and suppose it to be copper; is a good man obliged now to tell him that 'tis gold; or may he buy for a penny what is worth a thousand pence? 'tis plain enough by this time what my thoughts are, and wherein consists the controversy between the forementioned philosophers.

chapter 24.

whether a man's obliged to perform all his promises, or not; tho' at the expence of his life or reputation. some examples upon it.

are we bound to perform all those promises and bargains, which “in the praetor's language” have neither force nor fraud in them? here's a man, for example, that has gotten the dropsy, and another prescribes him an infallible cure for it, upon condition that he'll never make use of it again. the man recovers by its help at present, but falls again, sometime after, into the same distemper. suppose now that he, to whom he made such promise, will by no means allow him to use the cure again; what would be his duty in such a case! why, since he, who denies him the request, is inhuman, and 'tis a thing that will do him no manner of prejudice, 'tis the best way to take care of his life and safety. a good and wise man is desired by one, who appoints him his heir, and leaves him by will a considerable estate, that before he enters upon the possession of it, he should dance at noon-day in the open streets; and this he accordingly promises to do, because otherwise the testator would not make him his heir: would you have him perform now what he promised, or not? i could wish that he never had promised it at all, which i think would much better have suited with his character: but since he *has* done it, if he think it dishonourable to dance so in public, the best way will be not to stand to such a promise, provided he takes none of the money that was left him. unless the money may be turned to some very great benefit and advantage of the publick; so that 'twould be no disgrace for a man even to dance, when it brings so much good to his country along with it.

chapter 25.

several other cases, wherein a man is not obliged to perform his promises and vows; nor to give up a trust. the method he designs to take in the following part of the work.

neither is one bound to perform those promises, which are hurtful and prejudicial to the persons they were made to. thus father *phoebus* " that we may return to our fables" promised to grant *phaethon* whatsoever he should desire; and the mad young fellow desired to get up into his father's chariot. 'twas accordingly granted him; but before he could get to be well settled in it, he was struck down with lightning. how abundantly better had it been, in such a case, if the father had refused to perform such a promise? the same may be said of another, which *theseus* obtained of *neptune:* this god had promised to do any three things for him, whatever he should request: and he requested the death of his own son *hippolytus,* upon a false suspicion, that he had been naught with his mother-in-law. he obtained what he asked; which occasioned him very much sorrow and affliction. again, *agamemnon* had vowed, for a sacrifice to *diana,* the most beautiful thing that was born that year in his whole dominions. to be as good as his word, he was forced to offer his daughter *iphigenia,* than whom nothing that year had been born more beautiful. had not it been better to have broke his promise, than have done such an horrid and unnatural action? in some cases then a man is not obliged to perform his promises: no more is he to restore what was given him in trust. suppose, for the purpose, a man in his wits had entrusted you with his sword, and should demand it of you again when he's beside himself; your duty would be not to give it him again, and if you did, you'd be guilty of a very great error. again, should a man put a large sum of money in your hands, and afterwards raise a rebellion against his country; would you deliver up your trust, if demanded it by him? certainly no; for this would be to act against the publick interest, which ought to be preferred before everything else. thus a great manything s, which are honest of themselves, we may see cease to be so when the circumstances alter: to perform a promise, for instance, to stand to an agreement, or deliver up a trust, ought not to be done when they become unprofitable. this may suffice to have been said of those things, which a pretended wisdom would fain count profitable, tho' contrary to justice. but having laid down four general heads *in the first book,* from which all offices or duties are derived, i shall discourse upon each of the same *in this;* and make out, that what's contrary to any of those virtues, is only in shew, and not really profitable. of *prudence* then, which a knavish sort of cunning endeavours to imitate; as also of *justice,* which is never but profitable, we have discoursed already. it remains that we speak of the other two general heads of duty; the one of which consists in the greatness and excellency of a courageous soul; and the other in such a regularity of our actions, as is conformable to the precepts of temperance and moderation.

chapter 26.

that nothing can be profitable, which is contrary to the virtue of fortitude, shewn from the examples of ulysses *and* regulus.

ulysses thought 'twould be profitable for him, “if what the tragedians tell us be true; for *homer,* a writer of the greatest authority, never once insinuates any such thing" but the writers of tragedy accuse *ulysses,* for feigning to be mad that he might avoid the war; a design that was by no means honest and creditable: *well, but 'twas profitable* "will someone say" *to stay and govern at his own home, and enjoy himself quietly in his island* ithaca, *together with his parents, his wife and son. is there any such credit in the daily dangers and fatigues of war, that you can ever think comparable with living such a life of tranquillity and security?* yes; i wholly despise and contemn your *security,* being fully persuaded that it can never be profitable, so long as 'tis dishonest. pray what would they have said, do you think, of *ulysses,* suppose he had continued in his pretended madness? when after his glorious achievements in the war, he had yet these reproaches thrown upon him by *ajax,*

tho', you all know, he *first proposed this oath, yet* he*'s the only man that would have broke it.*

he *first endeavoured not to join in thy war, faint-hearted coward! feigning to be mad. and had not prudent* palamede *found out, by cunning, this his impudent deceit; the villain, notwithstanding all the ties of sacred oaths, had certainly gone off.*

'twas much better for him to bear all the hazards, not of the war only, but of the sea too, “as at last he did" than not to make one among the rest of the *grecians,* then resolving, by consent, upon a war with the *barbarians.* but to remove the scene from foreign countries, and fabulous relations, that we may come nearer home, and to a thing that really happened: *m. atilius regulus,* then a second time consul, was surprized in *africa* by *xanthippus* the *lacedaemonian,* and made a prisoner, “*amilcar,* father of *hannibal* being general of the *carthaginians"* and was sent by the *carthaginians* to the *roman* senate, upon solemn oath given, that, unless some remarkable prisoners were restored them, he should himself return back again to *carthage.* now as soon as this man arrived at *rome,* he could not but perceive what *appeared to* be his interest, but withal was persuaded “as the event declared" that it *only appeared so.* the case was thus: here he might have stayed in his native country, and have lived at home quietly with his wife and children; might have judged his misfortune, received in the war, no more than what all men in that state are liable to; and might still have continued in his old degree of honour among those of consular dignity. *and who can deny now,* “will anyone say" *that all these things are expedient and profitable?* who do you think? why *greatness of soul,* and true *courage* deny it. can you desire any greater and more illustrious authorities?

chapter 27.

what courage and greatness of soul teach us. a continuation of the story of regulus.

these are the virtues, by which we are taught to be afraid of nothing, to despise all the outward concerns of life, and count nothing intolerable that can possibly befall a man. *well, but pray what did this* regulus *do then?* he came into the senate, and told them what 'twas he was sent about, and refused to give his own vote in the case, forasmuch as he was not to be counted a senator, as being by oath under the enemy's power. and in his speech, which he spoke to the senate upon that subject, *"fool that he was,* some will be ready to say, *and an enemy to his own interest!"* he told them, *'twas best not to give up their prisoners; that they were young men, and might make able leaders; but that he, for his part, was grown almost useless, and worn away with old age.* the senate were so far persuaded by his speech, that they resolved the prisoners should be detained in custody, and he himself returned back again to *carthage;* not all the love which he had for his country, his friends and relations, being able to detain him. and tho' he knew well enough what a barbarous enemy, and what exquisite torments he was going to return to; yet he thought it his duty, whatever came of it, not to violate his oath. i think he was in a better condition therefore, even whilst he was murdered by being kept from sleeping, than here he could have been, had he stayed at home, and lived under the scandal of being an old captive and a perjured nobleman. *but was not it very great* folly *and* madness, *if he would not persuade the releasing of the prisoners, yet to go and dissuade it as much as he could?* pray how *folly* and *madness?* what, tho' 'twere conducive to the good of the republic? or can anything be profitable to a private citizen, which brings a disadvantage to the commonwealth in general?

chapter 28.

to separate profit from honesty, is to pervert the first principle of nature. all men naturally desirous of profit. the reasons given by those, who think regulus *did ill in returning.*

those men, who separate profit from honesty, wholly pervert the first principles of nature: for we all of us naturally desire our interest, toward which we are carried with so strong a bias, as that 'tis not in our power to turn the other way. for who is averse from? or rather, who does not most eagerly follow his own advantage? but since we can find out no real advantage, except in what's honest, becoming and commendable, therefore we count these the principal things; and take the word profit to signify something, which only relates to our outward necessities, and the supplying of them; without all that glorious and shining excellence, which appears in the actions of virtue and honesty. *but after all is done,* perhaps some men will say, *pray what is there in an oath, that he should be afraid thus to break it?* what! was it *jupiter*'s anger that he dreaded? but this is agreed on by all philosophers; not only those, who maintain that the gods lead an idle life, neither busying themselves, nor disturbing others; but those who affirm they are always busie, and always doing something that relates to the world: in this thing, *i say,* they are all agreed, that the deity neither hurts, nor is angry with anyone. but supposing the worst, pray what hurt could *jupiter*'s vengeance have done *regulus,* greater than what *regulus* did to himself? it could not be anything of religion therefore, that hindered him from following what appeared to be his interest. again, was he afraid of the baseness and dishonesty of the action? *as to that* in the first place, always of two evils choose the least: and where was any evil in the baseness of the thing, so great as was that of the torments which he endured? beside,

pray remember that sentence of *accius,* which however it might be said by an impious king, is yet generally acknowledged to be very well said, who when one told him, *you have broken your oath to me:* answered, *i neither am, nor have been tied by oath to any treacherous deceiver.* again they tell us, that as *we* affirm some things *seem* profitable, which *are not so;* so *they* affirm some things *seem* honest, which *are not so:* as this, for example, of returning to be tormented, rather than break one's oath; which *is not* honest, tho' it may *seem to be* so; because no man's obliged to perform that oath, which was extorted from him by the force of his enemies. and *lastly* they argue, that whatever makes very much for one's profit and advantage, thereby becomes honest, tho' before it did not seem so. this is what is generally brought against *regulus;* but let us see and examine all the parts of it in order.

chapter 29.

he answers the first part of the arguments brought against regulus. *the sacredness of an oath. the divinity of* faith. *pain none, or at least not the greatest evil. dishonesty the greatest, if not only evil. faith to be kept even with those who are treacherous. oaths made to enemies should be kept. not so those made to pirates, and why. what 'tis to forswear one's self. the form of oaths among the* romans. *laws of war to be kept inviolable.*

first then they say, *he could fear no harm from the anger of* jupiter, *who neither can be angry, nor do harm to anybody.* this proves as strongly against all oaths in general, as it does in particular against this of *regulus.* but the thing to be considered in peoples taking of oaths, is not what danger they are in, should they break them; but what a sacred and powerful obligation is laid upon them. for every oath is a religious affirmation; and whatever is promised after such a manner, as it were calling god for a witness to your words, ought certainly to be performed. for now *faith* and *justice* require it of us, and not any fear of that anger of the gods, which is not incident to their divine natures. that *faith* i mean, of which *ennius* has got these incomparable words:

o faith all-glorious and divine! in lofty temples fit to shine;

even jove *himself by thee doth swear!*

whosoever therefore doth not perform his oath, affronts the deity of that divine faith, which was “as *cato* in his speech informs us” set up by our fathers in the capitol itself, even next to the statue of the great god *jupiter.* but, secondly, they tell us, *supposing* jupiter *had been angry with* regulus, *he could not have brought any evil upon him, greater than what* regulus *brought upon himself.* this, i confess, would be very true, if there was no other evil but only pain: but *that* is so far from being the greatest evil, that, if we may credit some of the chief philosophers, it is not so much as any evil at all: among whom, i pray you, let *regulus* be counted of *no small* authority; if i may not rather say of the *greatest and most weighty:* for what greater testimony can anyone desire, than that of a principal man among the *romans;* who rather than be wanting in any point of his duty, chose to undergo the most exquisite torments? *but of two evils,* say they, *always choose the least:* that is, in plain words, *rather be a rogue than undergo any calamity.* can any calamity then be greater, than that of baseness and injustice? for if even the filth and deformity of the *body* be loathsome and offensive; how much more so must *that* of the *mind* needs be, when 'tis covered and polluted with shame and dishonesty? those philosophers therefore, who discourse of these things with most closeness and severity, venture boldly to affirm, *that nothing is evil but only what's dishonest:* and even those themselves, who do it more loosely, yet always acknowledge, *that 'tis the greatest however of all evils.* that saying of the poet's indeed is good, *i neither am, nor have been tied by oath to a treacherous deceiver;* but 'tis therefore so, because when *atreus* was brought upon the stage, he was to make him speak that, which was suitable to his character. but if once they begin to lay down this for a maxim, *that faith, when given to those who are trearous, is not to be kept;* they had best have a care, that this be not made a refuge and cover for perjury. *as for his oaths being made to an enemy;* even war itself has laws that belong to it; and faith, except in some very few cases, is always to be kept even with our greatest adversaries. for whatever you swear, for example, in such a manner, as that your conscience tells you it ought to be done, you are bound most inviolably to perform it: but where it is otherwise, you don't lie under any such obligation; and are not perjured, tho' you should not perform it. suppose, for the purpose, you had sworn to a pirate, that you would pay him such a sum, if heed spare your life; it would not be perjury, tho' you should not pay it him. for a pirate is by no means a lawful adversary, but rather a common pest and enemy of mankind; so that no one's obliged to keep his faith or oath with him. for to swear to a thing, and yet not perform it, is not immediately to *forswear* one's self: but then a man is properly said to be *perjured,* when he swears upon his conscience “as our form runs” to do such and such things, and yet does not do them. for that of *euripides* may be said in some cases to be very good, *my tongue indeed swore, but my conscience did not assent.* but had *regulus,* in his case, done anything contrary to the laws, and conditions, that are kept between enemies, it had been down-right perjury. for the *carthaginians,* with whom he had then to do, were a lawful

adversary, between whom and us there is all the fecial, and several other laws that are common to nations. for had it been otherwise, 'tis certain the senate would never have delivered up some eminent persons in chains to their enemies.

chapter 30.

examples of several eminent romans *given up to the enemy. answer to the rest of the arguments brought against* regulus.

but they *did* deliver both *lucius veturius* and *sp. posthumius,* in their second consulships to their enemies, the *samnites;* because, being beaten at the passage of *caudium,* and the legions being disarmed and sent away with disgrace, they had concluded a peace of their own heads, without any orders from the senate or people. *t. numicius* and *q. melius,* who were tribunes of the people at the same time, because by their authority the peace was concluded, were likewise delivered; that so we might be freed from any obligation of keeping it. and all this was done upon the proposal and advice of *posthumius* himself, who was the person delivered. the case of *mancinus,* a great many years after, was exactly the same; who having, without any orders from the senate, struck up an alliance with those of *numantia,* was the first man that spoke for that bill in the senate-house, which by *l. furius* and *sext. atilius* was carried to the people; and which they agreeing to, he was delivered to the enemy. he did more honestly than *sext. pompeius,* who being concerned in the same sort of crime, made interest to be excused from undergoing the same punishment; and by that means escaped it. this man now let the appearance of profit prevail over honesty; but in all the others mentioned, the authority of honesty easily carried it from the pretended profit. but to go on with *regulus:* another thing urged by his adversaries is this, *that he should not have performed what was forcibly put upon him.* as tho' a man of courage could be wrought upon by force, *but why,* say they, *did he go at all to the senate, being resolved to disswade the delivery of the captives?* this is to blame him for that, which particularly deserves commendation: he would not depend upon his own judgment, but pleading for that which he thought most profitable, left it to be determined by the judgment of the senate: and had not it been for his counsel in the case, the prisoners had surely been sent again to *carthage,* and he remained safe in his native country: but this he concluded would be a prejudice to the publick; and therefore esteemed it to be no more than his duty, to speak what he thought, and endure what might come of it. lastly, they add, *that whatever makes highly for one's profit and advantage, thereby becomes honest.* i answer, that it may indeed antecedently. *be* such, but can never *thereby become* such: for nothing is profitable but what is honest; and things don't *become* honest by their first being profitable, but *become* profitable by their first being honest. i conclude therefore, that of all those great and wonderful examples, which might easily be brought upon this subject, 'twill be hard to find any more illustrious and commendable, than this of *regulus.*

chapter 31.

regulus*'s returning to* carthage *a commendation of those times. the sacredness of an oath, tho' extorted by force, among the ancient* romans. *this illustrated by the example of* pomponius *and* manlius.

but the only thing that deserves our admiration, in all this glorious conduct of *regulus,* is his persuading the senate not to restore the captives. as for his returning again to *carthage,* 'tis true we admire it in our days, but at those times he could not have possibly avoided it. the age, i think, therefore should rather be commended for *that,* than the man. for there's nothing our ancestors took greater care of, than that the tie of an oath should be always held as most sacred and inviolable. this appears plainly from the xii tables; it appears from those laws which are called *sacratae;* it appears from the strict observation of leagues, by which we're obliged to keep faith even with enemies; and lastly, it appears from the punishments and penalties which have been inflicted by the censors; who in no one thing have been more severe, than in punishing those, who had transgressed their oaths. *m. pomponius,* a tribune of the people, once entered an action against *l. manlius,* the son of *aulus,* who had been dictator, for holding that office somewhat longer than he should have done. and amongst other things brought in this too against him, that he kept his son *titus,* who was afterwards *torquatus,* from conversation with the world, and had strictly charged him to live solitary in the country. as soon as the son heard his father was in trouble about this business, he's reported immediately to have set out for *rome,* and come early in the morning to *pomponius*'s house. *pomponius* was no sooner told of his coming, but he got up immediately; and thinking the youth, out of anger, had brought some complaint against his father, commanded all others to depart the room, and him alone to be brought in to him. as soon as the young man was got into the room, he drew his sword, and swore he would immediately kill *pomponius,* unless heed promise him upon oath, to meddle with his father no further. *pomponius,* out of sudden apprehension of the danger, did swear to him accordingly; and discharged his father from any more trouble; having first reported the matter to the people, and told them why he was forced to let fall his action. thus strict and conscientious were people at those times, in observing their oaths. and this *titus manlius* is that very person, who, being afterwards challenged by a mighty french man, killed him in a duel by the river *anien,* and was surnamed *torquatus* from wearing a chain, “in latin *torquis”* which he took from his neck. the same man again, in his third consulship, put to flight and defeated the *latins* near *veseris.* he was indeed a very great and extraordinary person; who as he shewed his love, in this case, to his father, so he was unnaturally cruel to his son.

chapter 32.

the severity of the romans *against the breakers of oaths. the example of ten sent by* hannibal *to the senate, upon oath of returning. fraud not sufficient to excuse a perjury. a resolute action of the senate in not redeeming eight thousand prisoners. the conclusion of this head.*

but as *regulus* did well in performing his oath; so those ten, who, after the battel at *cannae,* were by *hannibal* sent to the *roman* senate, upon oath of returning to the *carthaginian* camp, if they could not obtain an exchange of prisoners; did ill if they did not return accordingly: concerning whom writers have differed in their relations. *polybius,* an author of very good credit, informs us, ten persons of considerable quality were sent to the senate; and that nine of them honestly returned to the camp, not having been able to obtain what they went about; but the tenth stayed behind and remained at *rome.* this man, as soon as he was out of the camp, pretending he had forgot to take something along with him, went back thither again; as thinking his returning under such a colour, was a very sufficient performance of his oath. but certainly he was mistaken; for cunning's so far from excusing a perjury, that it aggravates it rather, and makes it the more criminal. this therefore was no more than a foolish piece of craftiness, impudently pretending to pass for prudence: whereupon the senate took care to order, that my crafty gentleman should be sent back in fetters again to *hannibal.* but the gloriousness action of the senate was this: *hannibal* had eight thousand of our soldiers his prisoners; not such as had either been taken in battel, or had fled from any imminent danger of their lives; but were left in the camp by *paullus* and *varro,* the then two consuls. the senate decreed that these should not be ransomed, tho' it might have been done with a small sum of money; for no other end but to let our soldiers see, that either they must resolve to conquer, or die. upon the news of which, as the same author tells us, *hannibal* presently began to be disheartened, when he saw that the senate, and people of *rome,* had so great resolution even in the midst of their misfortunes. thus, we see, honesty gets the better in the comparison, against that which has only the appearance of profit. but *acilius,* who has written an history in greek, says, more of them returned under this pretence to the camp, hoping by such a trick to get quit of their oaths; and *that* they were all of them branded with shame and dishonour by the censors. but let us now put an end to this third head; since from what has been said 'tis apparently manifest, that whatever is contrary to the virtue of *fortitude;* that is to say, whatever is done with a timorous, mean, disheartened, abject spirit, can never be really and truly profitable, because it is wicked, disgraceful and odious. and such would this action of *regulus* have been, had he either, in delivering his sence about the captives, spoke what was for his *own,* not the *publick* security; or afterwards chosen to remain at home, instead of returning to fulfil his oath.

chapter 33.

nothing contrary to temperance, &c. *can be truly profitable. who those philosophers were, that made happiness and misery consist in pleasure and pain. this opinion ruins all virtue, prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice: however these philosophers endeavour to clear themselves of this imputation; but can't get well off. pleasure opposite to honesty. the absurdity of those, who would have made happiness to consist in both these. a short recapitulation of this last book. how far pleasure may be allowed. a conclusion, by way of exhortation to his son.*

we have now finished our third head, the fourth and last remains only to be spoke to, which contains in it decency, modesty, moderation, continence and temperance. and can anything be profitable, that is opposite to a train of such excellent virtues? there hath been however a sect of philosophers, scholars of *aristippus,* who were called *cyrenaicks;* and others, who had the name of *annicerians* given them, that affirm all good to consist in pleasure, and count virtue itself *therefore* only desirable, because of some pleasure which it brings along with it. but these being now almost worn out of date, *epicurus* is mightily come into vogue, the great supporter, and, as 'twere, second founder of the same opinions. with these we must fight “as they say” with might and main, if ever we think of supporting the cause, and maintaining the interest of virtue and honesty. for if what *metrodorus* has written pass for truth, *that whatever can truly be called our profit, nay and all the welfare and happiness of life, consists in a firm constitution of body, and a well-grounded hope of its lasting continuance;* it is certain *this profit,* nay *this sovereign profit* “for such they account it” must sometimes be set in opposition to honesty. for what, in the first place, will be the office of *prudence?* only to cater and look about for pleasures?

how miserable a case is that virtue in, which is thus made a servant and pander to pleasure? but what shall be her business in this office? to taste and distinguish ingeniously betwixt pleasures? supposing this to be a pleasant business, 'tis certainly the most scandalous one that could ever have been thought on. again, can he that makes pain be the greatest evil, have ever such a virtue as *fortitude* in him, the very nature of which consists wholly in despising of pains and difficulties? i know *epicurus* upon several occasions, and this in particular, speaks very courageously as to the matter of pain; but we must not consider so much what *is* said, as what *ought to be said* by a man of his principles, who makes pleasure and pain to be the ultimate bounds of man's happiness and misery. so again, if you'd hear him about *continence* and *temperance,* he tells you abundance of extraordinary things in a great many places; but he's gravelled “as we speak” and can never be able to acquit himself handsomely. for with what face of reason can he commend *temperance,* who places his happiness in the enjoyment of pleasures? when the sensual appetite follows after pleasures, and 'tis the business of *temperance* to correct that appetite. but still they endeavour, in each of these virtues, to bring themselves off by one little shift or other: thus *prudence* is admitted, and defined to be *the skill of supplying us with pleasures, and defending us from pains:* and they make out *fortitude* as well as they can, by saying it consists in despising death and enduring torments: they do bring in a sort of *temperance* too, tho' not without a great deal of straining and difficulty; but however they make a shift, after some fashion, by saying, they count it the greatest pleasure, if they can but be exempt from pain and uneasiness. thus these three virtues stand up pretty well; but *justice,* the fourth, totters mightily with them, or rather indeed is quite fallen to the ground; with all those duties, which relate to the maintenance of human society: for what kindness, liberality, affability or friendship can there be amongst those, who desire these virtues not purely for themselves, but only in relation to their pleasure or advantage? to make short then, i shall only say, that as i have shewn before, that nothing can be profitable which is contrary to honesty; so now i do affirm, that pleasure in general is contrary to honesty. i the more blame therefore *dinomachus* and *callipho,* who thought this dispute might be brought to an issue, if they joyned both pleasure and virtue together, like a man and a beast as it were in the same yoke. for virtue can never admit of this conjunction, but abhors and disdains it; nor can ever the sovereign good and evil, which must be one single and simple thing, be made up and compounded of such different principles. but of this, which is a thing of the greatest moment, i have written at large in another work: let us now return to our present subject: what has been said in this last book, i hope, is enough to let anyone see, how 'tis his duty to determine his choice, if that which seems useful and expedient for him, should come into competition with that which is honest. but if it should be said, that even pleasure carries with it the appearance of profit; let it also be considered, that it never can be brought to an agreement with honesty: for the most that can possibly be said for pleasure, “that we mayn't seem wholly to exclude it” is, that it serves by way of sauce, to give a relish to things, but has no true profit or advantage in itself.

this is the present, dear son *mark,* that your father sends you, and in my opinion 'tis a very good one; but that must be judged of according to the use you yourself shall make of it. however entertain, among *cratippus*'s lectures, these three books, and shew them at least the civility due to strangers. had it been my fortune to have come to *athens* “which had surely been done, if i had not been recalled by the cries of my country” you might then perhaps sometimes have heard my lectures: however since now, in perusing these sheets, you'll have my voice, as it were, by proxy; pray bestow upon them as much time as you can, and i am sure *you can* as much as you please. when i hear you take a pleasure in this sort of studies, 'twill delight me to talk to you “which i hope may be speedily” face to face; or however to write to you, tho' at never so great a distance. in the meantime adieu, my dear *cicero,* and assure yourself, that *tho'* no one in the world is more dear to me than you are, *yet* you'll hereafter be much more so, if i find you take delight in such writings and instructions.

finis.